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TRADE-OFF BETWEEN PROFITABILITY AND POVERTY OUTREACH IN THE 
MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY DEPENDING ON THE INSTITUTION TYPE 
PURPOSE  OF  THE  STUDY:  The  thesis  studies  the  trade-off  between  profitability  and  
poverty outreach in the microfinance industry depending on the institution type. There are 
only  few studies  about  the  tradeoff  even  though there  is  a  lot  of  discussion  around it  in  the  
literature. The effect of the institution type (banks, non-bank financial institutions, 
cooperatives and non-governmental organizations) on that equation has not been studied 
before even though it has a large impact on both profitability and outreach. The main purpose 
is to find out whether institutions can achieve highly profitable operations at the same time 
with large poverty outreach. The study also investigates whether the effect varies between the 
different institution types.  
 
DATA: The thesis uses a large data set and multiple years’ panel data analyses of leading 
microfinance institutions. The study is conducted by using data of 795 institutions around the 
world and spanning over the years 1995-2011. I use random effects estimator with White’s 
robust standard errors and linear combination tests. In addition, I proceed with oneway 
ANOVA  tests  and  Bonferroni,  Scheffe,  and  Sidak  multiple  comparison  tests  to  study  the  
differences between institution types more closely. 
 
RESULTS: Profitability of the institution can be improved firstly by cutting the costs and 
secondly by increasing the interest rates. Banks and cooperatives are more profitable 
institution types. More commercialized and profit oriented institutions, especially banks, are 
more sensitive to changes in interest rates and cost structures. Based on my results, there is no 
clear tradeoff between profitability and poverty outreach. It is possible to achieve both 
profitability and the large poverty outreach but the results vary depending on the institution 
type. Banks and cooperatives suffer less on the trade-off between profitability and outreach. 
The  main  reason  why  the  banks  and  cooperatives  are  able  to  achieve  both  of  the  targets  is  
their cost effective operations. 
 
KEY WORDS: Microfinance, Trade-off, Mission drift, Operational self-sufficiency, 
Institution type, Outreach  
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SUHDE KANNATTAVUUDEN JA KÖYHIEN SAAVUTTAMISEN VÄLILLÄ 
MIKRORAHOITUSMARKKINOILLA RIIPPUEN INSTITUUTIORAKENTEESTA 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET: Tutkielman tarkoituksena on selvittää suhdetta 
mikrorahoitusinstituution kannattavuuden sekä köyhien saavuttamisen välillä riippuen 
instituutiorakenteesta. Kyseistä suhdetta on tutkittu vain vähän, vaikka sen ympärillä onkin 
paljon keskustelua kirjallisuudessa. Instituutiorakenteen (pankki, muu rahoitusyhtiö, 
osuuskunta tai kansalaisjärjestö) vaikutusta ei ole tutkittu aikaisemmin tähän yhtälöön liittyen, 
vaikka se vaikuttaa suuresti sekä kannattavuuteen sekä instituution mahdollisuuksiin 
saavuttaa kaikkein köyhimpiä. Tutkimukseni pääasiallinen tarkoitus on selvittää, voivatko 
instituutiot olla kannattavia ja samaan aikaan saavuttaa kaikkein köyhimpiä ihmisiä, ja miten 
tämä riippuu instituutiorakenteesta.  
LÄHDEAINEISTO: Tutkielma perustuu paneelidata-analyysiin, jossa käytetään usean 
vuoden aineistoa johtavilta mikrorahoituslaitoksilta. Aineisto kattaa vuodet 1995-2011 ja 
sisältää 795 instituutiota eri puolilta maailmaa. Toteutan tutkimukseni käyttäen satunnaisten 
vaikutusten estimaattorimallia hyödyntäen Whiten robusteja keskivirheitä. Tämän lisäksi teen 
ANOVA- testin sekä Bonferroni, Scheffe ja Sidak –vertailun tutkiakseni instituutiorakennetta 
tarkemmin.  
TULOKSET: Mikrorahoituslaitosten kannattavuutta voidaan parantaa ensinnäkin 
leikkaamalla kustannuksia ja toiseksi nostamalla korkoja. Pankit ja osuuskunnat ovat 
kannattavimpia instituutioita. Kaupallistuneet ja kannattavuutta tavoittelevat instituutiot, 
erityisesti pankit, ovat herkempiä korkotason ja kustannusrakenteen muutoksille verrattuna 
muihin instituutioihin. Tulosteni perusteella on mahdollista sekä harjoittaa kannattavaa 
toimintaa että saavuttaa suuri määrä köyhiä. Tulokset kuitenkin vaihtelevat 
instituutiorakenteen mukaan. Pankit ja osuuskunnat pystyvät saavuttamaan molemmat 
tavoitteet muita instituutioita paremmin. Syy tähän on, että pankeilla ja osuuskunnilla on 
kustannustehokkaimmat operaatiot.  
AVAINSANAT: Mikrorahoitus, mikrorahoituslaitos, kannattavuus, instituutiorakenne 
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1. Introduction 
1.1.  Background and motivation  
Microfinance industry has grown remarkably in recent years. Compound average growth rate 
for number of borrowers has been 21 % and for gross loan portfolio 34 % during 2003-2008 
(Gonzales, 2009). Based on the United Nations (2005) definition microfinance can be 
expressed as “the sustainable supply of small-scale financial services such as credit, savings 
accounts, and insurance to poor and low income people”. Mersland and Strøm (2009) have 
defined the mission of the microfinance institutions as to provide banking services to the poor 
which means lending very small sums to very poor borrowers. Schreiner (2002) states that 
almost all the microfinance practitioners agree that the goal is to improve the welfare of the 
poor. The more controversial topic is how to best achieve this goal. Microfinance can be seen 
as a poverty alleviation tool that has potential to become a self-sustaining industry. 
At the moment, one of the most complicated and a crucial issue in the microfinance industry 
is the trade-off between profitability and poverty outreach of the institutions. Is it possible to 
achieve both goals or should microfinance institutions decide which one to aim at? 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) state, in the introductory paragraph in one of the most 
comprehensive textbooks about the economics of microfinance, that “if there is one 
unresolved tension that animates those who spend their days working on microfinance, it 
entails how to navigate the trade-offs between maximizing social impact and building strong, 
large financial institutions. It is a healthy tension, but an inescapable one”. 
Ongoing debate between profitability and outreach disputes whether microfinance could be a 
profit generating and self-sufficient industry or does it need to be subsidized to ensure 
outreach to the poorest of the poor that may need microfinance more than any other group. 
One party claims that microfinance institutions should try to be self-sufficient and be able to 
function without enormous amounts of subsidies from the third parties.  The argument stems 
from the idea that MFIs should become financially self-sufficient institutions that can borrow 
from the commercial capital markets and serve large number of poor people. The concern of 
the opponents is that the profit-seeking approach would leave poorest of the poor discarded 
and therefore not contribute enough to the poverty alleviation goal. 
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 In my thesis, I study if there is a trade-off between being profitable and reaching the poorest 
or could the institutions reach both targets at the same time. There have been few studies 
about the topic using large data sets even though there is a lot of discussion in the literature 
around profitability and outreach. The earlier findings in the outreach and profitability trade-
off field are inconclusive. For example Mosley (1996); Mosley and Holme (1998); Galema 
and Lensink (2009); and Hermes et al. (2011) found supporting evidence that trade-off would 
exist. On the other hand for example Gonzales and Rosenberg (2006); Cull et al. (2007); 
Hishigsuren, 2007; Mersland and Oysten (2010); Mersland and Strøm (2010) and Quayes 
(2012) indicate that both profitability and outreach could be achieved at the same time 
depending on the situation. I have conducted my study with newer and larger data sets 
compared to the earlier trade-off investigations. Studies with newer data are necessary since 
the microfinance industry has developed significantly during the past ten years. Cull et al. 
(2007)  is  one  of  the  few solid  studies  in  the  field  but  is  conducted  with  the  simple  ordinary  
least squares model as many earlier researches. Nevertheless, I find out that the regression 
may not be linear and panel data regression could provide more accurate estimates. I am able 
to  bring  new insight  into  studies  by  multi-year  panel  data  regression  with  the  large  data  set  
from all around the world. 
Other niche for my study is the effect of the institution type (banks, non-bank financial 
institutions, cooperatives and non-governmental organizations) on the trade-off equation. 
Institution type has not been studied comprehensively in this context even though it has a 
large impact on both profitability and outreach. More commercialized institutions, such as 
banks, are often chasing profitability more eagerly compared to for example non-
governmental organizations. Therefore I investigate whether some of the institutions sacrifice 
their outreach more than others while aiming to profitable operations. I also investigate reason 
behind profitability and outreach functions of the different institution types to see the root 
causes causing differences in the tradeoff equation. 
To sum up, there is a lack of recent cross-country investigations that would show whether 
aiming to profitability has an effect on outreach of the institutions. My motivation is to study 
the trade-off equation with the larger and newer data set and provide updated and accurate 
recommendations. In addition, I investigate how the institution type effects on that tradeoff 
equation. The topic is relevant at the moment because there seems to be a shift from 
subsidizing MFIs to a focus on financial sustainability and efficiency of these institutions 
(Hermes et al., 2011).  
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1.2.The research question and methodology 
 
 
In my thesis, I first study the profitability function of the institution. Profitability is affected 
by the cost structure of the institution and by the changes in interest rates through asymmetric 
information problems. After studying profitability, I move on to my main issue about the 
trade-off between profitability and outreach in the microfinance industry. The purpose is to 
find if poverty outreach decreases while microfinance institutions aim to become more 
profitable. Finally I want to explore the differences in effects based on the institution types. 
My three research questions are following: 
Q1: What are the main drivers behind the profitability function of the institution?  
Q2: Can institutions achieve both high profitability and the large outreach to the poor?  
Q3: How does the institution type effect on the profitability and poverty outreach of the 
institution? 
In my thesis, I use large 15-years’ data sets of leading microfinance institutions. The data is 
collected from the MixMarket which is a commonly used information source to get accurate 
data on microfinance industry. My data consists of 795 institutions from 89 different countries. 
I have included only high quality data and use panel data regressions to be able to conduct as 
accurate analyses as possible. I have six separate equations and report results from random 
effects regression with White’s robust standard errors. I also run the linear combinations tests 
to get more accurate results for different institution types. In addition, I run oneway ANOVA 
tests  and  Bonferroni,  Scheffe,  and  Sidak  multiple  comparison  tests  to  investigate  the  
differences between institution types. Based on that, I am able to provide new insight about 
institution specific differences in regards the trade-off between profitability and outreach in 
the microfinance industry. 
1.3. Main findings  
First finding from my study is that the interest rates and cost drivers cause differences in 
profitability of the institution. Cost cutting and the more efficient operations have even larger 
impact on profitability and therefore focus should be directed to improve the operational 
The main objective is to study tradeoff between profitability and poverty outreach in the 
microfinance industry and how institution type effects on that equation. 
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efficiency of microfinance institutions.  Also setting the interest rates at an appropriate level is 
critical for profitability. Rising interest rates up to very high levels damages the profitability 
due to asymmetric information problems that cause decreased portfolio quality.  
After understanding the profitability side, I proceed to the outreach equations. The main 
contribution of my study shows that there is no clear trade-off between profitability and 
outreach. It is possible to achieve both profitability and poverty outreach and this seems to be 
true especially for the banks and cooperatives. The finding should have an impact on the 
regulation, donors and practitioners of microfinance. Based on my results, commercialization 
does not necessarily decrease outreach. Commercialization brings often more efficient 
operations, scale economies and opportunities to reach larger populations. Therefore, aiming 
to higher profitability should be supported in many areas of microfinance. My results also 
suggest that trade-off is not larger while institutions grow and mature. Therefore so called 
mission drift effect would not exist in a large scale. The contribution to the literature is 
relevant, because researches with large and accurate datasets have been missing.  
Regarding the institution types, I found significant effect of institution type on both 
profitability and outreach of the institution. Banks and cooperatives are the most profitable 
institution types. More commercialized and profit oriented institutions, such as banks, are 
much more affected by the negative effect of rising interest rates to high levels. They also 
benefit  more  on  the  relatively  high  personnel  costs  representing  ability  to  capitalize  the  
investments in personnel of the institution. In regards the outreach equations, cooperatives 
and banks actually suffer less on the trade-off between profitability and poverty outreach. 
This is mostly due to their cost effective operations. Seeking for profitability does not 
necessarily decrease the outreach of the institution and therefore it could be supported in the 
microfinance industry.  
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1.4. Key definitions 
Table 1 
Key definitions 
Term Definition 
Microfinance 
The provision of small-scale financial services such as savings, credit and other 
basic financial services to poor and low-income people (United Nations). 
MFI 
Refers to microfinance institutions including wide range of organizations 
dedicated to provide microfinance services. MFIs include non-governmental 
organizations, credit unions, cooperatives, private commercial banks, non-bank 
financial institutions and state-owned banks. 
Trade-off between 
profitability and outreach 
MFIs  may  not  be  able  to  serve  the  poorest  of  the  poor  when  trying  to  achieve  
high profitability. 
Microfinance mission drift 
MFIs may drift from their mission to serve the poorest of the poor while they 
grow and mature. Mission drift is not clear evident term because it includes the 
motivations and incentives that may lead to trade-off between profitability and 
poverty outreach. 
Microfinance banks (Bank) 
Usually licensed financial intermediaries regulated by a state banking supervisory 
agency. They may provide a number of financial services, including deposit 
taking, lending, payment services, and money transfers.  
Non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFI) 
Shareholder owned firms that provide similar services to those of banks, but are 
licensed under a separate category. 
Cooperatives and credit 
unions (Coop) 
Registered under a country’s cooperative law or are included as a special 
category in the banking law, but may lack effective external supervision or 
authorizing legislation. They are member-based financial intermediaries and may 
offer a range of financial services, including lending and deposit taking, for the 
benefit of its members.  
Non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) 
Organizations registered as a nonprofit for tax purposes or some other legal 
charter. The financial services of NGOs are usually more restricted and do not 
usually include deposit taking. These institutions are typically not regulated by a 
banking supervisory agency. 
 
1.5. Limitations of the study 
The largest limitations for my study are set by the availability of the data leading to the 
potential selection bias. I have used the data from MixMarket which is the largest 
microfinance database in the world. MFIs that are included into the database need to have 
adequate information infrastructure to be able to provide necessary data. This leads into the 
conclusion that MixMarket database probably represents a random sample of the best 
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managed  MFIs  in  the  world.  I  have  used  only  data  by  the  highly  ranked  MFIs  to  ensure  
appropriateness of the data but this biases my sample even further. However, it seems that 
these best managed MFIs are providing services for majority of the microfinance clients. In 
addition, as Mersland and Strøm (2008) explain, the more realistic comparison between 
institution types is possible, while very small MFIs - without intention to apply microfinance 
in a business-like manner - are left out from my sample. In regardless of the limitations, the 
data is commonly accepted and gives a good representation of the microfinance industry. 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
In the Chapter 2, I first go through the microfinance literature and the reasons for existence of 
microfinance industry. Following to that, I introduce the basic theoretical background for 
microfinance trade-off between profitability and outreach in the Chapters 3. In the Chapter 4, 
I go through the impact of the institution type followed by the synthesis of the literature 
review in the Chapter 5. I start the empirical analyses by introducing the hypotheses and the 
empirical methodology in the Chapters 6 and 7. Following to that, I present the findings and 
robustness checks for my empirical research. In the Chapter 9 and 10, I recap the results, 
suggest some future research topics and conclude my thesis. 
 
Figure 1 
Structure of the thesis 
  
8.1. 
8.2. 
8.3. 
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2. Introduction to microfinance  
2.1.  Reasons for and development of microfinance industry 
Microfinance practitioners aim to achieve the ultimate goal of poverty reduction by providing 
poor people access to financial services. The Millennium Development Goals set globally-
adopted targets to reduce extreme poverty by half by 2015 (United Nations, 2011). 
Microfinance is one of the most effective ways to answer to the poverty reduction challenge 
by providing the access to finance for the poorest of the poor. Microfinance can be defined as 
a provision of diverse financial services (credit, savings, insurance, money transfers, and other 
financial services) to poor and low-income clients (CGAP, 2010).  
The global outreach of microfinance has increased tremendously over the past 30 years. Maes 
and Reed (2012) find out that 3652 MFIs reported reaching over 200 million clients in 2010. 
They also state that the number of very poor families with a microloan has grown more than 
18-fold from 7.6 million in 1997 to 137.5 million in 2010. Practitioner’s goal is to reach 175 
million poor and low income people by 2015 (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). The impact 
of microfinance is even larger than the direct client numbers. When including on average five 
family members that are affected through access to credit, Maes and Reed (2012) conclude 
that microfinance reaches approximately 687 million poor and low-income people worldwide. 
There are different views of the size of the microfinance market, because most data sources 
are based on self-reporting (Rhyne and Otero, 2006) and different kind of institutions are 
included into the studies. The findings of Maes and Reed (2012) are from the Microcredit 
Summit, which is one of the largest databases for microfinance information. Other commonly 
referred source for microfinance data is MIX market which excludes large self-help groups 
and government-run programs (Rhyne and Otero). Therefore the numbers are relatively lower 
compared  to  Microcredit  Summit.  In  the  MIX  analyses,  Gonzalez  (2009)  finds  out  that  the  
annual compound average growth rate for the number of borrowers has been 21 % in 2003-
2008. An annual compound average growth rate for gross loan portfolio has been 34 % during 
these years. With these growth rates, the microfinance has a potential to meet the growing 
demand for financial services in the developing world.  
The need for microfinance is derived from the lack of financial services for the poor. Access 
to financial services or outreach of the financial system has become a major concern for many 
policymakers in developing countries. Given that almost 3 billion people live on less than two 
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dollars a day in developing countries, it is clear that the amount of microfinance at the 
moment  is  not  anywhere  close  to  its  full  potential  and  there  is  a  huge  unmet  demand  for  
financial services by the poor (United Nations, 2011). There are still the estimated 2.7 billion 
people  around the  world  that  do  not  use  formal  financial  services  (CGAP 2010).  Cull  et  al.  
(2009) introduce the estimate that roughly 40 to 80 percent of the populations in the most 
developing economies lack access to formal banking services. Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 
(2012) introduce even lower numbers in their region specific study presented in Figure 1. 
While financial services are nearly universal in high-income economies, with 89 percent of 
adults  reporting  that  they  have  an  account  at  a  formal  financial  institution,  it  is  only  41  
percent in developing economies. Even though microfinance has broadened access to finance 
for hundreds of millions of low income people who lack ready access to formal financial 
services (Cull et al., 2009), there is still huge demand to meet in the future. 
 
Figure 2 
Account penetration around the world 
The figure shows the percentage of adults that have an account at a formal financial institution in the different 
regions. 
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper (2012) 
Microfinance is rooted from the 19th century credit unions. Already those credit unions used 
joint-liability lending - one of the basic innovations in microfinance industry - that provides 
high repayment rates at affordable interest rates. In these unions, the villagers were linked by 
a “common bond” and there were a threat of stigma or social sanction preventing individuals 
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from defaulting. As an industry, microfinance started to develop in the 1970s after the 
realization that poor households can be reliable banking customers. In the beginning, there 
were substantial subsidies and institutions were costly and inefficient and mostly focused on 
farmers. In the 1980s the focus turned towards people in villages and towns running nonfarm 
enterprises (Cull et al., 2009). This enabled many advantages for microfinance industry 
because non-farmers were less vulnerable to weather or crop price changes and their income 
was more regular. At that time, the top microloan providers achieved repayment rates of 98 % 
and opened more room to develop microfinance that could someday work in a profitable way. 
In the 1980s and 1990s policy makers started to argue that MFIs should be profitable and 
financially sustainable.  
Nowadays, microfinance institutions are commonly divided to poverty lending approach 
institutions and financial system approach institutions (Hermes and Lensink, 2011). One of 
the most researched and successful poverty lending approach microfinance institutions has 
been Grameen Bank of Bangladesh based on the idea of Muhammad Yunus. It received the 
Nobel Peace Prize 2006 and introduced the group lending methods to the wide audience. The 
methodology was later replicated in many MFIs around the world. The basic idea was that 
microfinance can unleash the productivity of cash-starved entrepreneurs and raise their 
incomes above poverty lines (Cull et al., 2009). The working model in the Grameen Bank has 
been that two members of each five-person group receive their loan first. If all installment are 
paid on time, the initial loans are followed four to six weeks later by loans to two other 
members, and then, after another four to six week, by a loan to the group chairperson 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005). The groups are therefore the sources of solidarity that are 
offering mutual assistance in times of need. Grameen Bank is seen as a model example of 
MFI using poverty lending approach.  
When considering institutions that have adopted the financial systems approach, two most 
famous  institutions  are  BancoSol  in  Bolivia  and  Banco  Compartamos  in  Mexico.  BancoSol  
has achieved profits through extremely high interest rates which has aroused some criticism 
among the microfinance commercialization criticizers. Ylinen (2010) explains that BancoSol 
was the first nonprofit MFI to transform itself into a private, commercial microfinance bank. 
Banco Compartamos, on the other hand, conducted public stock offering in April 2007. The 
offering provided impressive returns to equity investors to their early investments and at the 
same time charged very high interest rates. The strategy entailed charging high interest rates 
to generate retained earnings that could fuel rapid expansion. These strategies have aroused 
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some criticism but on the other hand, the commercialized banks have been able to reach large 
number of poor customers while making the profit to shareholders.  
To be able to understand the trade-off between profitability and outreach, it is important to 
first understand that for what microfinance is needed. What does microfinance give that 
traditional and older ways of financing would not be able to deliver? Armendáriz and 
Morduch (2010) start their reasoning from the basic economic theory of diminishing marginal 
returns to capital. Based on the theory, the capital should flow from the rich people to poor 
people, because marginal return to capital is much larger for the poor people. Based on the 
concave production function, one could think that marginal return for poor entrepreneurs 
would be higher and based on that theory; the capital should flow from rich to poor. This is 
due the fact that in the lower levels, the marginal output from the initial investment (e.g. 
buying the first production machine) is greater than the later investments. Sophisticating the 
processes increases profitability less compared to initial investments. If the theory would truly 
hold, microfinance would not be needed, because capital flows could be ensured by other 
means. In reality though, the production function may not be concave and due to differing 
complementary inputs, poorer entrepreneurs may have lower marginal returns despite having 
less capital. In addition, poorer entrepreneurs may have no opportunities for scale economies 
which mean that poorer entrepreneurs would have even lower marginal returns despite having 
less capital (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). In reality the theory of diminishing marginal 
return to capital does not hold due to information asymmetry problems such as moral hazard 
and adverse selection. 
The most important reason for existence of microfinance is therefore market failures that stem 
from the poor information, high transaction costs and difficulties enforcing contracts 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Due to information asymmetry problems and lacking 
collaterals, it is more expensive to provide large scale of small loans and find all the necessary 
information instead of providing couple of large loans. Microfinance presents itself as an 
answer to these problems and a way to overcome the vicious circle by reducing transaction 
costs and overcoming information problems. It challenges long-held assumptions about what 
poor households can and cannot achieve and more broadly, shows the potential for innovative 
contracts and institutions to improve conditions in low-income communities. As Armendáriz 
and Morduch (2010) explain, state-owned development banks failed to achieve sustainable 
poverty reduction largely because the resources were mismanaged and interest rate 
restrictions prevented banks from operating viably in poor areas. Microfinance has potential 
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to answer to these issues, avoid the mistakes that state-owned banks previously made and 
create sustainable ways to reduce poverty.  
Relevance of the microfinance can be best judged based on the alternatives that would exist 
instead of microfinance industry. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) explain that the options 
for microfinance would be the formal banking sector lending or the informal channels of 
lending. Both of these channels exist at the moment. In formal banking sector there are 
several problems arousing from adverse selection and moral hazard that lead to a situation 
where raising interest rates can exacerbate incentive problems in lending. This can reduce the 
profits for banks working in poor communities, imposing the major bind on commercial 
banks trying to expand access. Without adding new measures to retain good incentives (e.g. 
what microfinance generally provides) commercial banks naturally avoid places where the 
operating costs are high and the collaterals scarce. In addition to formal banks, the informal 
lending is another extremity. For ages, poor people have been able to borrow, but only from 
the informal sector such as neighbors, relatives and local traders. These providers have large 
amount of information but not enough capital. Invention behind microfinance is trying to 
combine the best sides from the both of the traditional ways. Microfinance aims to capitalize 
local information from the informal channels and bring in resources outside the community. It 
is still important to remember that in the developing world, formal banking sector amounts 
less than 10 % of the total lending as seen in the Figure 2. There is a room for microfinance 
institutions and banks to expand in the developing world. 
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Sources of new formal and informal loans in the year 2011 
The figure shows the percentage of adults borrowing from the different sources in the year 2011. As seen, formal 
banks are less than 10 % of the total lending in the developing regions. Friends and family are the most 
important lending channels in the developing world.  
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12 
 
Microfinance has been in a revolution in the recent years. Increased competition has caused 
lower interest rates, lower costs, more efficiency and the introduction of new financial 
services. In addition commercialized banks have become interested in microfinance industry 
(Hermes et al. 2011). There has been a recent paradigm shift in microcredit industry, from 
subsidized credit delivery programs to financially self-sufficient institutions providing 
commercial microfinance and developing inclusive financial systems. Zeller and Johannsen 
(2006) describe that the old paradigm of sector-directed, supply-led and subsidized credit has 
based on faulty assumptions about the willingness and ability of poor farmers and micro-
entrepreneurs to pay for financial services. This assumption has led to faulty policy designs 
and implementations. The new paradigm of developing inclusive financial systems departs 
not from the need. It takes into account the demand including willingness and ability to pay 
for savings, credit and insurance services by micro-entrepreneurs. One of the most important 
changes is the shift from microcredit to microfinance. Microcredit meant mostly providing 
loans whereas microfinance includes also providing insurances, collecting savings from the 
low-income households and marketing client’s outputs. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) also 
introduce the new stream thought that the savings could be even more important than loans 
for the poorest people. Nevertheless, savings and loans should not be substitutes but 
complementary activities to providing loans. 
In addition to broader services and more professional operations, there is a huge amount of 
innovations and new trends in microfinance industry. Its future potential has been noticed 
around the world. Spreading of the new technologies enables availability of microfinance for 
millions of new people. Banking through mobile telephones is taking off for example in the 
Philippines, South Africa and Kenya. Mobile banking can reduce costs and increase the 
quality of services, even in poor communities. It also brings banking services available for 
new customer groups that are living too far from the traditional bank branches. Honohan 
(2009) founds that higher mobile phone penetration and better institutions of governance are 
correlated across countries with the access of finance, even after controlling for per capita 
income. In addition, social networks will be even more important in marketing and 
distributing the microloan services in the future based on the Wydick et al. (2011) research. 
Wydick et al. (2011) find endogenous peer affect to appear in some extent among 
geographical neighbors, but appear most strongly within church networks among their sample 
of households in Guatemala. They conclude that MFIs should consider using existing social 
networks  such  as  churches  in  their  attempts  to  broaden  and/or  deepen  the  outreach  of  their  
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microfinance services. In recent years, there have also been new ways of microfinance 
through internet. One example is KIVA which is a non-profit organization with a mission to 
connect people through lending to alleviate poverty. Leveraging the internet and a worldwide 
network of microfinance institutions, allows individual people to make small loans for the 
poor people in the developing world that need financing.  
2.2.  Microfinance as a solution to information asymmetry problems 
One of the reasons for the existence for microfinance is that it is able to tackle the issues that 
other forms of borrowing were not able to do. Microfinance offers innovative ways to handle 
information asymmetry and capital requirement problems that neither traditional banking nor 
informal lending could provide by themselves. Asymmetric information refers to a 
situation in which one party in a transaction has more or superior information compared to 
another. Asymmetric information causes issues in a form of agency problems. Agency 
problems arise while the interests of two groups are not aligned. It often refers to a 
relationship between a principal (often shareholder) and an agent of the principal (often 
management of the company). In the context of microfinance, agency theory refers also to a 
situation where lender is unable to observe the borrower’s characters or effort, or to observe 
her  profits.  In  this  context,  the  principal  (the  lender)  is  trying  to  do  business  with  the  agent  
(the borrower) (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). The problem arises from the two main 
factors being that the poor people do not have sufficient collateral to offer as security for 
banks and the banks have incomplete information about poor borrowers. In addition, it is 
difficult to enforce contracts in countries with weak judicial systems. The main problems 
arising from the asymmetric information are namely adverse selection and moral hazard.  
2.2.1.  Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection problems arise before contractual agreement takes place because banks are 
not able to discriminate against risky borrowers (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). The loan 
officers  won’t  have  all  the  necessary  information  or  it  is  too  costly  to  acquire.  Adverse  
selection is likely to occur because it is hard for lenders to determine which customers are 
likely to be risky and which safe. Lenders would naturally charge riskier customers higher 
rates compared to safe ones. In this way, lenders could compensate for the added probability 
of  default.  Due  to  the  fact  that  the  lender  cannot  identify  the  risky  and  safe  customers,  the  
lender raises average interest rates for all the customers, which may drive the safe customers 
out  of  the  credit  market.  At  some  point,  the  interest  rates  increase  to  a  level  that  safer  
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borrowers do not want to take loans at that rate. The consequence is that the bank is left with 
the very risky pool of borrowers. This is a market “imperfection” since worthy borrowers do 
not participate in the credit market when efficiency would suggest they should (Armendáriz 
and Morduch, 2010 p.42).  
2.2.2. Moral hazard 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010 p. 48) define that moral hazard in lending refers to a situation 
where the bank’s risk is tied to unobservable choices made by borrowers. Lender’s cannot 
observe borrowers’ choices (about how hard to work or which projects to choose) nor the 
realization of project returns. Ex-ante moral hazard refers to a problem that lender cannot 
ensure that borrower are putting in full effort to make their investment projects successful. It 
relates to the idea that unobservable actions or efforts are taken by borrowers after the loan 
has been disbursed but before the project returns are realized. Ex-post moral hazard happens if 
after the projects have been completed and profits realized, the lender may not be able to 
verify the magnitude of the returns. The borrower could take the money and run without 
repaying. It is tempting for the borrower to claim to have had bad luck (and to ask for a 
reprieve in paying the loan) when in fact the investment was highly profitable. This is also 
called as enforcement problem, which refers the difficulties that emerge after the loan is made 
and the borrower has invested.  
2.2.3. Information asymmetry resolved through the group lending methodology 
Agency problems are basically a mismatch of resources and abilities. On one side, banks have 
funds to lend but they lack information and cost-effective ways to make the agreements. On 
the other side, local people have all the information necessary but they lack the capital to 
make the loans. MFIs may try to hire local employ but there is a risk whether they work 
reliable way in the bank’s best interest. Microfinance aims to answer to this question and 
provide indirect linkages between the money lenders and the borrowers or potential borrowers. 
Group lending practices are generally less costly, as Hermes et al. (2011) present, supporting 
the view that this lending technique helps reducing information costs related to lending to the 
poor more than other lending techniques do.   
Joint-liability group lending methods is one of the innovations in microfinance industry that is 
utilized to solve information asymmetry problems. In solidarity group lenders case institutions 
employ contracts based on joint liability with “solidarity group”. Group loans have been the 
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most famous way of providing microfinance services. Loans are not given for individual 
people but for a group from three to ten persons. Basically, group members are allowed to 
self-select other group members and are given an incentive to monitor their peers and put 
pressure on defaulting group members. Banks cannot know the risk profiles of their customers 
since there is not enough information available. In the case of individual loans, banks are not 
able to price the risk into the interest rate, because they do not know the risk profiles. In the 
group lending, the groups want to include only the members that are trustworthy and most 
likely to pay their loans back. Moreover, the members of the groups have similar risk-profiles. 
Self-selection therefore solves adverse selection problem.  
On the other hand, monitoring and social sanctions provide solutions to moral hazard 
problems. In the developing countries, the community is very important and therefore people 
are ready to work for the common good and avoid moral hazard. Group members are usually 
willing to support if one member is in trouble because otherwise they are not able to get loan 
by themselves. Group responsibility clause of contracts can mitigate the moral hazard, 
adverse selection and enforcement problems crippled previous attempts at lending to the poor 
by outside financial institutions (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).  
Even though the group lending is a cornerstone in the microfinance industry, there are also 
downsides and inefficiencies. This includes for example too harsh punishments due to the 
default of one people. Group lending may be unsuitable for wealthier borrowers, which has 
led renowned institutions such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and BancoSol in Bolivia to 
offer individual lending contracts for their better-off clients (Ylinen, 2010). Also Armendáriz 
and Morduch (2005) explore that in relatively industrialized areas, group lending may be a 
poor fit for potential customers. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) argue that actually group 
lending methodology won’t give any new information to the bank but gives the members of 
the group incentives to use their information to the bank’s advantage. Armendáriz and 
Morduch (2010) question the efficiency of the group lending methodology in a following way: 
Might groups collude against the micro lender by collectively deciding not to repay? If the 
group of borrowers is not willing to impose social sanctions upon themselves, can the group 
nonetheless provide advantages? They also find some questions relating to peer monitoring. 
What would be the results if the population of borrowers is dispersed and local information is 
therefore weak and costly to obtain? Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) explore for example 
the situation that if the loans are given in a region where work mobility is very high and the 
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case that what would happen if the group members are not able to observe each other’s efforts. 
This may discourage people to try their best and increase the free-riding problems. 
2.2.4. Solutions beyond group lending methodology 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) describe that the recent trend has been that MFIs tend to 
shift from group loans to individual loans. Therefore all the problems are not resolved through 
the means mentioned above. Individual-based lenders use bilateral lending contracts between 
a lender and a single borrower. Liability for repaying the loan rests with the individual 
borrower only. Group lending methodology makes microfinance different from conventional 
banking because of many new elements used. Nevertheless, those elements are not 
intrinsically linked and therefore can be used separately from the group lending method. 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010 p. 137-162) define the ways to separate components 
including (1) creating dynamic incentives, (2) frequent repayment installments or (3) 
complementary incentive mechanism. At the moment, many of the MFIs do not necessarily 
involve group loans but use other innovative elements more flexibly. 
The first important way to capitalize the benefits of the innovative ways of handling 
information asymmetry problems is to be able to create dynamic incentives. Dynamic 
incentives include non-refinancing threat, progressive lending, competition and incentives. 
The threat to stop lending is strong if the customers have close and repeated relationship with 
the borrower and if they make sure that borrowers do not have contracts with other potential 
lenders (Aleen, 1990). Progressive lending is the bases of these innovative ways to provide 
microfinance. It was also bases in the original Grameen Bank methodology. Armendáriz and 
Morduch (2010) define that the progressive lending refers to the practice of promising larger 
and larger loans for groups and individuals in good standing. Progressive lending allows the 
lenders  to  test  borrowers  before  increasing  the  loan  sizes.  Competition  and  existence  of  
several players has a positive impact if the market is controlled through information sharing 
through credit bureaus. The problem with competition is that the borrowers may start to take 
loans from the several players. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010 p. 146) claim that the 
cooperative behavior between the microlenders, could help to mitigate the problem. 
The second way to capitalize the benefits from the elements used originally in the joint-
liability lending, is to set frequent repayment schedules. These repayment times can be 
monthly, weekly or even daily in the beginning. Often the repayment time lengthens if the 
customer is able to provide earlier payments in time. The frequent repayment installments are 
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the other very efficient way to improve microfinance sector performance also for individual 
lenders. Nevertheless, this kind of incentives may be problematic as Pellegrina (2011) 
explains. The reason is that tight repayment schedules may preclude borrowers from 
undertaking long-term investments. This often happens in the agriculture industry where the 
production cycle is long. 
The third important category that Armendáriz and Morduch (2010 p. 137-162) introduce, is 
the complementary incentive mechanism. Some of these additional means are already in use 
and working while others are still in the level of theory. Complementary incentive mechanism 
includes flexible approaches to collateral, financial collateral, making repayments public, 
targeting women, information gathering by the bank or cross reporting. In the other industries, 
both adverse selection and moral hazard could be solved by offering collateral, but in the low 
income countries, borrowers won’t have anything to offer as collateral. Flexible approach to 
collateral means that the bank accepts different kind of collaterals for example tangible assets 
such as livestock, land and housing. The idea is that the resale value of the collateral is not the 
main interest but the value for household to give up the collateral. Financial collaterals on the 
other hand mean that borrowers need to build up financial assets (e.g. savings account) and 
use that as collateral. Public repayments are an effective tool since the borrowers have a threat 
of social stigma. Targeting to women can be used as well in the individual lending than in 
joint liability lending and women seem to be more reliable repaying their loans compared to 
men. Information gathering by bank staff can be efficient tool if the bank is able to 
incorporate neighbors in the credit decisions. Cross-reporting on the other hand refers to a 
methodology where statements made by one borrower about another are used as bases for the 
loan processing. Through these means which are originally used in the joint-liability lending, 
microfinance institutions are able to provide financing also for individual people. 
2.3.  Effectiveness as a development tool  
Microfinance aims to reduce poverty by employing profit-making banking practices in low-
income countries and communities. Access to basic financial services such as savings, 
payments, and credit can make a substantial positive difference in poor people’s lives. For 
firms, especially SMEs, lack of access to finance is often the main obstacle to growth (CGAP 
2010). Microfinance industry has grown remarkably in recent years but there are still debates 
whether it really contributes substantially to reduction of the poverty. Advocates argue that it 
is one of the most efficient tools to reduce poverty whereas opponents argue that microfinance 
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won’t improve the living of the poorest of the poor. I will now go through some positive and 
negative views whether access to finance through microfinance helps to reduce poverty.  
I start with the advocates’ view that also many politics and specialist follow and which have 
led to big subsidies and general acceptance to microfinance industry as an effective 
development tool. Hermes and Lensink (2011) state that first of all, access to finance raises 
investments in income generating activities and possible diversifies the sources of income 
which may contribute to a long-lasting increase in income. Mosley and Hulme (1998) define 
that the tendency for the willingness to take risks and to invest in new technology usually 
increases with income. For the core poor, borrowing for consumption enables them to reduce 
gradually their income-vulnerability. By the aid of that, they are able to get themselves into 
position where they can contemplate riskier investments in working capital, hire personnel 
and eventually invest also in fixed capital. Access to finance may contribute to better 
education, health and housing of the borrower. It also contributes towards gender equality and 
therefore to an improvement of the social and economic situation of the women.  
Hermes and Lensink (2011) also explain that the spillover effects have a high impact on 
poverty alleviation. Maes and Reed (2012) define that on average five family members are 
affected by the loan. The indirect effect on the villages and communities are manifold 
compared to that. The spillover effects may be even higher in the case where loans are given 
for better-off poor. Therefore it can be reasoned that giving loans for the better-off poor could 
actually lead to greater overall poverty reduction.  
There are also some additional positive effects of microfinance. Becchetti and Castriota (2011) 
find that microfinance can be a very effective recovery tool after disasters. Their main 
findings, based on the evidence from Tsunami 2004, are that the post-tsunami loan to income 
ratio has a significant effect on the borrowers’ recovery measured in terms of change in 
income or in worked hours and the effect of the loan to income ratio is significantly stronger 
for damaged versus non-damaged borrowers. This kind of new ways to handle natural 
disasters are very beneficial and it can be seen that recapitalizing MFIs under stress after 
disasters may provide an effective liquidity injection that can restart and stimulate economic 
activity. 
From the critics point of view there is a doubt if microfinance actually reduces the poverty 
and this is mainly due to fact that the poorest of the poor won´t necessarily have access to 
finance as Hermes and Lensink (2011) describe. Reasons behind are for example that poorest 
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of the poor often decide not to participate in microfinance programs since they lack 
confidence  or  they  value  the  loans  to  be  too  risky.  The  core  poor  are  often  not  accepted  in  
group lending programs by other group members because they are seen as a bad credit risk. 
The staff members of microfinance institutions may prefer excluding the core poor since 
lending to them is seen as extremely risks. For these reasons, the way microfinance programs 
are organized may lead to the exclusion of the core poor (Hermes and Lensink, 2011). In 
addition, microfinance may not be used for purposes that borrowers mention when applying 
the loan. The different usage of the money and the high interest rates may lead to damaging 
situation for poorest of the poor. There is for example evidence that men may use the money 
borrowed and leave women with the debt burden (Hermes and Lensink 2011). Self-evidently 
this does not improve women´s situation in the developing world.  
One important critic for microloans is that it may not be suitable in some sectors and therefore 
recommendations cannot be generalized. Pellegrina (2011) compares microfinance, bank 
lending and informal channels in the agricultural sector to study the impact of microfinance 
on investments. She finds that in the agriculture sector households borrowing from informal 
sources or banks invest more compared to ones that borrow from microfinance institutions. 
She finds that in some sectors microfinance loans mainly help to increase working capital 
expenditure, whereas bank loans play an important role in accumulating fixed assets which is 
important for long-term productive activities. Pellegrina (2011) therefore shows that 
microfinance may be less effective in increasing long-term investments compared to the bank 
loans in the agriculture sector. In the worst case, microfinance could even push borrowers 
more towards investments in projects with short-term revenues.  
3. Profitability and poverty outreach in the microfinance industry 
3.1.  Profitability 
3.1.1.  An increasing importance of profitability  
As Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) state that for some people commercialization represents 
the corruption of an idea conceived as a poverty reduction strategy. To others, it is the hope 
and the future of microfinance. Hermes and Lensink (2011) describe two approaches about 
microfinance and its functionality. Financial systems approach emphasizes the importance of 
financially sustainable microfinance programs and the importance of being able to cover the 
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cost  of  lending  money out  by  the  income generated  from the  outstanding  loan  portfolio.  On 
the other hand, poverty lending approach highlights the importance of providing mainly 
subsidized interest rates to help to reduce poverty. Today the general opinion is in favor of 
financial systems approach. The main argument is that if MFIs are not financially sustainable, 
large scale outreach of the poor cannot be achieved in the long-run.   
It has become more acceptable to aim to private capital and more commercialized ways of 
operations. Krauss and Walter (2009) introduce some of the MFIs that have taken advantage 
of capital markets as an attractive financing alternative. The first was Banco Compartamos in 
Mexico, which undertook a $68 million local-currency microfinance bond issue in 2002 and 
subsequently listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange in a highly successful IPO in April 2007. 
Also Morgan Stanley had microfinance issue worth USD 108 million that was oversubscribed 
2007. Standard & Poor’s announced plans in 2007 to begin rating MFIs, which would make 
microfinance-backed securities eligible for investment by pension funds (Krauss and Walter, 
2009).  
Even though there are some exceptions, there are still some hurdles before profit-maximizing 
companies could fully benefit from MFI market (Byström, 2008). Byström (2008) states that 
first, mainstream investors and commercial banks are used to dealing with regulated entities 
organized as profit maximizing firms that can go bankrupt and work in a clearly defined legal 
environment. Second, macropolicy and government regulation have to be adapted to 
accommodate commercial microlending. Third, if the international capital markets are to be 
tapped on a larger scale, the MFIs/investors have to be able to hedge the foreign exchange 
risk they are exposed to when they borrow/lend in a foreign currency. Fourth, multilateral 
development banks, donors, and similar entities have to support institutions and technical 
know-how in order to make microlending more efficient and transparent. It is important to be 
able to overcome these hurdles because there is a huge latent demand for financing as shown 
in the Figure 3. Morgan Stanley (2007) estimated that the estimated potential market demand 
for microfinance is about $250-300 billion and there is a potential to increase commercial 
capital tremendously. 
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Figure 4 
Current and potential funding for MFIs 
Morgan Stanley (2007) explains that commercial sources of capital are critical to allow industry to reach its 
potential (illustrative). The estimated potential market demand for microfinance is about $250-300 billion. 
Source: Morgan Stanley (2007) 
Krauss and Walter (2009) studied that the role of nonprofit lenders and investors in 
microfinance institutions has declined as broader sources of funding have been accessed. 
These new sources include client deposits of bank-related micro-lenders, refinancing via 
interbank deposits and commercial loans, and fund raising in capital markets. Because there is 
a huge unmet demand, for profit-investors are needed to come into the microfinance market. 
In addition to large market size and demand, Byström (2008) explains that profit-maximizing 
companies should expand to microfinance market due to higher risk-adjusted returns from 
microlending than from corresponding traditional lending. Krauss and Walter (2009) find that 
returns from microloans to be largely uncorrelated with returns from most other asset classes 
and MFIs seem to a significant degree detached from global capital markets. However, MFIs 
domestic risk exposure might be lower than for most alternative emerging market investments. 
Byström (2008) also adds that commercially viable microlending could be an interesting 
alternative for private investors who want to alleviate poverty.  
3.1.2.  Revenue increase through higher interest rates 
Profitability improvement can be achieved by increasing revenues or by cutting costs. In a 
case of the microfinance industry, the clear way to improve revenues is to increase interest 
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rates. Adverse selection and moral hazard affect remarkable on the optimal level of interest 
rates. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) discuss about the arguments and recommend that 
prudently raising interest rates can be a key to microfinance success and partly eliminate 
information asymmetry problems. Nevertheless, they remind that raising the interest rates 
above threshold level can undermine the quality of the institution’s loan portfolio and reduce 
profitability. 
Kar (2011) explains that interest rates charged by MFIs have implications based on the 
agency theory. Generally, owing to the agency problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, interest rates charged to the borrowers affect financial performance of MFIs. Kar 
(2011) notes that interest rates affect loan delinquency rate and they also have impact on 
overall financial sustainability level. Demand forces may also affect this relationship between 
interest rates and sustainability because excessive high interest rates may reduce credit 
demand and thus profits (Cull et al., 2007). Kar (2011) finds out that the turning point for the 
interest rate is 30 % in his sample. Before turning point, interest rates can be increased safely 
and this will not harm the existing sustainability situation. He portrays the relationship 
between loan delinquency and yield and plot yield against predicted values of PaR30 and 
PaR90. U-shaped  relationship confirm that PaR30 declines first as interest rates increase and 
then increases as interest rates go further beyond the turning point. U-shaped association can 
be explained by either selection effects or repayment effects. Kar’s (2011) findings match 
with the standard adverse selection effects of high interest rates described in the literature.  
It is a controversial issue whether high interest rates imply monopoly and inefficiency. High 
interest  rates  may be  the  sign  that  rich  people  are  taking  advantage  of  poor  that  won’t  have  
any other options than pay very high interest rates. Monopolists often make the market more 
inefficient, because they can decrease the amount of loans and charge the higher rates from 
the existing loans. High interest rates may not necessarily mean that there is monopolist 
position. Interest rates reflect how costly it is for moneylenders to acquire capital, to transact 
business, monitor clients and accommodate risk. If the default rates are high, the high interest 
rates may be necessary to make the lender to break even. By improving any of the mentioned 
areas, microfinance institutions could potentially be able to decrease the interest rates charged. 
Therefore high interest rates can be not due to monopoly profits or high default rates, but also 
due to high opportunity costs. 
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The profitability of institution can most likely be improved by raising the interest rates at least 
up to a certain threshold level. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that this may not support 
the ultimate poverty reduction goal of microfinance. Mersland and Strøm (2010) argue that if 
increasing revenue side, which means high interest rates for very poor people, the lending for 
the poor people is possible but the poverty reduction impact may not be sufficient. 
3.1.3.  Cost cutting with high poverty reduction potential  
Many or the researchers argue (e.g. Mersland and Strøm, 2010) that improving cost efficiency 
of the institutions could be the best way to be able to reduce poverty through microfinance. If 
institutions are able to improve their efficiency and decrease the costs, the better services 
could be offered for the poor people. Compared to charging high interest rates, cutting the 
costs would have fewer negative side-effects on the poor people. 
Mersland and Strøm (2010) study the evolution of average loan sizes offered by MFIs. Based 
on their investigation, they argue that MFIs should increase efficiency to be able to offer 
smaller loan sizes. They claim that cost aspect is crucial in the assessment of mission drift and 
being able to achieve both profitability and also sustainable outreach to the poor people. Cull 
et al. (2008) also recommend that it was a triumph to overcome the well-known problems of 
asymmetric information, but further innovation is needed to overcome the challenges of high 
costs. They found out, that the high rates of loan repayment are maintained, but the profit-
maximizing investors have limited interest to those institutions that reach most of the poorest 
people. Those institutions charge the highest interest rates from their customers but also have 
the highest transaction costs due to small transactions sizes. There is therefore a great poverty 
reduction potential if institutions are able to invent more efficient ways to operate and 
streamline their cost structures. They would be able to either provide the same services to the 
poorest people with the lower interest rates or provide services to even larger amount of poor 
people without charging extremely high rates of interest.  
3.1.4.  Subsidies to ensure efficient operations  
There are also arguments that microfinance institutions need subsidies to be able to improve 
their operations and develop those to more efficient direction. On the other hand, the 
advantage of microfinance industry has often thought to be that it has a possibility of 
achieving massive scale through highly efficient operations without on-going subsidies. The 
scale and the effect of subsidies is debatable topic.  
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Hermes and Lensink (2011) state that the full promise of microfinance, to reduce poverty 
without  ongoing  subsidies,  is  not  met  yet.  They  explain  that  there  are  quite  many  
microfinance institutions that have been able to achieve high loan repayment rates but 
relatively few earn profits. Hermes and Lensink (2011) roughly estimate that only 1–2% of all 
MFIs in the world (approximately 150 organizations) are financially sustainable. In most 
cases, these are large, mature, regulated, and relatively well-known MFIs. There are about 8% 
of  all  MFIs  that  are  close  to  being  profitable.  Both  these  types  of  MFIs  are  commercial  
organizations focusing on profitability. A third group, roughly 20% of all MFIs consist mostly 
of  NGOs that  may become sustainable  in  the  future  but  are  not  yet  sustainable.  This  means  
that 70 % of all the MFIs, mostly smaller start-up organizations, are far from being financially 
sustainable and are dependent on subsidies (Hermes and Lensink, 2011).  
Nevertheless, there are very different views of the current status of subsidies. For example 
Cull et al. (2009) explains that the poorest people could be served without on-going subsidies. 
They state that it is more the norm than exception to earn profit in microfinance industry and 
therefore  the  full  promise  of  microfinance  seems  to  be  achievable.  They  found  out  that  the  
median nongovernmental organization do earn profits, thanks to the relatively high interest 
rates. Following to that they state that the profits are actually rather remarkable given the 
longstanding presumption that meaningful service to the poor can be done only with subsidy, 
a presumption consistent with mainstreaming economic theory. Cull et al. (2009) claims that 
57 % of all MFIs and 54 % of all nonprofit MFIs in their sample were profitable. In addition, 
they  found  out  that  87  %  of  all  the  borrowers  were  served  by  the  profitable  firms.  The  
differences may come from the fact that institution can be profitable even though they would 
receive  a  large  amount  of  subsidies.  Therefore  it  seems  that  there  is  a  potential  for  
microfinance institutions to become profitable but there is still a lot of work to do before 
institutions can claim to be financially sustainable and profitable.  
One of the fears of relying on subsidies is that it can undercut both scale and efficiency. 
Hartarskam (2005) shows the negative relationship between donors and operational self-
sufficiency. This may indicate that donor representatives’ ability to raise funds may have 
brought in easy money and, thus, lower incentives for sustainability. Morduch (2005) 
highlights the importance of recognizing that the same forces driving efficient outcomes in 
free markets, such as hard budget constraints, clear bottom lines, and competitive pressure, 
should also be deployed in contexts with subsidies. If deployed well, there are circumstances 
in which subsidies can increase the scale of microfinance outreach, access to commercial 
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finance, and depth of outreach to the poor (Morduch, 2005). Hudin and Traca (2011) find that 
subsidies  have  had  a  positive  impact  on  efficiency,  in  the  sense  that  MFIs  that  receive  
subsidies are more efficient than those that do not. Nevertheless when the subsidies increase 
beyond a certain threshold level, the marginal effect on efficiency turns to negative. Hudin 
and Trace (2011) research explores that 26% of MFIs receive levels of subsidization higher 
than that threshold, which implies that a marginal cut on subsidy intensity would increase 
their  efficiency.  Results  can  be  interpreted  in  a  way  that  small  subsidies  allow  MFIs  to  
increase the productivity of their staff, but beyond a certain threshold, they lower productivity 
in line with the moral hazard arguments. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a shift from subsidizing MFIs institutions to a focus on 
financial sustainability and efficiency of these institutions. This goal stresses the importance 
of being able to cover the cost of lending money out of the income generated from the 
outstanding loan portfolio and to reduce these costs as much as possible (Hermes and Lensink, 
2011). In general, subsidies have both advantages and disadvantages. The most important 
thing is to be able to implement possible subsidies in a sustainable way.        
3.1.5.  Measures of profitability 
Profitability of institution can be measured with several proxies. Most commonly used are 
probably operational self-sufficiency (OSS), financial self-sufficiency (FSS), return on assets 
(ROA) and profit margin. OSS is financial revenues divided by the sum off financial expenses, 
impairment loss and operating expense. The measure indicates whether lenders cover their 
operating costs and therefore the ratio is a rough measure of efficiency (Armendáriz and 
Morduch, 2010). Financial self-sufficiency on the other hand is adjusted operating revenue 
divided by the sum of adjusted financial expenses, loan loss provision expenses and operating 
expense. ROA is the ratio of net operating income after taxes over average total assets, to 
measure profitability. It measures how well MFI use its total assets to generate returns. Profit 
margin is the net operating income divided by the financial revenue. 
3.2. Outreach 
3.2.1.  Reaching the poorest of the poor to alleviate poverty 
Outreach in microfinance discussion describes how well the poorest people are reached and 
how well  MFIs are able to meet their  poverty alleviation mission. The measures of outreach 
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are rough estimations of the actual outreach. Schreiner (2002) introduces different dimensions 
of outreach which include worth, cost, depth, breadth, length, and scope. This framework 
encompasses both the poverty lending approach and the self-sustainability approach (similar 
to financial systems approach). The poverty lending approach assumes that it is best to help a 
few very poor people a lot for a short time with only loans. The self-sustainability approach 
assumes that it is best to help many less-poor people a little for a long time with a range of 
financial services (Schreiner 2002). Schreiner concludes that most of the dimensions are 
difficult to measure and it is especially true in large datasets as one used in my research.  
Quayes (2012) defines that social outreach generally refers to either breadth of outreach or 
depth of outreach. It may occasionally include outreach to women borrowers. Breath of 
outreach is measured by the number of people a MFI has extended credit to, or the number of 
borrowers over a specific time period. Depth of outreach is defined as access of credit 
disbursement to poor people; wherein the poorer the borrowers are the greater is the depth of 
outreach. I use the depth of outreach as my primary dimension. It is the dimension that 
measures best the social focus of the institutions and is used in many other studies (e.g. 
Hermes et al., 2011; Cull et al, 2007).  
It  is  still  important  to  remember  that  poverty  outreach  does  not  mean that  institutions  could  
achieve each individual borrower. The question is more about the level of outreach and that a 
large scale of very poor people is reached, not all the poor people. Byström (2008) explains 
that  it  is  obvious  that  the  most  credit  risky  borrowers  will  never  be  able  to  get  cheap  
commercial funding. They will continue having to turn to money lenders or their social 
networks. This means that profit seeking institutions won’t borrow to those individuals and 
they need help in a development aid based systems. Byström (2008) reminds that one should 
never forget that microfinance is no panacea for complete poverty reduction. There will 
always be people whose basic needs have to be supported by specific development programs: 
either because they simply are too poor or because they for some other reason are unable to 
find  an  economic  opportunity  no  matter  how  cheap  the  funding  is.  And,  finally,  there  will  
always be people that are never reached by any safety net, no matter how fine meshed the net 
is. Byström’s (2008) finding is extremely important to keep in mind when studying the 
outreach of the institutions. Without that, the extreme examples may bias the whole research.   
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3.2.2.  Measures of outreach 
There are several proxies to measure outreach such as an average loan size and percentage of 
women borrowers. Other commonly used measures for outreach are the use of group lending 
methods and proportion of rural populations (Mersland and Strøm, 2010). In my study, I have 
ended up using average loan balance and proportion of female borrowers and I explain those 
two more carefully in this chapter.  
Average loan balance is divided by GDP per capita to provide comparable results for all the 
countries. In general, it is seen that smaller loan balances reflect to more focus on poor, bigger 
proportion of poor people in the customer base and therefore better outreach. Increasing 
average loan balance is expected to have positive effect on profitability if the tradeoff exists. 
There are some indications that the average loan size is not the best possible measurement to 
study the outreach of the poor even though it is a largely used proxy in the industry. For 
example Mosley and Hulme (1998) explain that many studies avoid calculations of poverty 
impact and often treat the fact that small loans are being made as the proof that the poor are 
being reached and the fact that loans are being repaid as proof that incomes have increased. 
Galema and Lensink (2009) explore the problem relating to outliers, because an MFI can 
appear to have less outreach, when it has just a few very large borrowers that distort average 
loan size upward. They also argue that cross-subsidization of smaller loans with larger loans 
can increase total outreach. Armendáriz and Szafarz (2011) argue that in richer regions like 
Latin America, there is actually more scope for cross-subsidization. This implies that the 
higher average loan size is not necessarily a sign of mission drift. In addition, comparing 
average loan size across countries is problematic since different countries are in different 
stages of development. This leads to a situation where a large loan in one country can be a 
small loan in another. Regardless of these shortcomings, the average loan size/loan balance is 
the most commonly used and accurate proxy for the outreach (e.g. Schreiner, 2002; Cull t al. 
2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). 
Because average loan balance is not the perfect measurement, I also use the proportion of the 
women as an indicator of outreach. Women have become a focus of microfinance worldwide. 
Maes and Reed (2012) show that from 1999 to 2010, the number of poorest women reached 
has increased from 10.3 million to 113.1 million. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) explain 
that women may be better from the microfinance institution’s standpoint and they may 
enhance efficiency in a broader economic sense. Both ex ante and ex post moral hazard can be 
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more easily reduced while borrowing for women. Women do not have that many 
opportunities to obtain credit and therefore they are willing to commit different kind of strings 
attached e.g. weekly repayment and small loan amounts. Women are also poorer and therefore 
their marginal utility function is deeper compared to men. Women are also less mobile which 
makes them more safe targets to borrow. Women have been shown to repay their loans more 
often and to direct a higher share of enterprise proceeds to their families (Karlan and 
Goldberg, 2007). Pitt and Khandker (1998) find out that consumption increases by 18 
percentages when lending to women but only 11 percentages when lending to men. They also 
explain  that  women  are  more  reliable  and  have  higher  payback  ratios,  credit  for  women  
increases the household consumption level significantly more than credit for men and women 
use  more  substantial  part  of  their  income  for  health  and  education  of  their  children.  In  
addition, the annual household consumption increases significantly more if credit is provided 
for women (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). Pitt and Khandler (2006) found that women 
empowerment increases remarkably through microfinance. Credit programs for women 
enable them to take greater role in household decision making, greater access to financial and 
economic resources, greater social networks, greater bargaining power against their husbands, 
and to have greater freedom of mobility. 
Percentage of female borrowers is an important proxy to measure outreach of the institutions. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  not  perfect  and  there  are  difficulties  with  all  the  proxies  used  for  the  
outreach. Critics think for example that at times women need to hand the money back to men 
who use the money and women are burden with the responsibility of the repayment (Hermes 
and Lensink, 2011).  
3.3. Trade-off between profitability and outreach 
3.3.1.  Is it possible to achieve both profitability and poverty outreach? 
One of the most controversial issues in microfinance has been the extent of the trade-off 
between profitability and reaching the poorest clients. These two objectives are the 
cornerstone of the microfinance industry and it is a very controversial issue whether these 
objectives are in conflict. Many of the studies today have found trade-off between 
profitability and outreach to some extend (e.g. Mosley, 1996; Mosley and Holme, 1998; 
Galema and Lensink, 2009; Hermes et al. 2011). Still there are other studies that show that the 
trade-off is not significant or it exists only in certain situations (e.g. Gonzales and Rosenberg, 
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2006; Cull et al., 2007; Hishigsuren, 2007; Mersland and Oysten, 2010; Mersland and Strøm, 
2010; Quayes, 2012). The trade-off refers to a situation that institution would not be able to 
achieve high profitability without losing its outreach to poor people. If the trade-off exists, it 
means that profitable institutions are not able to reach the poorest of the poor, who need the 
microfinance services most. If trade-off would not exist, it means that institutions with higher 
profitability are able to generate more revenues or reduce more costs compared to less 
profitable institutions. They are therefore able to compensate higher cost of reaching the 
poorest in some other way. If the trade-off would not exist, it would indicate a positive future 
for commercialized microfinance institutions. Those would have a huge profit generating and 
poverty reduction potential. 
Trade-off between profitability and depth of outreach stems from the fact that transaction 
costs  have  a  fixed  cost  component  so  that  unit  costs  for  smaller  savings  deposits  or  smaller  
loans are high compared to larger financial transaction (Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). Cull et 
al. (2009) states that when both large and small loans require similar outlays for screening, 
monitoring, and processing loans, the small loans will be far less profitable unless interest 
rates and fees can be raised substantially. This law of decreasing unit transaction costs with 
larger size transactions generates the trade-off between financial sustainability and improved 
outreach to the poor (Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). In addition, Cull et al. (2011) find that 
administrative costs per dollar lent are much higher for small loans than for large loans, the 
interest rates necessary to cover all costs (including costs of funds and loan losses) are much 
higher for MFI loans than for conventional bank loans. There are also opposite hypotheses 
and  for  example  Quayes  (2012)  finds  out  that  lower  costs  are  associated  with  smaller  sized  
loans. This may be due to the fact that the terms and conditions of small loans are 
standardized and routine, and as such have a lower cost per borrower. Quayes (2012) also 
notes that many group loans are smaller in size and require lower cost of monitoring on part 
of the MFI management. In contrast, relatively larger loans may entail higher administrative 
costs and result in a higher cost per borrower. The trade-off between profitability and outreach 
would imply that shifting focus towards increasing sustainability and profitability reduces the 
scope for the more traditional social aim of the MFIs to serve the poorest people. 
To cover the higher costs of providing small loans, MFIs may set higher interest rates or 
reduce their costs. Cull et al. (2007) find the evidence that there is the possibility of earning 
profits while serving the poor but it often demands high interest rates. Due to these higher 
interest rates, also MFIs that offer relatively small loans are able to make a small profit (Cull 
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et al., 2009). Ylinen (2010) also explores that there are advocates that promote the idea that 
interest rates should be raised to cost-covering levels. On the other hand economic theory 
finds several reasons why the rates should not be raised too high. Cull et al. (2007) also find 
that raising fees to very high levels does not necessarily ensure greater profitability. Most of 
the researchers suggest that it is not the target to provide small loans with extremely high 
interest rates. That is not a good way to reach poverty reduction. Ylinen (2010) concludes that 
even though some poor people have proved to be able to pay high interest rates, it does not 
mean that they all can because the non-financial abilities of the poor vary greatly. Therefore, 
improving efficiency could help enlarge market penetration and improve profitability of the 
MFIs.  Through efficiency, MFIs are also able to facilitate the social  mission, when they can 
pass the cost savings into lower interest rates. 
Mission drift means that institutions would suffer even larger tradeoff between profitability 
and poverty outreach while they grow and mature. Mission drift can be used as a synonym for 
the trade-off studies but it is easily mixed with cross-subsidization or progressive lending and 
therefore it is not easy to determine. Mission drift is widely used concept in microfinance 
discussions which tries to answer to question: Have microbanks moved away from serving 
their poorer clients in pursuit of commercial viability? Armendáriz and Szafarz (2011) define 
mission  drift  as  a  phenomenon whereby  an  MFI  increases  its  average  loan  size  by  reaching  
out to wealthier clients neither for progressive lending not for cross-subsidization. One 
general mistake is that it would be necessarily bad to provide financial services to the 
wealthier clients even though it is usually necessary to be able to serve the poorest clients in a 
profitable way. Based on the Armendáriz and Szafarz (2011) cross-subsidization occurs by 
mixing richer and poorer customers. This helps microfinance institutions to meet their 
outreach-maximization objectives, particularly when the continued flow of funds from 
international donors/local governments and socially responsible investors is biased in favor of 
self-sustainable institutions. Armendáriz and Szafar (2009) bring up a very relevant point that 
maybe mission drift should not be measured only based on the customers that MFI is lending 
to. Should for example high interest rates for monopoly holding MFI be included to the 
definition of mission drift? Too high interest rates from the poorest of the poor are not clearly 
aligned with the poverty reduction mission. 
It is also important to note that the question is not black and white and clearly the effect will 
exist  in  some  situation  with  some  conditions.  Gonzales  and  Rosenberg  (2006)  state,  the  
practical question is not whether there is some trade-off between MFI profitability and client 
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poverty, but whether such a trade-off has significant force in the circumstances in which most 
MFIs are actually operating. Gonzales and Rosenberg (2006) define that in the first place 
some potential borrowers who are extremely poor, have no reliable source of income from 
which a loan could be repaid, and lack the opportunity to start microbusiness. They also state 
that secondly, some very poor people live in remote and sparsely populated areas where 
administrative costs of lending are extremely high, and where interest rates would have to be 
correspondingly  high  to  cover  those  costs.  Clearly  it  cannot  be  profitable  to  lend  to  people  
who are unlikely to repay. Therefore there are exceptions and poverty outreach doesn't mean 
that each individual poor would be reached. Trade-off studies rather investigate whether poor 
people can be reached in a large scale while maintaining profitability of the operations.  
3.3.2. Empirical evidence of the trade-offs 
There are some cross-country studies relating to the tradeoff between profitability and 
outreach. Proponent of the existence of the tradeoff is for example Mosley (1996) who studies 
the change from NGO to commercialized bank. He explains that objectives to reduce poverty 
and achieve financial self-sufficiency are often conflicting. He claims that poverty reduction 
decreases with the loan sizes whereas financial performance improves with loan size as 
economies  of  scale  are  reaped.  In  addition,  Hermes  et  al.  (2011)  find  that  MFIs  that  have  a  
lower average loan balance or MFIs that have more women borrowers as clients are less 
efficient. One important reason is the higher cost for borrowing to the poorest. In addition, if 
MFIs focus on maximizing efficiency, mission drift might be stimulated, since MFIs serving 
the poorer parts of the population are less efficient. Also, Galema and Lensink (2009) explore 
that MFIs face a trade-off between returns and outreach, since it is more costly to borrow to 
very poor borrowers. They also face a trade-off between risk and outreach, since it is typically 
more  risky  to  finance  the  types  of  MFIs  that  serve  the  poorest  borrowers.  Moreover,  
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) state that recent studies have shown a correlation between 
commercialization and a decline in the percentage of female clients as a share of total clients. 
On the other hand, there are several studies that show that institution could achieve both 
profitability and poverty outreach. For example Quayes (2012) concludes that there is 
complementary positive relationship between depth of outreach and financial self-sufficiency. 
He  concludes  that  it  does  not  matter  whether  the  financial  sustainability  is  self-imposed  by  
MFI or required by the donor agencies. Also Gonzales and Rosenberg (2006), using data of 
2600 MFIs, show that there is no conflict between financial sustainability and outreach.  They 
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show that there is no indication that serving poorer customers tends to hurt financial 
performance seriously. In addition, for example Hishigsuren (2007) concludes that institution 
won’t drift from their mission because the deliberate decision by the management but more 
because of the challenges posed by the scaling-up process. He researched only very limited 
number of institutions in India to see if the trade-off is existent in some specific situation. He 
finds out that the MFI has not drifted from its poverty alleviation mission significantly when 
the drift is measured in terms of depth, quality, and scope of outreach. There are some 
minimal shifts but those are not large enough to indicate abandonment of the poorer members.  
There are also several studies that find trade-off existing for some of the institutions but not 
for all of them. These studies indicate that tradeoff may be a problem in a certain situations. 
For example Mersland and Oystein (2010) find that the average loan size has not increased in 
the  industry  as  a  whole,  nor  is  there  a  tendency  towards  more  individual  loans  or  a  higher  
proportion of lending to urban customers. Nevertheless, Mersland and Oystein (2010) found 
that  inefficient  MFIs  need  to  shift  their  loan  portfolios  toward  larger  average  loans  and  are  
then  most  susceptible  to  mission  drift.  They  also  find  that  when  an  MFI  increases  its  cost  
efficiency, it is better able to advance loans to the poorer members of the community. In 
addition,  Cull  et  al.  (2007)  find  no  evidence  on  trade-off  between  their  measures  of  
profitability and outreach. They find some institutions that have both achieved profitability 
and meaningful outreach to the poor, but disaggregation by lending-type reveals trade-offs 
between the two objectives. Individual-based lenders as a group have the highest average 
profit levels, but they perform least well on measures of outreach. Individual based lenders 
find it cost effective to increase the average loan size. The lenders need to consider whether it 
can make sense to shift focus to wealthier borrowers who can absorb larger loans, even at the 
sacrifice  of  outreach  to  the  poorest  segments  in  a  community  (Cull  et  al.,  2007).  They  also  
find that larger and older microbanks focus increasingly on clients that can absorb larger loans. 
Morover, Zeller and Johannssen (2006) did the research about the poverty outreach depending 
on  the  type  of  institution  in  the  Peru  and  Bangladesh,  in  two counties  where  there  is  a  long  
developed microfinance sector. The analysis shows that microfinance institutions are able to 
reach the poor, but that also a large share of their clients belongs to the non-poor population.  
Differences in trade-off may therefore depend on the institution types, but also on the 
environment that MFI is operating. Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) conclude that based on 
their market-failure hypothesis, mission drift is less likely in the countries with well-
developed financial systems. MFIs serve poorer people in countries with well-developed 
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financial systems. In the countries with well-developed financial systems, traditional financial 
institutions and microfinance institutions stand in more direct competition with each other. 
This competition pushes MFIs down the market and makes mission drift by MFIs more likely. 
In addition some other studies find only slight or no evidence of trade-off in a microfinance 
industry  as  a  whole,  but  the  trade-off  is  often  evident  when  dividing  the  sample  to  smaller  
groups. 
There has also been discussion on incentives for MFIs to prevent the trade-off between 
profitability and outreach. Aubert et al. (2009) show how a positive correlation between 
wealth and repayment gives rise to problems in designing internal incentives for agents in 
pro-poor  MFIs.  They  explore  the  situation  where  the  costs  of  acquisition  of  information  on  
wealth  and  auditing  are  high  and  the  share  of  very  poor  in  the  population  of  potential  
borrowers is large. In this case, MFI will prefer to give incentives to agents to select based on 
the ability of repayment forgetting poverty levels. To bring up right kind of incentives, pro-
poor targeting can be done by selecting impoverished geographical areas or by using financial 
products that are only attractive to poor borrowers. The problem arouses because some large 
areas are left uncovered and the method has a cost on the poor. For these reasons, improving 
methods to gather information on wealth and carrying low-cost audits is a priority to prevent 
mission drift among pro-poor MFIs. 
4. Institution types in microfinance industry 
4.1.  Institution type based on agency theory 
Institutions are different in forms of ownership, agency problems and governance. As Fama 
and Jensen (1983) state, the analyses of performance cannot be done independently of the 
question of governance. In regards to asymmetric information in microfinance industry the 
impact of institution type is relevant due to the different ownership structures. Agency 
problems usually arise in separation of ownership and management. Different institution types 
have their own ways to go through the information asymmetry problems and adapt to 
different  control  systems.  Therefore  the  institution  type  of  the  MFIs  is  one  of  the  main  
interests in my thesis. 
One of the most well-known investigations about the institution type of the firm is the Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) research where they research property rights, agency theory and the 
theory of ownership structure for the firm. In the corporate governance literature, this problem 
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is known as the agency problem. This literature refers to the manager as an agent, who unlike 
a principal, does not own the resources of the firm. The principal bears the residual risk and is 
the residual claimant of the firm’s wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Costs associated with 
this problem are called agency costs and represent costs that residual claimants bear in order 
to benefit from the professional services of managers. The goal of many governance 
mechanisms is to minimize agency costs by aligning the objectives of the owner-principal 
with the objectives of the manager-agent. Agency costs stems from the separation of the 
ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The costs can be minimizes depending 
on the way of organizing the management and control of the organization. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) state that the agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort 
by two or more people even though there is not clear cut principal-agency relationship. The 
most relevant agency problem in a relation to institution type is the one between the owners 
and the management as stated in the general theory.  
In addition the owner-management relationship, the lender-borrower relations is crucial in the 
microfinance industry. In that case the agency problem refers to a situation where lender 
(agent) wants to do business with the borrower (agent). In the microfinance industry, the 
agency theory can also be thought in a way that the top management is the principal and loan 
officers (or other field staff) are the agents. By defining the relationship in this way, 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010 p. 352) are able to study the difficulties that the management 
have in working with the staff members to whom the daily decisions are delegated. Managers 
must decide how to adequately reward their unobserved effort in order to most effectively 
maximize the institution’s objectives. Based on this framework, management capacity of the 
MFI is one of the most important factors defining the success of the microfinance institutions. 
Microfinance industry brings some new viewpoint to the agency theory because donors are 
one of the main stakeholder groups. The principal-agent relationship can equally be applied to 
the relationship between the MFI and the donor (Mersland and Strøm, 2008). Donors may 
have problems of entrusting their money to microfinance institutions that are owned by profit-
motivated investors (Mersland and Strøm 2008).  
Hannsman (1996) states that the agency costs stem from the market based contracts between 
the enterprise and its stakeholders like employees, customers, donors, debt holders and from 
the practice of ownership between management and the owners as well as between the owners 
themselves. The argument is that the ownership cost can be minimized depending how the 
ownership is organized. Hanssman’s (1996) logical reasoning that the intrinsic differences 
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between shareholders owned and NGOs lie in who controls the organization and who receives 
the profit from it. Also Mersland (2009) assumes based on the Hannsmann (1996) logical 
framework that different costs will be incurred depending whether the ownership is assigned 
to investors and customers compared to non-governmental organizations.  
4.2. Introduction to different institution types 
Fernando (2004) explains that the microfinance industry is going through a significant global 
change and the importance of the shareholder firms is increasing remarkably. Microfinance 
was largely an operation of NGOs and state-sponsored programs until the late 1980. At that 
time regulated and shareholder owned institutions started to provide a range of financial 
services to poor and low-income households. This change is largely due to transformation of 
NGOs to shareholder-owned firms. In recent years, the industry has been encouraged towards 
more regulated institutions and the general viewpoint has been that shareholder firms are the 
best way to organize operations. For example Mersland (2009) states that shareholder firms 
(in the thesis banks and NBFIs) are the most appropriate way of ownership defined in the 
literature. The main arguments are that banks can be regulated by banking authorities, accept 
deposits provide larger range of better quality services, be independent from donors, attract 
private equity capital and benefit from superior corporate governance because they are 
privately owned. Fernando (2004) states that in regards to profitability and outreach, 
shareholder owned firms have performed much better in comparison to conventional financial 
institutions. 
Institution types may be divided in different ways, but I use division to banks, non-bank 
financial institutions (NBFI), cooperatives & credit unions and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO). I present the findings of the earlier literature based on these groups 
even though the categorization has been different in some of the earlier studies. Rural banks 
are not included in my analyses (similarly to Cull  et  al.,  2009),  because they are often state-
run banks, sample size is very small and varying subsidy and operational policies imply. They 
target clients who live and work in non-urban areas and who are generally involved in 
agricultural-related activities. 
Banks can be either government owned or shareholder owned institutions. MixMarket defines 
that banks are licensed financial intermediaries regulated by a state banking supervisory 
agency. They may provide any of a number of financial services, including: deposit taking, 
lending,  payment  services,  and  money  transfers.  Microbanks  represent  a  wide  array  of  
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institutions. Common is their primary operational focus on reaching financial sustainability. 
Zeller and Johannsen (2006) explain that they differ from commercial banks in two aspects. 
First,  they  acknowledge  and  wish  to  serve  the  demand  for  financial  services  for  micro  and  
small-scale customers and entrepreneurs. But they often avoid mentioning the word poor or 
poverty in their mission statements. Second, they use collateral substitutes and other 
innovations, just like other MFIs. Microbanks include the state-owned community-level banks 
or micro-banks “built from scratch” with technical assistance from consulting companies 
(Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). Their main difference with credit unions and village banks is 
that  they  are  not  owned  by  their  members,  but  either  by  individuals  or  legal  entities.  Legal  
entities can be the state, NGOs, private companies, or individuals, or a mix of all. Zeller and 
Johannsen (2006) point out that while the social and poverty focus of member-based MFIs is 
clearly embedded in the ownership and therefore incentive structure, microbanks depend on 
the social commitment of its owners to make compromises between making more profit and 
staying at the lower end of the market. Because of their profit orientation, microbanks offer 
relatively high loan sizes. Therefore they may be unlikely to reach the poor in any significant 
number. However, these better-off clients may not have any access to traditional commercial 
banks and loans to small and medium enterprises can make an indirect contribution to poverty 
reduction, e.g., by creating jobs for the poor people. While depth of outreach may not be their 
comparative advantage, the advantages of microbanks lie in serving the neglected middle 
market (Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). In regards to ownership theories, banks are similar to 
private companies. They are characterized by the separation of management and control 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The managerial power seems to be smaller in banks compared for 
example to NGOs. As Fama and Jensen (1983) explain the lack of autonomy and 
independence in shareholder owned firms can reduce the effectiveness of the organization and 
to expropriation by managers.   
Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) are shareholder owned firms. NBFIs provide 
similar services to those of banks, but are licensed under a separate category. The separate 
license may be due to lower capital requirements, to limitations on financial service offerings, 
or to supervision under a different state agency. In some countries this corresponds to a 
special category created for microfinance institutions (MixMarket). Armendáriz and Morduch 
(2010) state that nonbank financial institutions tend to have more efficient processes while 
retaining the flexibility of less commercial institutions. Based on the Hannsman (1996) 
ownership strategy, in NBFIs, shareholders control the organization, decide on how to 
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distribute profits, and are free to sell their privileges. In regards the agency costs, the interests 
of owners and management are not fully aligned in shareholder owned firms similarly to 
banks. Therefore it causes some risks for the managing the organization. The agency cost can 
be mitigated in similar way than in other for-profit institutions.  
Cooperatives and credit unions are registered under a country’s cooperative law or are 
included as a special category in the banking law, but may lack effective external supervision 
or authorizing legislation. They are non-profit, member-based financial intermediaries and 
may offer a range of financial services, including lending and deposit taking, for the benefit of 
its members. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) define that credit unions and cooperatives tend 
to be embedded in their communities, and they can benefit from the ability to collect savings. 
These institutions often face governance issues because members who are net savers have 
different  priorities  compared  to  members  that  are  net  borrowers.  The  borrowers  are  often  
more homogeneous compared to other institution types. While not regulated by a state 
banking supervisory agency, it may come under the supervision of regional or national 
cooperative council (MixMarket). Zeller and Johannsen (2006) state that the major 
comparative advantages of credit unions lie in their ability to service large numbers of 
depositors in urban as well as higher-potential rural centers and use these savings to provide a 
diversified range of loans to individual members. Based on the Hanssman (1996) theory, in 
the case of cooperatives, the control is in the hands of members through the voting rights. The 
members are also the only ones who are financially supposed to benefit from the company. In 
regards the agency theory, it could be thought that in cooperatives the interests of the 
principal and the agent are well-aligned since the owners are the ones that also manage and 
use the institution’s benefits. While most members of credit unions are for non-poor people, 
this type of institution also reaches many poor people because of the breadth of outreach 
(Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). Since the members, owners, management and borrowers are 
mostly the same people, the information asymmetry problems can be reduced through this 
institution type. Labie and Périlleux (2008) study credit unions and find out that  this form of 
institutions are clearly growing and the growth is based on the development of networks. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are organizations registered as a nonprofit for tax 
purposes or some other legal charter. The financial services of NGOs are usually more 
restricted and do not usually include deposit taking. These institutions are typically not 
regulated by a banking supervisory agency (MixMarket). As Armendáriz and Morduch (2010 
p. 347-375) find out NGOs are flexible and innovative, but they can suffer from weak 
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governance because stakeholders are often passive and only weakly influence management. 
Based on the Hannsman theory (1996), there may be several main stakeholders, but no 
particular group or person can legally claim ownership of it or receive residual earnings from 
it. The practice of ownership involves costs such as agency costs from the separation of the 
ownership and the cost of collective decision making. The hypotheses based on Jensen’s and 
Meckling’s (1976) agency theory would be that the agency costs are higher for NGOs because 
they do not have a specific owner. Nevertheless, NGOs may be able to offset that loss in 
agency cost by reducing customer adverse selection and moral hazard due to closer customer 
relations and better tapping into local information networks (Hanssman, 1996). Cull et al. 
(2009) found out in their study that among the leading institutions, nongovernmental 
organizations are far from peripheral: they serve more borrowers overall and more borrowers 
on profit-making bases. This statement holds only before controlling the subsidies. After 
doing the adjustments to subsidization, it seems that without subsidies, these institutions 
would not be able to achieve profits. Moreover Hanssman (1996) argues that NGOs can 
operate successfully in more imperfect market compared to other types of microfinance 
institutions. 
Microfinance sector has many specific characters and therefore all the effects cannot be taken 
directly from the other industries. Most equity holders in shareholder owned firms (NBFIs or 
banks) are NGOs which may indicate that the type of ownership probably matters less in 
microfinance than in other industries (Mersland and Strøm, 2008). Cull et al. (2009) states 
that trends in outreach will likely shift towards private sector banks as they grow and spread, 
but today nongovernmental organizations and other nonprofits maintain a large and distinct 
niche. For these reasons and changes, it is very important to do the through research whether 
the institutional type in reality has some effect on the financial and social performance of the 
microfinance institutions.  
4.3. Performance and institution type 
Most of the earlier studies have found some differences in profitability and outreach regarding 
institution type. Nevertheless, the effect of institution type to trade-off equation has not been 
studied comprehensively before.  
There are several studies that show significant difference based on the institution type. 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) study shows a significant difference in financial performance, 
efficiency, size, solvency and portfolio status according to the legal status of MFI. They 
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measure performance with different dimensions: profitability, commercial performance, 
social performance and organizational efficiency. The results depend on the dimension used. 
However, they found that private microfinance companies are more sustainable compared to 
NGOs. On the other hand, for example Cull et al. (2009) shows the more commercially 
oriented  MFIs  focus  on  better  of  clientele.  MFIs  seem in  this  way to  act  more  and  more  as  
pure commercial banks. Moreover, Cull et al. (2011) did the research about the effects of 
regulation and supervision on MFI performance and outreach. They found out by controlling 
for the non-random assignment of supervision via treatment effects and instrumental variables 
regression, the evidence consistent with the hypotheses that profit-oriented microfinance 
institutions respond to supervision by maintaining profit rates. Nevertheless, those institutions 
curtail  outreach  to  women  and  customers  that  are  costly  to  reach.  On  the  other  hand,  the  
institutions with a weaker commercial focus instead tend to reduce profitability but maintain 
outreach. Based on these findings, some national legal frameworks consider NGOs and most 
cooperatives as inferior to banking organizations (Mersland, 2009). One consequence has 
been a call for NGOs to transform into shareholder firms (Fernando, 2004; Mersland, 2009). 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010 p.242) also state that the most important shift for a 
commercialized institution is the ability to distribute profits to shareholders. Nothing bars 
NGOs from earning profits and many NGOs even do that. However, profit earned by an NGO 
cannot be distributed to shareholders. Instead, profit is generally re-invested in the institution. 
With transformation into a fully regulated, commercial business, profit can be earned by 
investors, providing the opportunity to attract shareholders with only limited social goals 
giving commercial microfinance institutions access to vast pool of capital.  
On the other hand, Mersland and Strøm (2008) found that difference between shareholder 
owned (banks and NBFI) MFIs and non-governmental MFIs is minimal in regards of 
performance. They recommend that instead of transforming NGOs to commercial institutions, 
governments could support adaption of legal framework allowing well-performing NGOs to 
mobilize savings. Mersland and Strøm (2008) found that NGOs are not more socially oriented 
than shareholder firms and shareholder firms are not more commercially oriented compared to 
NGOs. Shareholder firm’s superiority in scale and scope do not seem to be related to 
ownership type, but to the legal constraints which impede most NGOs from mobilizing 
savings. They conclude that NGOs are driven by the same economic rationality as any other 
banks. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) end up to a similar conclusion and found no 
difference in performance or outreach depending on the legal form (regulated/unregulated). 
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However they find that MFIs collecting savings, achieve better outreach which implicates 
many indirect benefits from regulation. Nevertheless, higher capitalization rates or bigger 
leverage won’t increase outreach. Hartarska (2005) also studied corporate governance in East 
European MFIs and didn’t find the effect of organizational structure on performance.  
Findings from the literature relating the institution type are inconclusive. Many of the 
researchers do not state that any form of ownership would outperform others, but admit that 
the institution types are different. This is further supported by findings in general banking 
markets as well as the pro-poor banking history, indicating that mutual and non-profit 
ownership can compete successfully with investor ownership. For example Mersland (2009) 
research the cost of ownership and found out that cost-variables related to market contracting 
favor  NGOs  and  COOPs,  whereas  most  cost-variables  related  to  the  practice  of  ownership  
favor shareholder firms. Mersland and Strøm (2008) conclude that ownership theories do not 
bring the clear predictions regarding the efficiency of different ownership types in 
microfinance markets.  
4.4. Should regulation be encouraged? 
There are also several studies that indicate that stronger regulation would effect on 
performance of the institution. Banks and cooperatives are more regulated compared to other 
institutions (Lapenu and Zeller, 2001) and therefore regulation is closely related to institution 
type. From the public policy perspective, banking regulation is justified by market failure 
arising from asymmetric information, market power and negative externalities (Freixas and 
Rochet, 1997). Asymmetric information inherent in the transaction between the financial 
intermediary and depositor is the most fundamental reason for the banking regulations 
(Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Depositors are small, dispersed, uninformed and cannot therefore 
exercise their control rights and effectively monitor managers. Market power may be the 
relevant issue if MFI operates as a local monopoly. Contagious bank runs occur when the 
failure of one bank imposes a negative externality on other banks and jeopardizes the safety 
of the payment system (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). Some MFI could create negative 
externalities but the relevant question is to what extend a small MFI operating in a niche 
market represents a threat to the payment system of a country and is this threat large enough 
to justify the cost of regulation. Solvency regulation prevents the impact of negative 
externalities but it often relies on the quality of collateral to classify the risk. However, MFIs 
usually use group loans and promise of larger loan sizes instead of collaterals.  
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Some researchers claim that the current push for commercialization and regulation of MFIs is 
not justified by cross-country studies but is based on the positive experience of transformed 
incumbents. Hartaska and Nadolnyak (2007) present some reasons to object regulations such 
as regulatory capture, creating and extracting rents and to preventing entry by the new 
competitors. In addition, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) recommend that MFI’s 
transformation into regulated financial institution may not lead to improved financial results 
or outreach. There may be some indirect impacts because MFIs collecting more savings reach 
more borrowers and the only way that MFIs can access savings is through regulation. In 
addition, Mersland and Oystein (2009) found no effect of bank regulation in financial 
performance and outreach. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) state that regulatory involvement 
may lead to a mission drift if demands to fulfill regulatory requirements (e.g. capital adequacy) 
divert attention away from serving the poor (e.g. by shifting the focus from serving poor 
clients to serving wealthier borrowers to improve capital adequacy ratios) and may hold back 
innovation in lending technology that has been the driving force behind MFIs ability to 
expand outreach and serve poor clients.   
Regulatory costs are often high for microfinance institutions because of limited scale 
economies. Relative to their assets, smaller institutions face higher costs than larger 
institutions in complying with regulations (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010 p. 259). Some of 
the requirements that regulated microfinance institutions face are the rules governing 
operations, minimum capital requirements, consumer protection, fraud prevention, 
establishing credit information services, secured transactions, interest rate limits, foreign 
ownership regulations and tax and accounting issues. In addition to that, institutions need to 
hire relatively costly personnel to handle the legal and reporting requirements of the regulated 
institution.  Even  though  the  risks  and  the  costs  related  to  intermediation  and  regulation  are  
high, many social mission institutions want to be regulated to be able to take deposits. The 
development impact of the savings is large and therefore institutions want to offer this 
possibility for the poorest of the poor.  
One important point relating to regulation is that it may be better to concentrate support and 
licensing on the small minority of MFIs whose managers show the potential to produce 
massive growth. As Gonzales and Rosenberg (2006) explain microfinance industry tends to 
be concentrated. The median share of the largest MFI in a country is one third of the entire 
market. The median share is 81 percent for the top five MFIs, and 95 percent for the top ten. 
A similar concentration is visible when looking at the worldwide market, where 9 percent of 
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the MFIs account for 75 percent of the borrowers.  Gonzales and Rosenberg (2006) claim that 
the pattern would seem to have strategic implications for development agencies and policy 
makers. In moving toward saturation of the microfinance market, it is probably not necessary 
to let “a thousand flowers bloom”. As seen the viewpoints towards regulation are varying and 
closely related to institution type. 
5. Synthesis of the literature review 
Microfinance industry has been growing tremendously in recent years and effects on over half 
a billion poor and low-income people directly or indirectly (Maes and Reed, 2012). 
Nevertheless, based on the CGAP’s (2010) forecast, there are still 2.7 billion people around 
the world that do not use formal financial services. There is a huge future demand and 
potential for microfinance industry to develop. Microfinance industry could provide access to 
finance for millions of people if able to capitalize commercial sources of funding. 
Microfinance has been able to combine the best sides from traditional formal and informal 
lending channels. Formal channels are capable of providing enough financing whereas 
informal channels provide knowledge about the local communities. As Cull et al. (2008) state 
the basic innovations to overcome the well-known problems of asymmetric information have 
been the cornerstone for the success of microfinance sector. The future development should 
be directed towards more efficient ways of operating.  
There may be a tradeoff between profitability and poverty outreach of the institution, but 
evidence is inconclusive. The reason behind the tradeoff would be the higher cost linked to 
reaching the poorest customers. It may be more expensive to go to rural areas and provide 
smaller loans to the poorest of the poor. Nevertheless, this issue can be solved by either 
increasing the interest rates to cover costs or by decreasing costs through more efficient 
operations. As seen from the literature, viewpoints relating to trade-off between profitability 
and outreach are different. There is clear need for a comprehensive cross-country study with 
new and multiple year data. At the moment, many policy decisions are made based on the 
assumptions and not well-researched facts.  
Not all the MFIs need to have the similar targets, goals and methodologies. Based on the 
literature, it cannot be stated that one institution type would be simple better than other 
because all of the types have their strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, Lapenu and Zeller 
(2001) show that more than 95 percent of the volumes of the microfinance transactions go 
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through  banks  or  cooperatives.  They  state  that  although  60  percent  of  MFIs  are  still  
unregulated, they only account for less than 2 percent of the volume of savings mobilized and 
loans disbursed. Based on these numbers, it would seem that banks and cooperatives are the 
most efficient ways to organize institution. The commercial institutions may be able to 
provide services for the much larger amount of people in developing world. Nevertheless, 
Ylinen (2010) concludes that there is room and demand for a variety of MFIs: those focusing 
on the poorest and perhaps therefore depending on donations; as well as those moving up-
market  and  serving  a  better-off  clientele  with  the  support  of  commercial  funds.  Cull  et  al.  
(2009) suggest based on their evidence that the future of microfinance is unlikely to follow a 
single path. They were investigating the profit-driven Banco Compartamos and the “social 
business” model of Grameen Bank and came into conclusion that both models have their own 
strengths. Commercial investments are necessary to fund the continued expansion of 
microfinance, but institutions with strong social missions, many taking advantage of subsidies, 
remain best placed to reach and serve the poorest customers, and some are doing so at a 
massive scale. Cull et al. (2009) conclude that the market is a powerful force, but it cannot fill 
all the gaps. In addition, Mosley and Hulme (1998) consider that there may be a need for 
different models of lending to the poorest for example focusing on the provision of the 
savings facilities, simple insurance facilities (e.g. against drought) and small consumption 
loans with flexible repayment periods. Based on the newest findings in the literature, there is 
demand for different kind of MFIs. 
6. Hypotheses for the empirical research 
Based on the academic research, it seems that no straight-forward conclusions can be drawn 
from the earlier research relating neither to trade-off nor to institution type. Nevertheless, I 
have been able to conduct three main hypotheses relevant to my thesis. The lack of 
comprehensive studies and clear-cut results strengthens the importance of my study. I start my 
empirical research by first studying profitability of the microfinance institution followed by 
its relationship to outreach. I have framed my hypotheses to get answers to my research 
questions: Q1: What are the main drivers behind the profitability function of the institution? 
Q2: Can institutions achieve both high profitability and the large outreach to the poor? Q3: 
How does the institution type effect on the profitability and poverty outreach of the institution? 
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I start the empirical part of my paper by studying the profitability function of the institution. I 
structure the model similarly to Cull et al. (2007) to identify the main factors affecting the 
profitability of the institution. I divide profitability to revenue and cost sides. Interest rates are 
the  main  driver  in  the  revenue  side.  I  scrutinize  the  effect  of  interest  rates  that  bases  on  the  
asymmetric information problems. Increasing interest rates is expected to improve 
profitability up to the certain level and after that level profitability starts to decline. I 
hypothesize that increasing interest rates decreases portfolio quality due to the adverse 
selection and moral hazard. I expect the results to be consistent with the falling demand for 
credit and thus diminishing scale economies at high interest rates. The theory behind is that 
because lenders face informal asymmetry and borrowers lack collateral, charging interest 
rates above a certain threshold aggravates problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. At 
high interest rates, only low-quality borrowers that do not expect to be able to repay would 
find it in their interest to borrow. Cull et al. (2007) explain that if the hypothesis is true, 
microfinance institutions charging relatively high interest rates should expect to face lower 
repayment rates and profitability. They also claim that the relationship in regards the 
profitability (but not portfolio quality) could also arise from demand forces: overly high 
prices may reduce demand for loans. Even though rising interest rates is important, for 
example Mersland and Strøm (2010) state that the cost side efficiency may be even more 
relevant to the overall profitability and poverty reduction potential of the institution. Based on 
these findings from the literature, I form my first hypotheses relating the profitability function 
of the institution. 
H1: The main drivers for the profitability of the microfinance institutions are increasing 
interest rates and decreasing costse.  
After understanding the roots for profitability of the institution, I proceed towards the second 
research question to form hypotheses on the outreach function. In regards the trade-off 
between profitability and outreach, my hypothesis is that higher levels of outreach are related 
to lower levels of profitability of the institution. It would indicate that MFIs experience trade-
off between profitability and outreach to the poor. This is due to the fact that it is more 
difficult and expensive to reach the poorest clients, customers may not be able to repay their 
loans and processing many small loans could be more expensive compared to few large loans. 
I test the outreach through the average loan balance of the institution as well as with the 
percentage of female borrowers. I also expect that older and larger institutions would have 
higher average loan balance and the trade-off would be larger when institutions grow and 
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mature. Earlier academic results relating to trade-off have been inconclusive as explained in 
the literature review.  
H2: MFIs experience trade-off between profitability and poverty outreach meaning that 
higher levels of profitability are related to lower levels of outreach.  
The third research question, about institution type, is studied throughout two other hypotheses 
because institution type effects on both of them. Ownership theories do not provide clear 
prediction regarding preferred ownership type in the microfinance markets. The relationship 
between ownership and either performance or outreach have been studied with inconclusive 
results. I hypothesize that the institution type effects on the trade-off equation especially 
because institutions’ cost structures differ significantly. Hermes et al. (2011) explains that the 
cost  functions may differ between types of MFI due to differences in the levels of subsidies 
these institutions receive outside. Based on the Lapenu and Zeller (2001), banks and 
cooperatives seem to have highest transaction volumes in the microfinance industry. 
Shareholder firms (banks and NBFI) and cooperatives are expected to be most profit-oriented 
institutions. Accordingly, I assume that NGOs are in general more socially oriented. Based on 
the Schreiner’s (2002) framework assumptions, more socially oriented MFIs trade off narrow 
breath,  short  length  and  limited  scope  with  greater  depth,  while  less  socially  oriented  MFIs  
trade off shallow depth with wide breath, long length and ample scope. Regarding the 
outreach, my hypothesis is that NGOs would be more socially oriented and have greater depth 
of outreach. Based on the literature, I would expect banks, NBFIs and cooperatives to trade-
off the depth of outreach to obtain higher profitability levels. I would expect banks, NBFIs 
and cooperatives to suffer more from the trade-off compared to NGOs. 
H3: Banks, non-banks financial institutions and cooperatives are more profitable and suffer 
more on the tradeoff between profitability and outreach compared to NGOs. 
In addition to these main hypotheses, it is important to remember that regional differences 
bring a lot of complication to the study. The trade-off effects are not expected to be the same 
in different regions where environment and amount of the poorest people are totally different. 
7. Empirical methodology and data 
I start my empirical analyses by introducing six different regression equations that I use to 
study profitability and outreach of the institutions. Equations 1-3 research the Hypothesis 1 
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followed by the Equations 4-6 that concentrate on the Hypothesis 2. In addition to base 
equation, I am able to study the effect of each institution type be using linear combination 
model (UCLA, 2012). By studying the linear combinations, I am able to test the null 
hypothesis that the effect of specific variable is zero when each institution type is one. 
Through this method, I am able find out the effect of each institution individually and not 
only compared to omitted category. The effect of the institution type, Hypothesis 3, is studied 
through  all  these  regression  equations.  In  addition,  I  run  oneway  ANOVA  tests  and  
Bonferroni, Scheffe, and Sidak multiple comparison tests to investigate the differences 
between institution types more closely. All the variables used in the equations are introduced 
in more detail in the Chapter 7.4.  
7.1. Regression equations 
I start my regression analyses by studying the profitability function of the institution as 
follows: 
 
 
In  the  equation,  i  refers  to  different  time  periods  and  j  to  different  variables  inside  the  
category. Profitability is measured by financial self-sufficiency (FSS), return on assets (ROA) 
and profit margin (Profit). Institution type is divided to four different categories: banks, non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs), cooperatives/credit unions and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Banks is used as an omitted category due to the fact that it is the most 
commercialized category. My study concentrates on the commercialization. By using the 
banks as a reference category, I am able to study if the effect is visible and significant in the 
most obvious category. After that I am able to study, whether some other form of institution 
type would affect positively into the equation. It is not feasible to assume that the institution 
type  would  only  change  the  intercept  of  the  regression  line  and  therefore  I  use  the  
slope/interactive dummy variables. 
In the Equations 1, 2 and 3 the orientation matrix includes three different variables that 
describe the institutions business practices. Variables are the ratio of loans to assets, the 
average loan size (relative to GNP per capita) and the formal profit status. The formal profit 
status is a dummy variable. The region variable includes dummy variables for each of the 
region. Latin America is the omitted category due to having most of the observations. 
Profitabilityi = Į + ȕ1Yieldi + ȕ2Typeij + ȕ3Yieldi* Typeij + ȕ4Personnel Costi + ȕ5Personnel 
Costi*Typeij + ȕ6Total Costi + ȕ7Total Costi*Typeij + ȕ8Agei + ȕ9Sizei + ȕ10Orientationij + 
ȕ11Regionij + İij 
(1) 
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Dougherty (2007) recommends to select the most dominant or normal category as a reference 
category.   
After conducting the first regression equation, I also include yield squared and its interaction 
terms to the equation to be able to study the effect of interest rates more carefully. In the 
Equation 2, I test the impact of rising interest rates. I study whether there is some threshold 
level for rising interest rates. I have not included the interaction terms with institution type 
and personnel/total cost into the reported equations and results, because adding those terms 
does not improve the explanatory power of the equation. The Equation 2 is as follows: 
 
 
Following to the Equation 2, it is clear that interest rates are an important factor affecting the 
profitability. I replace profitability by the portfolio quality in the Equation 3 to study if the 
declining profitability is due to worse portfolio quality. I measure the portfolio quality with 
the PaR30 ratio, loan loss ratio and write-off ratio with the following equation: 
 
 
After understanding the profitability of the institution, I start to consider outreach of the 
institution and explore the Hypothesis 2. The Equation 4 for the trade-off between 
profitability and outreach is as follows: 
 
 
Outreach is measured with two different proxies that are the average loan balance and the 
percentage of women borrowers. In the Equations 4, 5 and 6, the control variable matrix 
includes the loans to assets ratio, profit status dummy variable and the portfolio quality 
variable. These variables are expected to have impact on outreach and therefore those need to 
be included to obtain as appropriate results as possible. Otherwise components are similar to 
described above.  
Profitabilityi = Į + ȕ1Yieldi + ȕ2Yield^2i + ȕ3Typeij + ȕ4Yieldi*Typeij + ȕ5Yield^2i*Typeij + 
ȕ6Personnel Costi + ȕ7Total Costi + ȕ8Agei + ȕ8Sizei + ȕ9Orientationij + ȕ10Regionij + İi.   
(2) 
Portfolio qualityi =  Į +  ȕ1Yieldi + ȕ2Yield^2i + ȕ3Typeij + ȕ4Yieldi*Typeij + ȕ5Yield^2i*Typeij + 
ȕ6Personnel Costi + ȕ7Total Costi + ȕ8Agei + ȕ8Sizei + ȕ9Orientationij + ȕ10Regionij + İi  
(3) 
Outreachi = Į + ȕ1Profitabilityi + ȕ2Typeij + ȕ3 Profitabilityi* Typeij + ȕ4Agei + ȕ5Sizei + ȕ6Controlij 
+ ȕ7Regionij + İi 
(4) 
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After doing the basic outreach regression, I want to study the complementary effect with age 
and size. Two last equations therefore investigate the effect of maturity and size of the 
institutions. Equations are following: 
 
 
 
 
Variables are similar as described in the Equation 4. Based on these six regression equations, 
I will accept or decline my hypotheses described in the previous section. I run several 
regressions for each of the equations to be able to scrutinize the individual and pooled effects 
of each of the variables used.  
7.2. Regression estimators 
This paper uses pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and traditional panel data methods to 
study  the  profitability  and  outreach.  The  results  are  similar  with  different  equations  and  
estimators. When judging between different estimators, panel data estimator is superior to 
pooled OLS because it takes time dimension of the data into account. Due the non-linearity of 
the data, time invariant explanatory variables and heteroscedasticity problems, random-effect 
estimator  is  the  most  appropriate  estimator.  I  have  conducted  the  analyses  for  all  of  the  
equations by different methods, but mostly random effects model results are reported. In this 
section, I go through the different methods and explain why the random effects model is the 
best fit for my study.   
7.2.1. Linear estimator 
 I start the analyses with the linear ordinary least squares (OLS) model. OLS is a statistical 
technique that minimizes the sum of the squared deviations between a dependent variable and 
one or more independent variables. Linear estimator can be used to show the direction of my 
study, but at later stages, it is not the most efficient estimator. I expect that my variables could 
have concave relation instead of linear and therefore the linear estimator would not result 
sufficient conclusions. In addition, linear model won’t capitalize the time dimension of the 
data which indicates that panel data methods would be better for a large data set for multiple 
Outreachi = Į + ȕ1Profitabilityi + ȕ2Typeij + ȕ3Age + ȕ4Profitabilityi*Typeji + ȕ5Agei*Typeij + 
ȕ6Profitabilityi*Agei + ȕ7 Profitabilityi*Typeji*Agei + ȕ8Controlij + ȕ9Regionij + İi 
(5) 
Outreachi = Į + ȕ1Profitabilityi + ȕ2Typeij + ȕ3Sizei + ȕ4Profitabilityi*Typeji + ȕ5Sizei*Typeij + 
ȕ6Profitabilityi*Sizei + ȕ7Profitabilityi*Sizei*Typeij + ȕ8Controlij + ȕ9Regionij + İi 
(6) 
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years. Dougherty (2007) explains that very common problem with linear models is fitting of 
models with cross-sectional data sets that could cause bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. 
Some of  the  dynamics  in  the  data  are  detected  with  cross-sectional  data  and  therefore  panel  
data approach could better reveal the dynamics. 
Regardless of these reasons, I run OLS regression and test its appropriateness. I start with 
linear regression with estimator that is robust to certain types of misspecification as long as 
the observations are independent. If the variations for each MFI are so small that pooled 
regressions suffice, I would use pooled OLS instead of panel data estimations. ANOVA 
(Analyses Of Variance) is the statistical technique for comparing means for multiple 
independent populations. I therefore test the equality of the population means. The null 
hypothesis of the test is that the regression slopes are homogeneous for all individual MFIs at 
all  times.  Based  on  the  results  of  F  tests  at  5  % significance  level,  I  reject  the  homogeneity  
assumption and conclude that the pooled OLS regression is inappropriate. I proceed with my 
analyses with the panel data estimation similarly to Mersland and Strøm (2010).  
7.2.2. Fixed effects estimator 
The dynamic panel data approach offers advantages to OLS and therefore I run the regression 
with  traditional  panel  data  methods,  fixed  effects  and  random  effects  estimators.  One  
assumption for panel-data estimators is that the idiosyncratic errors must be homoscedastic 
and  uncorrelated  across  time.  If  assumption  does  not  hold,  estimator  will  be  inefficient  and  
biased.  
In the fixed effects estimator I would like to take into account unobserved institution specific 
variables (e.g. management capacity) that has an impact on regression. This could be done by 
estimating parameters based on the institution. When using the fixed effects estimator, I 
assume that something within the institution may impact or bias the predictor or outcome 
variables. Therefore there is assumed to be correlation between institutions error term and 
predictor  variables.  Fixed  effects  estimator  removes  the  effect  of  those  time-invariant  
characteristics from the predictor variables so it is possible to assess the predictor’s net effect 
(Torres-Reyna).  
When choosing the appropriate fixed effects estimator, I need to reject within-groups fixed 
effect method and first difference fixed effects method. Those seem appealing, because 
unobserved heterogeneity disappears. The fixed effects panel data estimation amounts to 
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subtracting the individual MFI averages from the annual observation, and performing 
regression on these transformed variables. The procedure removes individual MFI 
heterogeneity, since fixed effects are assumed constant during the observation period. Thus, 
the fixed effects are removed together with the constant.  Nevertheless, the intercept and any x 
variable that remains fixed for each individual will disappear from the model (Dougherty, 
2007). In the other words, the problem with the model is that both intercept and the any x that 
remains constant will drop out of the model. As Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) also state, a 
major shortcoming of the fixed effect model is that it cannot accommodate time invariant 
variables. This is very serious disadvantage, because variable for institution type is mostly 
fixed for span of time and therefore these methods cannot be used for my study. As Mersland 
and Strøm (2010) state using the time invariant variables gives some restrictions on methods 
used. The third common version of the fixed effect approach is known as the least squares 
dummy variable regression (LSDV) model. In the model unobserved effect is brought 
explicitly into the model. Formally, the unobserved effect is now being treated as the 
coefficient of the individual-specific dummy variable (Dougherty, 2007).  LSDV may not be 
feasible if we have large amount of parameters (Mycielski, 2007).  
I therefore try to use the feasible generalized least squares method (FEGLS). I prefer using 
FEGLS to correct serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. In theory, this regression method 
is similar to OLS if error terms are not correlated, because it only controls the unobserved 
effects that have an impact on error terms not to estimates. Therefore it does not fully control 
fixed effects, but in reality taking into consideration the correlation between error terms 
causes  results  closer  to  fixed  effects  than  OLS.  The  method  should  be  more  appropriate  
compared to normal pooled OLS because taking into account the correlation in the error terms 
drives the results closer to fixed effects estimation. Nevertheless, the GLS method won’t take 
into account the unobserved effects to estimates.  
I would like to consider the institution specific variables. Nevertheless, I have very large data 
set with almost 800 institutions; it is not feasible to create dummies for each of the institutions 
for all the time periods. Nevertheless, I am able to test the fixed effects estimation by running 
the regression for the biggest geographical area that is Latin America and Caribbean. I add the 
institution specific dummies to this regression. Due to these changes, I am able to test the 
fixed effect model and run the directional Hausman test as explained in the paragraph “7.2.4. 
Defining the appropriate estimator”.  
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7.2.3. Random effects estimator 
Dougherty (2007) explains that random effects estimator expects unobserved effects to be 
normally distributed and they cannot be correlated with the regressor. The main benefit with 
the random effects estimator is that it permits time-constant variables which enable to study of 
the institution types. Difference to fixed-effect estimator is that the random-effects estimation 
is performed assuming that the fixed effect error is part of the error term (Mersland and Strøm, 
2010). Due to the disadvantages of the fixed effects estimators, it seems that the random 
effects model is the only possible estimation technique to get proper results. To correct 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the random effects-estimator, it is estimated using 
White´s robust standard errors.  
7.2.4. Defining the appropriate estimator 
As explained earlier, panel data have many advantages and it should be used for the study. In 
addition, it seems that fixed effects estimator is not suitable for this research indicating that 
random effects estimator could be the one to use as used also by Merland and Strøm (2009). I 
still run some tests to test and confirm the most appropriate method.   
Fixed effects and random effects estimators are different in a way that fixed effects estimator 
allows  the  unobserved  effects  to  be  correlated  with  the  regressor.  Random effects  estimator  
expects unobserved effects to be normally distributed and they cannot be correlated with the 
regressor.  Fixed  effects  estimator  is  always  consistent  but  if  the  unobserved  effects  are  
correlated with the observed regressors, random effects estimator is not consistent. If the 
unobserved effects are not correlated, both estimators are consistent, but random effects 
estimator is more efficient. After approximating both models, it is important to define which 
one is more reliable. Dougherty (2007) explains that random effects estimator is more 
attractive, because observed characteristics that remain constant for each individual, are 
retained in the regression model. On contrary, in fixed effects estimation they have to be 
dropped. The other reason to prefer random effects-estimator is that I do not lose n degrees of 
freedom. Random effects estimator has two preconditions: (1) observations should be drawn 
randomly from the population and (2) unobserved effect need to be distributed independently 
of the Xj variables. If preconditions are violated, fixed effects estimator should be used. The 
first condition is met in my data, but the appropriateness of the second can be tested by 
Hausman test through examining if the unobserved effects are not correlated with the 
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regressor. If they are not violated, random effects estimator could be used and it gives more 
efficient estimates.  
After conducting the fixed effect and random effect regressions, I see that there are no large 
differences in results, which would indicate that the random effects regression could be more 
appropriate estimator to use. In addition, I would like to run the Hausman test for both 
profitability and to outreach equations. The null hypothesis is that the observations are 
distributed independently of the Xj. If this is correct, both random and fixed effects are 
consistent, but fixed effects is inefficient, because it involves estimating an unnecessary set of 
dummy variable coefficients. If the null hypothesis is false, the random effects estimates will 
be subject to unobserved heterogeneity bias and will therefore systematically differ from the 
fixed-effect estimations.  
In  this  paper  Hausman  test  cannot  be  processed  in  a  normal  way.  Using  White´s  robust  
standard  errors  in  random  effects  estimator  is  in  conflict  with  the  basic  assumptions  of  the  
Hausman test. Using White´s robust standard errors already admits that I am not dealing with 
the model in which the unobserved effects are not correlated. Hausman test cannot be used 
because I should be comparing consistent estimator to potentially inconsistent one. In this 
regression,  with  White´s  robust  standard  errors  in  random  effects  estimator,  neither  of  the  
estimators is consistent. I prefer taking into account the heteroscedasticity existing and 
therefore I use White’s robust standard errors. Thereupon, Hausman test cannot be performed. 
To be able to run the directional Hausman test, I will run the random effects regression 
without White’s robust standard errors. Due to the large data set, I am not able to run fixed 
effects regression with institution fixed effects for the whole data set. Due to this reason, I run 
the regressions only for LAC area in a way that I can include institution fixed effects into the 
equation. In profitability regression, Hausman test results value 8.81 (degrees of freedom 18) 
and for outreach regression value 8 (degrees of freedom 12). This means that I can accept the 
null hypotheses and both methods are consistent but a fixed effect is inefficient, because it 
involves estimating an unnecessary set of dummy variable coefficients.  
The Hausman test results are only directional but clearly confirm my hypotheses and earlier 
researches that the random effects estimator would be the most appropriate method to use. 
Due to the institutional type invariant, large data set, similar results in fixed effect and random 
effects estimator and directional Hausman test results, random effects model seem to be the 
best choice. 
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7.3. Data description and limitations 
The data used is collected from MixMarket which is publicly available data set from 
www.mixmarket.org. Microfinance Information Exchange (or the MIX) is a non-profit 
private organization that aims to promote information exchange in the microfinance industry. 
Database includes more than 2000 MFIs in the developing world. MFIs can voluntarily 
participate in the MixMarket database, but data entry is closely monitored by MixMarket. 
Participants have to enclose documentation that supports the data, such as audited financial 
statements and annual reports. The financial, social and operational information featured on 
each MixMarket profile is directly reported by that institution or affiliated network and/or 
gathered from the institutions’ publications (i.e. annual report). MIX analysts validate all data 
received and standardize according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
The MicroBanking Bulletin provides additional information and adjusts the financial data to 
ensure comparable results. Participating MFIs typically have three characteristics: First, they 
are willing to be transparent by submitting their performance data to an independent agency. 
Secondly, they display a strong social orientation by providing financial services to low-
income persons. Thirdly, they are able to answer all the questions needed for the analysis. 
(Microfinance Bulleting, 2010) 
MFIs that report data to MIX are awarded diamonds based on their level of transparency and 
reliability: the higher the number of diamonds, the higher the level of transparency. 
MixMarket puts the reporting MFIs into five categories. Institutions rated four-diamond and 
higher have financial statements audited by a third-party accounting firm or similar 
(MicroBulletin, 2010). I have decided to use only four-and five-diamond rated institutions to 
ensure the appropriate data input. 
My data covers years from 1995 to 2011 and includes microfinance institutions that report to 
MIX and have sufficient amount of data available. I started my analyses with 1844 MFIs from 
different parts of the world. I sorted data out by including only observations of annual data, 
only observations reported in USD and only over 4-diamond rated MFIs. After these 
adjustments, I had 842 institutions but I left out institutions that belong to rural bank category. 
These institutions are often government owned and the sample size is so small that it includes 
too many exceptional values. After these changes, my data included 799 institutions and 6039 
observations. I deleted the largest outliers and I was left with 795 institutions and 5924 
observations from 96 different countries. The data set is larger compared to earlier studies 
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conducted on the topic. Table 1 shows that there are observations from all the years 1995-
2011, but the earlier years have few observations. The majority of the observations are from 
2003 to 2011.  
Table 2 
Number of observations per year 
The table shows the number of observations per year. Most of the observations in my sample are from the years 
2003 to 2011. Therefore the recent years are more dominant in my sample. 
 
There are some limitations in MixMarket dataset. First of all, there is no comparable dataset 
that would be universally acceptable and cover the whole microfinance world. Therefore the 
institutions in this paper are selected based in large part on the quality and extent of their data. 
The data set is thus not representative of all microfinance institutions. Nevertheless, Honohan 
(2004) finds that the largest 30 microfinance institutions account for more than 90 percent of 
the clients served worldwide by the 234 top firms. I am not able to do similar comparison here 
but the evidence suggests that during the sample period the institutions here served over half 
of all microfinance customers worldwide. Cull et al. (2007) made the similar reasoning based 
on the Honohan´s findings. Other limitation is that there may be a large firm bias since many 
small firms are not included into the MixMarket dataset. MFIs that are included into the 
database need to have adequate information infrastructure to be able to provide necessary data. 
This leads into the conclusion that MixMarket database probably represents a random sample 
of  the  best  managed  MFIs  in  the  world.  Nevertheless,  it  does  not  include  any  informal  
channels of microloans that are very common in developing countries. Those are impossible 
to take into account with the worldwide dataset because it would require poll where loan 
channels would be asked from individual people. The advantage of this data is that much 
background “noise” such as very small MFIs or small development programs without 
intention to apply microfinance in a business-like manner have been filtered out. This allows 
for more realistic comparisons of institution types as Mersland and Strøm (2008) explain.   
7.4. Variables used in the regression 
I use new set of variables compared to earlier studies. I first study the profitability function of 
the institution followed by the outreach model. In the following paragraph, I go through the 
variables and their expected effect on profitability and outreach. 
Year -95 -96 -97 -98 -99 -00 -01 -02 -03 -04 -05 -06 -07 -08 -09 -10 -11
# of observations 2 21 38 67 95 135 172 260 363 451 524 573 632 697 743 748 390
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Profitability (OSS, ROA, Profit) is the dependent variable in the profitability function and 
the main explanatory variable in the outreach equation. Profitability is measured with three 
different indicators that are operational self-sufficiency (OSS), return on assets (ROA) and 
profit margin (Profit). Financial self-sufficiency (FSS) is also a very commonly used indicator, 
but I have decided to use OSS for two following reasons. First, FSS includes a cost for own 
funds of the MFI by applying the inflation rate to own funds (Crombrugghe, Tenikue and 
Sureda 2008). Second, as Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) present, since the donors monitor 
MFIs’ OSS and can exercise long-term control due to increased competition for donations, 
OSS is likely to be more reliable approximation of financial sustainability of an MFI than FSS. 
OSS, ROA and profit margin are studied in separate regression holding other variables 
constant. It seems that OSS has the most of the data (less missing observations) in my sample 
and it has been the proxy for profitability in many other studies. If the tradeoff hypothesis 
would hold, profitability would have negative impact on the outreach equation. 
Outreach (ALB, Female) is the main dependent variables in the outreach function and the 
control variable in the profitability function. It is measured with two different proxies; 
average loan balance (ALB) and the proportion of the female borrowers (Female). Average 
loan  balance  is  commonly  used  measure  for  the  outreach  also  in  the  other  studies  (e.g.  
Schreiner, 2002; Cull t al. 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). 
Real gross portfolio yield (Yield) measures the interest rates and is one of the explanatory 
variables in the profitability function. I use real gross portfolio yield as a measure of interest 
charges faced by customers since it captures both direct interest charges and any additional 
fees charged by lenders. Loan losses are not netted out of the revenues, the measure captures 
the ex-ante interest rate charged by the lender rather than the ex-post interest realized on the 
portfolio (Cull et al. 2007). For example Kar (2011) finds out that the portfolio yield is 
positively and significantly related with both measures of financial self-sufficiency which 
suggest that higher interest rates improve financial performance. That is also expected result 
in my equation. 
Real gross portfolio yield squared (Yield^2) is one of the main explanatory variables in the 
profitability function. It is expected to have negative coefficients indicating a non-linear 
association that MFI profitability and sustainability first increases, and then decreases with 
interest rates. Interest rates are crucial factor in regards the agency theory. When lenders face 
informational asymmetry and borrowers lack collateral, charging interest above certain 
56 
 
threshold could aggregate problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. At high enough 
rates, only low-quality borrowers that do not expect to be able to repay would find it in their 
interest  to  borrow.  If  the  conjecture  is  true,  microbanks  charging  high  interest  rates  should  
expect to face lower repayment rates and profitability (Cull et al., 2009). 
Institution type is the main interest of 
the study and it is as an explanatory 
dummy variable and constitute for the 
interaction terms throughout all the 
equations. I have created dummies for 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFI), 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
and cooperatives/credit unions (Coop). 
Banks are the omitted category. These 
institutional types are specified more 
carefully in the literature review section. 
Institutional type in one of the interests 
of my study and the Figure 4 illustrates 
the amount of different institution in 
the  sample.  It  can  be  seen  that  NGOs are  the  biggest  institutional  type  (47  %)  even  though 
NBFIs are almost at similar size both amounting approximately 40 percentages. 
Cooperatives/credit unions and banks both form a little over 10 percentages of the sample.   
Age is classified in MIX benchmark tables into three categories (new, young and mature) 
based on the maturity of their microfinance operations. This is calculated as the difference 
between the year they started their microfinance operations and the year of data submitted by 
the institutions. Age is expected to have a positive effect on profitability and negative effect 
on outreach. The claim is that when MFIs get older, the focus for poorest decreases and more 
effort is put towards the more well-off poor. Including age allows for the possibility to test the 
hypothesis that more experienced and older MFIs would be more efficient and therefore 
profitable. There is also an alternative hypothesis that newer institutions have been able to 
adapt new interventions and technologies from the beginning and therefore have more 
efficient operations and are able to achieve profits (Mersland and Ström, 2010). Due the 
47%
40%
13%
11%
NGO NBFI Cooperative/Credit Union Bank
Figure 5 
Division between institution types 
The figure represents the percentage part of each institution 
type in my sample. NGOs combine almost half of the 
institutions (47%) whereas NBFIs are 40 % of the sample. 
Cooperatives and credit unions each form 13 % of the 
institutions. 
57 
 
importance of the age variable I also include the multiplicative interaction terms (Equations 5) 
of age, institution type and profitability to do the through analyses of the age variable.  
Size is measured with the size of the gross loan portfolio similarly to Cull et al. (2007). Size is 
explanatory variable in both of the equations. It is expected that larger institutions are more 
profitable and therefore the relation between size and profitability is expected to be positive. 
If gross loan portfolio increases in the average loan size but no increase in the number of 
borrowers, outreach of the institution would decline. If number of borrowers increases 
accordingly, outreach would stay at the same level. Therefore the effect of size can be either 
neutral or negative to outreach. Size is similar factor with age, that suggest that less outreach 
and better profitability will follow when institution grow and mature. I also create 
multiplicative interaction terms for profitability, institution type and size in the Equation 6 
and expect to find out similar results with the age.  
Loans to Assets (LtA) ratio is measured as a loans divided by assets. It is used in both of the 
equations and is expected to have positive effect on profitability and outreach. The 
measurement indicates how big proportion of the institutions assets is tied up to its loan 
portfolio. Ylinen (2010) explains that it can reveal institutions behavior regarding outreach. If 
the ratio is high, it would mean that the MFI focuses on credit products and searches 
efficiency through its core products. On the other hand, low ratio may indicate that credit is 
only  side  product  and  in  that  case,  there  won’t  be  that  much  focus  on  efficiency  or  
profitability. 
Profit status (PStatus) reveals whether the institutions are registered as for-profit or not-for-
profit institutions. Profit status is s control variable in both of the equations. For-profit 
institutions are expected to have higher profitability and lower outreach compared to non-for-
profit institutions. In my data, I have 316 institutions (40%) that are reported to be for profit 
organizations and 479 (60%) non-for-profit institutions. Profit status often reflects well if the 
institution is regulated as well. In regards the regulation, 426 (54%) institutions are regulated 
in my data set. Profit status won’t necessarily reflect to actual profitability of the institutions. 
Cull et al. (2009) found out that most of the institutions in the data that have total revenues 
exceeding total costs in fact have “nonprofit” status. These institutions are earning profits in 
an accounting sense but “non-profit” status institutions cannot distribute profits to investors. 
This is an important notation because it means that microfinance industry’s drive towards 
profitability does not necessarily imply a drive towards commercialization. 
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Total expense ratio (TEtA) measures total expenses including personnel and capital costs 
compared to total assets. It is used as a control variable in both of the equations. Total 
expense ratio is expected to have negative effect on profitability. 
Personnel costs (PEtA) are measured relatively to total assets and are expected to affect 
positively on the profitability of the institution. This is due to fact the often better employees 
need to be paid more. Good employees on the other hand improve the profitability and 
efficiency of the institution. Identifying the credit-worthy borrowers is personnel-intensive. 
Once identified, such borrowers receive larger loans which makes this strategy cost-effective 
(Cull et al., 2007).   
Portfolio quality (measured with PaR30) captures the accounting convention that loans 
exceeding 30 days overdue respectively cause an unacceptably high risk of non-repayment. 
PaR30 enters as an explanatory variable in the profitability regression and is hypothesized to 
be inversely associated with profitability. After studying the effect of profitability, I also run 
the  regression  to  study  the  effect  of  rising  interest  rates  to  the  portfolio  quality.  In  that  
equation, PaR30 is the main dependent variable with the loan loss ratio and write-off ratio. I 
take risk into account also in the oureach regression as a control variable similar to Mersland 
and Oystein (2010). They also explain that the risk prediction in the equation is not clear-cut. 
First of all, higher risk per customer may lead to a greater trade-off because that institution 
may  favor  higher  loans  to  members  of  society  who  are  better  off.  However,  risk  prediction  
hypotheses could also result in the opposite prediction. When risk per customer increases, that 
MFI would like to reduce the average loan size to limit the risk exposure to particular 
customer.  
Loan loss ratio (LLR) and write-off ratio (Writeoff) are used as an alternative 
measurement for portfolio quality. Loan loss ratio is calculated by subtracting the value of 
loans recovered from the write-offs and dividing the product by the average gross loan 
portfolio. The write-off ratio is the total amount of loans written off during the period. A 
write-off is an accounting procedure that removes the outstanding balance of the loan from 
the loan portfolio and from the impairment loss allowance when these loans are recognized as 
uncollectable. Standardized policies are applied for loan loss provisioning and write-offs 
because MFIs vary tremendously in accounting for loan delinquency. Microfinance Bulletin 
explains that some count the entire loan balance as overdue the day a payment is missed. 
Others do not consider a loan delinquent until its full term has expired. Some MFIs write off 
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bad debt within one year of the initial delinquency, while others never write off bad loans, 
thus carrying forward a defaulted loan that they have little chance of ever recovering. In 
Microfinance Bulleting any loan with a payment over 90 days late is classified as "at risk". 
They provision 50 percent of the outstanding balance for loans between 90 and 180 days late, 
and 100 percent for loans over 180 days late. Some institutions also renegotiate (refinance or 
reschedule)  delinquent  loans.  These  loans  present  a  higher  probability  of  default  and  all  
renegotiated balances are provisioned at 50 percent. If there is adequate information, 
Microfinance Bulletin adjusts to assure that all loans are fully written off within one year of 
their becoming delinquent. In most cases, these adjustments are a rough approximation of risk. 
Most participating MFIs have high-quality loan portfolios, so loan loss provision expense is 
not an important contributor to their overall cost structure.  
Region is taken into account with 
different dummy variables, because 
differences between continents are 
remarkable. Regions are divided to 
four different categories that are Latin 
America and Caribbean (LAC), Asia, 
middle (North Africa, Europe and 
Middle East) and Africa with the 41 % 
34 %, 25 % and 11 % proportions 
respectively as shown in the Figure 5. 
Microfinance differs in different 
geographical locations due to the 
growth rates, inflations, interest rates, 
regulatory issues, percentage of the 
poorest people, cultural factors, 
availability of capital and many others. There are also differences relating to profit status of 
institutions in the different regions. In Africa only 11 % of the institutions are for-profit. The 
corresponding numbers in the other regions are that in LAC 33 %, Asia 29%, in the middle 
region 26%. 
After describing the variables, I present number of observations, mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values for all the main variables in my regressions in the 
Table 3. The number of observations varies between the variables since I use unbalanced 
Figure 6 
Division between geographical areas 
The figure represents percentage of institutions in each 
region in my sample. LAC (Latin America and Caribbean) is 
the largest region with 41 % of the institutions, whereas Asia 
has 34 % of the institutions. Middle region includes 25 % of 
the institutions and Africa 11 % of the institutions.  
41%
34%
25%
11%
LAC Asia Middle Africa
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panel data. For most of the variables, the mean and median values are quite similar indicating 
that the most exceptional values have been eliminated from my sample. Standard deviations 
are large for average loan balance and size of the institutions. These results are rational, 
because  sizes  of  the  institutions  vary  in  the  microfinance  field.  The  clear  differences  in  the  
average loan balances of the institutions indicate that this proxy shows considerable 
differences in outreach of the institutions. Minimum and maximum values show the extreme 
values that have included to my sample.  
 
 
 
  n Mean Median St.dev Minimum Maximum 
OSS 5634 1.15 1.12 0.36 0.01 4.79 
ROA 5019 0.02 0.02 0.09 -1.23 0.67 
Profit 5623 0.02 0.11 0.45 -4.40 1.96 
ALB 5733 6.14 6.11 1.32 1.61 11.07 
Female 5045 0.67 0.68 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Yield 3625 0.25 0.22 0.18 -0.25 1.79 
Writeoff 4714 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.02 1.27 
PaR30 5187 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.00 1.00 
LLR 4893 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.29 1.46 
TEtA 5018 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.00 1.74 
PEtA 4004 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.83 
Size 5896 15.44 15.31 1.98 7.35 22.32 
Age 5894 2.49 3.00 0.73 1.00 3.00 
PStatus 5896 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
LtA 5836 0.76 0.79 0.17 0.00 2.18 
 
After descriptive statistics, it is also important to study the correlations between the variables. 
The correlation matrix, in the Table 4, shows that proxies chosen to measure some of the main 
variables have quite high correlation. The main interest of my study are the profitability 
proxies and outreach proxies. Regarding the profitability, OSS, ROA and Profit are all 
relatively highly correlated. Correlations vary from 0.75 to 0.84. Outreach proxies, ALB and 
Female, are 0.67 correlated. PaR30 that measures the portfolio quality is only 0.25 correlated 
with the other proxies for portfolio quality. Nevertheless, the other measures for portfolio 
quality, LLR and Writeoff, are 0.96 correlated. Profitability indicators are all negatively 
correlated with total expenses and personal expenses showing that higher cost structure 
decreases the profitability of the institution. Yield is highly correlated with total expenses 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
The table shows that number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values 
for all the main variables in my regressions. Abbreviations in the table are following: OSS – operational self-
sufficiency, ROA – return on assets, Profit – profit margin, ALB – average loan balance, Female – percentage of 
female customers, Yield – portfolio yield, Writeoff – write-off ratio, PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), LLR – 
loan loss ratio, TeTA – total expenses to assets, PeTA – personal expenses to assets, Size – size of the gross loan 
portfolio,  Age – maturity of the institution, Pstatus  – profit status, LtA – loans to assets.  
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(0.72) and personal expenses (0.69). This indicates that institutions that have very high cost 
structure need to raise their interest rates up to higher levels to be able to cover the costs. On 
the other hand, if the institution is able to optimize its cost structure, it does not need to raise 
interest rates to a very high level. In addition, age and size are also correlated by 0.34 showing 
that older institutions are usually larger in size as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Empirical results  
I have conducted many regressions for my six different equations and I present the findings 
from the most important regressions here. I have also run the oneway ANOVA tests and 
Bonferroni, Scheffe, and Sidak multiple comparison tests to study differences between 
institution types more closely. I go through the regressions and interpretation of the results 
and summarize the main findings in the end of each section. In the Chapter 9, I analyze the 
results more and draw future recommendations. The regressions use banks as a reference 
category for the institution types and LAC as a reference category for the geographical 
regions. In reality, this means that the results reported represent the results specific to those 
OSS ROA Profit ALB Female Yield Writeoff PaR30 LLR TEtA PEtA Size Age LtA Yield^2 PStatus
OSS 1.00
ROA 0.75 1.00
Profit 0.76 0.84 1.00
ALB 0.12 0.10 0.15 1.00
Female -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.67 1.00
Yield -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.24 0.20 1.00
Writeoff -0.22 -0.22 -0.26 -0.01 -0.05 0.18 1.00
PaR30 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.26 1.00
LLR -0.19 -0.19 -0.21 -0.04 -0.03 0.18 0.96 0.24 1.00
TEtA -0.39 -0.46 -0.42 -0.26 0.19 0.72 0.28 0.07 0.25 1.00
PEtA -0.29 -0.35 -0.32 -0.33 0.22 0.69 0.20 -0.01 0.19 0.88 1.00
Size 0.15 0.17 0.26 0.43 -0.18 -0.19 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.28 -0.36 1.00
Age 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.07 0.03 -0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.16 -0.16 0.34 1.00
LtA 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.13 -0.01 -0.12 -0.15 -0.10 -0.13 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.12 1.00
Yield^2 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.11 0.12 0.91 0.15 -0.02 0.12 0.51 0.59 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 1.00
PStatus -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.16 -0.10 0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.27 -0.22 -0.09 0.08 1.00
Table  4 
Correlation matrix 
Abbreviations in the table are following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, ROA – return on assets, Profit – 
profit margin, ALB – average loan balance, Female – percentage of female customers, Yield – portfolio yield, 
Writeoff – write-off ratio, PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), LLR – loan loss ratio, TeTA – total expenses to 
assets,  PeTA  –  personal  expenses  to  assets,  Size  –  size  of  the  gross  loan  portfolio,   Age  –  maturity  of  the  
institution, Pstatus  – profit status, LtA – loans to assets. Correlations between the profitability proxies are quite 
high (OSS, ROA and Profit) varying from 0.75 to 0.84. Also the correlation between outreach proxies (ALB and 
Female) is 0.67. In regards to portfolio quality measures, the writeoff ratio and loan loss ratio has high 
correlation (0.96), but PaR30 is approximately 0.25 correlated with the other measures. Profitability is negatively 
correlated with the cost variables (TeTA and PeTA). On the other hand cost variables and yield variables are 
highly correlated. 
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groups. For this reasons the interaction terms for other groups are added and I also run the 
linear combinations test to obtain individual effect of each of the variable.  
8.1. Profitability  
To be able to state whether the aiming to profitability weakens the outreach of the institution, 
I first analyze the profitability function of the institution and start testing Hypothesis 1. In 
regards the profitability the results are at the most part as hypothesized and there are 
differences between institution types. I first analyses the profitability function with three 
different proxies for profitability. After that I add yield squared terms to the equation to be 
able  to  study  the  effect  of  raising  interest  rates  to  very  high  levels.  I  then  replace  the  
profitability measures with the portfolio quality measures to study the effect of raising the 
interest rates even further. 
The  results  of  the  profitability  function  are  presented  in  Table  5.  The  profitability  of  the  
institution is studied with three different proxies (operational self-sufficiency, return on assets 
and profit rate). ROA has the highest total explanation degree (R squared) being close to 75 %. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the results indicate the same direction throughout the proxies used 
and there are differences only in magnitudes and in significance levels. In general, it seems 
that  the  models  fit  relatively  well  based  on  the  R2 scores and Chi-squared statistics. R2, the 
coefficient of determination, is relatively high in my sample. R2 is the proportion of the total 
sum of squares explained by the regressions line. It describes how well regression line fits the 
observations and larger values of R2 indicate that the model is well specified. Dougherty 
(2007) states that R2 seldom being much above 0.5 even in well-specified model and therefore 
I can be satisfied with the R2 levels close to 0.6 in most of the regressions. 
Yield is positive and significant throughout all the regressions. Also the yield interaction 
terms with NBFI and NGO are positive and significant when using ROA and Profit as proxies. 
Therefore the results indicate that the positive effect of high interest rates is even stronger for 
other institutions than for banks. I want to study the effect for each of the institution type. A 
linear combination test, in Table 6, shows that the yield improves profitability of each 
institution type. This result is strong and significant throughout all the institutions in the 
microfinance industry.  
The other important finding in the profitability function is the negative impact of total costs 
and positive impact of personnel costs on profitability. The magnitude of the total cost seems  
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  OSS ROA Profit 
Yield 0.726*** 0.180*** 0.842*** 
  (5.59) (6.89) (5.67) 
NBFI 0.027 0.013 -0.069 
  (0.35) (1.03) (-0.82) 
NGO 0.015 0.029** -0.032 
  (0.18) (1.97) (-0.32) 
Coop 0.018 -0.03** -0.078 
  (0.19) (-1.95) (-0.80) 
Yield*NBFI 0.129 0.176*** 0.364** 
  (0.86) (4.55) (2.07) 
Yield*NGO 0.092 0.208*** 0.700*** 
  (0.56) (5.52) (3.05) 
Yield*Coop 0.349 0.1 0.252 
  (0.96) (1.37) (0.83) 
Age 0.002 0.006*** 0.041*** 
  (0.13) (2.65) (3.58) 
Size 0.003 -0.001 0.015*** 
  (0.56) (-0.48) (2.96) 
ALB -0.021* -0.009*** -0.035*** 
  (-1.69) (-4.66) (-3.04) 
LtA 0.589*** 0.176*** 0.790*** 
  (9.49) (16.74) (10.40) 
PStatus 0.033 0.006 0.03 
  (0.92) (1.01) (0.97) 
PaR30 -0.351*** -0.072*** -0.523*** 
  (-4.23) (-4.66) (-3.38) 
TEtA -2.73*** -0.479*** -2.488*** 
  (-8.16) (-5.67) (-6.34) 
PEtA 2.559*** 0.329** 0.908 
  (3.90) (2.07) (1.16) 
TEtA*NBFI 0.743** -0.11 0.358 
  (1.96) (-1.11) (0.80) 
TEtA*NGO 0.816** -0.246*** -0.188 
  (1.87) (-2.61) (-0.35) 
TEtA*Coop 0.115 0.097 0.73 
  (0.21) (0.69) (1.35) 
PEtA*NBFI -2.217*** -0.43** -0.974 
  (-3.26) (-2.46) (-1.17) 
PEtA*NGO -2.096*** -0.349** -0.802 
  (-2.88) (-2.02) (-0.89) 
PEtA*Coop -1.687 -0.398 -1.518 
  (-1.62) (-1.57) (-1.36) 
Africa 0.01 0.001 0.047 
  (0.31) (0.17) (1.64) 
Asia -0.089*** -0.030*** -0.110*** 
  (-3.69) (-5.42) (-3.82) 
Middle 0.034 -0.002 -0.027 
  (1.23) (-0.46) (-1.29) 
Cons 1.045*** 0.003 -0.310** 
  (6.62) (0.12) (-2.01) 
        
n  3446 3446 3446 
R^2 0.46 0.744 0.609 
Wald Chi 589.97 1145.97 549.09 
  24.00 24.00 24.00 
 
Table 5 
Results from the profitability regression 
The table shows results based on the profitability function of the institution (Equation 1). Abbreviations in the 
table are following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, ROA – return on assets, Profit – profit margin, Yield – 
portfolio yield, Age – maturity of the institution, Size – size of the gross loan portfolio, ALB – average loan 
balance, LtA – loans to assets, Pstatus  – profit status, PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), TeTA – total expenses 
to  assets,  PeTA  –  personal  expenses  to  assets.  Profitability  (dependent  variable)  is  measured  with  OSS,  ROA  
and Profit. Main interests are the yield, cost drivers (TeTA and PeTA) as well as institution type variables. The 
regression is run with the random effects method with White’s robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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to be significantly higher compared to the yield coefficients. This indicates that decreasing the 
total cost is the most efficient way to improve profitability of the institution. Cost reduction 
leads to improved efficiency that may improve the overall performance of the institution. The 
positive effect of the increasing personnel costs is interesting factor and due to the importance 
of well-educated and talented staff for the MFIs’ success and profitability.  
When studying the regressions further, both total costs and personnel costs have mostly 
opposite interactions with the other institution types. This depends on the profitability proxy 
used. The finding means that negative effect of total costs and positive effect of personnel 
costs are more significant factors to banks’ profitability compared to other institutions. 
Summing the coefficients for the cost terms proves that the effect exists for all the institutions 
but the magnitude is largest for the banks. Total expenses decrease profitability of all the 
institution types significantly as seen in the Table 6 with linear combinations. Nevertheless, as 
seen  in  the  Table  6,  the  personnel  expenses  are  not  significant  to  any  other  institution  type  
than for the banks. This may be due the fact, that banks have been able to get the most 
talented staff through their larger size and international spread and are able to have more 
efficient operations. 
 
 
 
  OSS ROA Profit 
Yield*NBFI 0.854*** 0.357*** 1.206*** 
  (11.17) (12.18) (12.42) 
Yield*NGO 0.818*** 0.388*** 1.542*** 
  (7.67) (14.11) (8.30) 
Yield*Coop 1.074*** 0.281*** 1.094*** 
  (3.17) (4.04) (4.06) 
PEtA*NBFI 0.342 -0.101 -0.066 
  (1.42) (-1.26) (-0.19) 
PEtA*NGO 0.463 -0.02 0.106 
  (1.34) (-0.28) (0.23) 
PEtA*Coop 0.872 -0.069 -0.61 
  (1.07) (-0.35) (-0.75) 
TEtA*NBFI -1.987*** -0.589*** -2.130*** 
  (-10.48) (-10.88) (-9.31) 
TEtA*NGO -1.914*** -0.725*** -2.676*** 
  (-6.67) (-16.84) (-7.10) 
TEtA*Coop -2.615*** -0.382*** -1.758*** 
  (-5.94) (-3.35) (-4.63) 
 
Table 6 
Linear combinations for the profitability regression 
The table shows the base effect for each of the institution type interaction term without comparing results to the 
omitted category. The table shows that the positive effect of rising interest rates and the negative effect of total 
expenses on profitability are significant throughout the institution types. Abbreviations in the table are 
following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, ROA – return on assets, Profit – profit margin, Yield – portfolio 
yield, TeTA – total expenses to assets, PeTA – personal expenses to assets. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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When considering the other factors effecting on profitability, age and size both have positive 
effect. This indicates that older and larger institutions are in general more profitable. 
Surprising result is that the lower average loan balance improves profitability indicating that 
giving the smaller loans (better outreach to poorest) would improve profitability of the 
institution. This is studied more carefully in the Tables 9-10. The loans to assets (LtA) ratio 
have positive and mostly significant effect. Institutions that are concentrating their efforts 
mostly on providing loans are able to achieve higher profitability. I also observe that profit 
status has a slight positive effect but it is not significant for any of the proxies. Nevertheless, 
it is included to improve the explanatory power of the model as a whole. The PaR30 variable 
that measures the risk and portfolio quality has a strong negative effect as expected. When it 
comes to area specific results, Asia has negative and significant coefficients. This means that 
profitability in Asia is remarkable lower compared to LAC. 
After defining the main drivers for profitability, I want to study more carefully how extremely 
high interest rates may affect to profitability through decreased portfolio quality in the Tables 
7-8 and in the Table 14-15 in the Appendixes 1-2. Based on the agency theory, it is expected 
that  when  rising  to  interest  rates  to  very  high  levels,  the  problems  of  adverse  selection  and  
moral hazard cause decrease in the profitability of the institution. I study this effect by adding 
the yield squared term and its interactions. When adding the yield squared terms to the 
equation, most of the variables remain the same. The regression shows that for banks, 
profitability is increasing in portfolio yield, but only up to the point at in which the negative 
quadratic yield coefficient outweighs the positive linear coefficient. Nevertheless, in my 
sample, this effect is not significant and therefore I am not able to draw unambiguous 
conclusion  on  that.  In  addition,  it  is  not  necessarily  true  for  any  other  institution  types.  In  
regards to NBFIs and cooperatives, interactions with yield and yield squared are significant 
and  different  compared  to  banks.  To  be  able  to  state  whether  the  yield  squared  increases  or  
decreases the profitability, I run the linear combination tests for this equation as well. As seen 
in  the  Table  8,  the  interactions  between  yield  squared  for  NBFIs  and  cooperatives  are  
significant and positive. This indicates that these institutions should increase their interest 
rates to even high levels to be able to obtain better profitability. Especially for NBFIs, both 
yield and yield squared interactions are positive and significant indicating the positive effect 
of raising interest rates to high levels. All the control variables remain similar to profitability 
regressions reported earlier. In addition, the regional differences remain the same through all 
of these regressions indicating relatively lower profitability for the institutions in Asia 
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  OSS ROA Profit 
Yield 0.918*** 0.275*** 1.063*** 
  (5.44) (5.44) (5.63) 
NBFI 0.09 -0.007 0.003 
  (1.52) (-0.61) (0.04) 
NGO 0.062 -0.022 -0.106 
  (0.83) (-1.49) (-1.19) 
Coop 0.082 -0.025** 0.043 
  (1.10) (-2.0) (0.65) 
Yield*NBFI -0.405* -0.044 -0.136 
  (-1.84) (-0.71) (-0.57) 
Yield*NGO -0.222 0.022 0.516 
  (-0.76) (0.26) (1.24) 
Yield*Coop -1.301*** -0.236*** -1.028*** 
  (-3.28) (-3.54) (-3.53) 
Yield^2 -0.149 -0.018 -0.149 
  (-1.31) (-0.46) (-1.27) 
Yield^2*NBFI 0.572*** 0.198*** 0.645*** 
  (3.29) (3.56) (3.44) 
Yield^2*NGO 0.414 0.122 -0.058 
  (1.19) (1.04) (-0.12) 
Yield^2*Coop 2.910*** 0.838*** 2.886*** 
  (4.69) (9.58) (6.29) 
Age 0.005 0.006*** 0.040*** 
  (0.40) (2.63) (3.58) 
Size 0.002 -0.001 0.014*** 
  (0.37) (-0.98) (2.71) 
ALB -0.024* -0.011*** -0.039*** 
  (-1.93) (-5.50) (-3.41) 
LtA 0.597*** 0.187*** 0.808*** 
  (9.69) (18.01) (10.97) 
PStatus 0.023 0.005 0.026 
  (0.62) (0.73) (0.84) 
PaR30 -0.351*** -0.076*** -0.527*** 
  (-4.12) (-4.80) (-3.46) 
TEtA -2.008*** -0.654*** -2.436*** 
  (-11.21) (-19.22) (-11.27) 
PEtA 0.411* -0.077 -0.008 
  (1.92) (-1.44) (-0.03) 
Africa 0.013 -0.002 0.045 
  (0.42) (-0.25) (1.53) 
Asia -0.097*** -0.035*** -0.115*** 
  (-3.91) (-6.25) (-3.96) 
Middle 0.03 -0.003 -0.026 
  (1.11) (-0.67) (-1.31) 
Cons 1.058*** 0.07*** -0.245* 
  (7.03) (2.60) (-1.82) 
        
n  3446 3446 3446 
R^2 0.468 0.734 0.616 
Wald Chi 444.55 1162.88 509.33 
  22.00 22.00 22.00 
Table 7 
Results from the yield squared regression 
This table shows the importance of the rising interest rates to the profitability function of the institution (Equation 2). The table shows 
whether rising interest rates above certain threshold level effects on the profitability of the firm. Abbreviations in the table are following: 
OSS – operational self-sufficiency, ROA – return on assets, Profit – profit margin, Yield – portfolio yield, Yield^2 – portfolio yield squared, 
Age – maturity of the institution, Size – size of the gross loan portfolio, ALB – average loan balance, LtA – loans to assets, Pstatus  – profit 
status, PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), TeTA – total expenses to assets, PeTA – personal expenses to assets. Profitability (dependent 
variable)  is  measured  with  OSS,  ROA  and  Profit.  Main  interests  are  the  yield,  yield  squared,  cost  drivers  (TeTA  and  PeTA)  as  well  as  
institution type variables. The regression is run with the random effects method with White’s robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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  OSS ROA Profit 
Yield*NBFI 0.513*** 0.231*** 0.927*** 
  (3.68) (6.28) (5.95) 
Yield*NGO 0.696*** 0.296*** 1.579*** 
  (2.82) (4.43) (4.10) 
Yield*Coop -0.383 0.039 0.036 
  (-1.06) (0.89) (0.16) 
Yield^2*NBFI 0.423*** 0.182*** 0.495*** 
  (3.24) (4.55) (3.34) 
Yield^2*NGO 0.265 0.104 -0.207 
  (0.80) (0.94) (-0.45) 
Yield^2*Coop 2.761*** 0.819*** 2.737*** 
  (4.52) (10.48) (6.15) 
 
After finding out that the profitability depends on the level of interest rates, I want to research 
why interest rates have an effect on profitability. Based on the agency theory, the 
hypothesized reason is that charging too high interest rates decreases the quality of the 
portfolio. Cull et al. (2007) have found empirical evidence that supports that asymmetric 
information conclusion. They found out that for individual lenders, the loan delinquency rates 
increased as interest rates rise. To study the reasons for effect of interest rates, I replace 
profitability indicators with portfolio quality indicators and results are reported in the Table 
14 in the Appendix 1.  
Consistent with the agency theory, increasing interest rates to very high levels causes higher 
PaR30, loan delinquency ratio and loan write-off ratio. In my regressions, when considering 
only the effect of yield, the results are not significant. Nevertheless, increasing interest rates 
up to the certain level (yield squared) the portfolio quality decreases. This is significant when 
portfolio  quality  is  measured  with  loan  loss  ratio  and  write-off  and  positive  in  all  the  cases.  
These results indicate that interest rates could be raised up to a certain level but rising interest 
rates above that level decrease the portfolio quality. These findings are consistent with 
adverse selection: “safe types” choose not to borrow when the interest rate on loans rises 
above a threshold, leaving a disproportionate fraction of “risky types” in the pool of 
borrowers. This exacerbates problems with loan repayment (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).  
Table 8 
Linear combinations for the yield squared regression 
The table shows the base effect for each of the institution type interaction term without comparing results to the 
omitted category. The results show that rising interest rates effects differently on banks and cooperatives 
compared to NBFIs and NGOs. Abbreviations in the table are following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, 
ROA – return on assets, Profit – profit margin, Yield – portfolio yield, Yield^2 – portfolio yield squared. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Regarding to institution type, the portfolio quality of NGOs and cooperatives is lower 
compared  to  banks  and  NBFIs.  In  addition,  it  seems  that  rising  interest  rates  for  very  high  
level is most damaging for the portfolio quality of the banks. When studying the linear 
combinations in the Table 15 in the Appendix 2, the results are not significant and consistent 
between any of the institution types. Nevertheless, it seems that for example NGOs, that have 
lower portfolio quality to begin with,  could more easily increase interest  rates and still  keep 
portfolio quality at an acceptable level. The result confirms that the negative effect of the 
rising interest rates is higher in the category of banks. 
I have also conducted all these profitability regressions by using only OSS as a dependent 
variable and adding different variables one by one in the Table 16 in the Appendix 3. This 
table shows that the main variables remain similar even though the control variables change.  
 
 
 
 
 
8.2. Tradeoff between profitability and poverty outreach 
As a next step, I move on to the outreach regression to study the trade-off between 
profitability and outreach to the poor. I run the regression where the outreach is the main 
dependent variable. Again, I measure the profitability through three different indicators and 
outreach  with  two  different  proxies.  As  seen  in  the  Table  9,  all  the  proxies  provide  similar  
results even though there are differences in magnitudes and significance levels.  
For banks, profitability effects on average loan size negatively and significantly throughout 
all the measures. When the profitability increases, the average loan size decreases and vice 
versa. In addition, the relationship between profitability and the number of female borrowers 
is positive and significant in most of the cases. These results indicate that profitable banks are 
more focused on the poor and women than less profitable banks. This observation is opposite 
to my initial hypotheses. Throughout all the proxies, profitability effects negatively and 
Result 1: I accept the Hypotheses 1 that the profitability can be improved by decreasing 
the costs through more efficient operations or by increasing interest rates. Total costs 
decrease profitability whereas higher personal costs improve profitability level of the 
institution, especially for the banks. The other way to improve profitability of all the 
institution types is to raise interest rates. Nevertheless, after a certain level, profitability 
declines due to decreased portfolio quality. For banks, rising interest rates has more 
dramatic negative effect on profitability compared to other institution types. 
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significantly to the average loan size and positively to the proportion of female borrowers 
when considering the banks category. 
 
 
 
 
  OSS   ROA   Profit 
  ALB Female   ALB Female   ALB  Female 
Profitability -0.384** 0.062   -2.218** 0.462**   -0.304** 0.045 
  (-2.14) (1.54)   (-2.49) (2.16)   (-2.35) (0.93) 
NBFI -0.562** 0.223***   -0.074 0.149***   -0.056 0.142*** 
  (-2.46) (3.40)   (-0.62) (4.31)   (-0.46) (4.07) 
NGO -0.493** 0.277***   -0.105 0.243   -0.086 0.232*** 
  (-2.05) (3.79)   (-0.63) (5.33)   (-0.51) (5.06) 
Coop 0.758*** 0.141*   0.9*** 0.057   0.904*** 0.042 
  (2.67) (1.66)   (5.10) (1.21)   (5.03) (0.88) 
Profitability*NBFI 0.451** -0.071*   2.289** -0.422*   0.292** -0.04 
  (2.36) (-1.66)   (2.50) (-1.93)   (2.12) (-0.81) 
Profitability*NGO 0.366** -0.041   2.244** -0.41*   0.279** -0.025 
  (2.04) (-0.94)   (2.53) (-1.86)   (2.15) (-0.51) 
Profitability*Coop 0.146 -0.086   1.836 -0.714**   0.132 -0.044 
  (0.68) (-1.54)   (1.25) (-2.42)   (0.86) (-0.78) 
Age 0.037 -0.005   0.028 -0.007   0.04* -0.005 
  (1.40) (-0.64)   (1.02) (-0.88)   (1.52) (-0.67) 
Size 0.295*** -0.004   0.303*** -0.004   0.296*** -0.005 
  (16.78) (-1.28)   (16.41) (-1.28)   (16.42) (-1.54) 
LtA 0.059 0.004   0.029 -0.003   0.079 0.001 
  (0.58) (0.15)   (0.27) (-0.10)   (0.80) (0.04) 
PStatus 0.27** 0.006   0.244** 0.007   0.274** 0.006 
  (2.41) (0.19)   (2.19) (0.26)   (2.46) (0.20) 
PaR30 0.059 -0.116***   0.15 -0.122   0.057 -0.11** 
  (0.52) (-2.58)   (1.34) -2.47**   (0.50) (-2.48) 
Africa -0.826*** 0.053*   -0.826*** 0.054**   -0.83*** 0.054** 
  (-7.65) (1.92)   (-7.55) (2.0)   (-7.70) (1.96) 
Asia -1.47*** 0.225***   -1.486*** 0.227***   -1.486*** 0.227*** 
  (-20.24) (12.40)   (-20.26) (12.71)   (-20.59) (12.54) 
Middle 0.562*** -0.11***   0.549*** -0.111***   0.558*** -0.11*** 
  (6.33) (-5.07)   (6.13) (-5.12)   (6.30) (-5.07) 
Cons 2.158*** 0.464***   1.677*** 0.534***   1.682*** 0.551*** 
  (6.90) (5.52)   (5.13) (7.83)   (5.10) (7.92) 
                  
n 5051 4673   4646 4314   5042 4664 
R^2 0.601 0.385   0.597 0.399   0.603 0.389 
Wald Chi 2391.10 736.72   2306.6 775.56   2373.10 747.85 
  15.00 15.00   15 15.00   15.00 15 
 
Table 9 
 Results from the outreach regression 
This table shows the impact of profitability to outreach of the institution (Equation 3). The regression studies 
whether there is a tradeoff between being profitable and having a large poverty outreach. Abbreviations in the 
table are following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, ROA – return on assets, Profit – profit margin, ALB – 
average loan balance, Female – percentage of female borrowers, Age – maturity of the institution, Size – size of 
the  gross  loan  portfolio,  LtA  –  loans  to  assets,  Pstatus   –  profit  status,  PaR30  –  portfolio  at  risk  (30days).  
Outreach (dependent variables) is measured with two proxies: ALB and Female. The profitability is measured 
with three proxies, OSS; ROA and profit margin. The regression is run with the random effects method with 
White’s robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The relationship between the profitability and outreach becomes more apparent when I 
disaggregate by the institution type. All the profitability measures for other institution types 
indicate opposite reaction compared to banks. Especially results for NBFIs and NGOs are 
quite similar in magnitude. Nevertheless, when running the linear combination test in the 
Table 10, it is apparent that these results are not significant for any of the interactions. The 
effects are different compared to banks, but the effects themselves are not significant. For 
cooperatives, the profitability has a negative effect on the average loan balance showing the 
similar effect as for the banks.  
 
 
 
  OSS   ROA   Profit 
  ALB Female   ALB Female   ALB  Female 
Profitability*NBFI 0.067 -0.008   0.071 0.039   -0.012 0.005 
  (0.84) (-0.61)   (0.29) (0.79)   (-0.20) (0.47) 
Profitability*NGO -0.018 0.022   0.026 0.051   -0.025 0.019 
  (-0.51) (1.54)   (0.19) (0.96)   (-0.89) (1.41) 
Profitability*Coop -0.238** -0.024   -0.382 -0.253   -0.172** 0.000 
  (-2.07) (-0.61)   (-0.32) (-1.24)   (-1.97) (0.00) 
 
When considering the other variables, the observations are quite consistent throughout the 
measures and with my initial hypotheses. The increasing size also increases the average loan 
sizes and decreases the proportion of female borrowers as expected. The effect of age has the 
same direction but the results are not significant. Profit status seems to increase the average 
loan sizes but won’t affect to number of female borrowers. It seems that on average for-profit 
companies offer bigger loans. On the other hand, portfolio quality does not have significant 
effect on average loan sizes, but it decreases the amount of female borrowers. This finding is 
consistent with Pitt and Khandker (1998) who show that female are often more credible 
borrowers. Therefore portfolio risk is smaller if there is a large amount of female borrowers. 
Based  on  my  data,  regional  differences  are  quite  significant.  It  seems  that  in  Africa  and  in  
Asia, the outreach is much larger compared to LAC if measured by average loan size and 
proportion  of  female  borrowers.  Both  measures  are  significant  throughout  all  the  indicators  
used. In the middle region, the outreach is significantly smaller compared to LAC region. On 
important point relating to proportion of women is that the percentage of female clients varies 
Table 10 
Linear combinations for the outreach regression 
The Table shows the base effect for each of the institution type interaction term without comparing results to the 
omitted category. Abbreviations in the table are following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, ROA – return on 
assets, Profit – profit margin, ALB – average loan balance, Female – percentage of female borrowers. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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by region. The highest percentages are in Asia, followed by Africa and LAC and the fewest 
women are served by microfinance institutions in the middle region (similarly to Karlan and 
Goldberg, 2007). To sum up, size, age, profit status and portfolio quality all effect negatively 
on the outreach of the institution. 
After finding out that there may not be a tradeoff between profitability and outreach, I still 
want to study the effect of age and size more closely. I scrutinize the tradeoff equation to see 
if there would be a larger trade-off while institutions grow and mature. The base of the 
mission drift hypotheses is that socially oriented institutions drift from their original mission 
while they become larger and mature. My last equations (Equation 5 and 6) study the 
interactions between profitability, institution type and age/size.  
Because I want to especially consider the effect of the different institution types, I need to 
make multiplicative interaction terms with the different institution types. Brambor, Clark and 
Golder (2006) argue that it is important to use interaction models whenever the hypotheses 
are conditional in nature. I am testing the conditional effect of profitability to outreach 
depending on the institution type and age and size of the institution. All the constitutive terms 
have to be included into the interaction model specification. Omitting the constitutive term 
would lead to omitted variable bias and therefore results biased and inconsistent estimates of 
the other coefficient of the model (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006).  
Adding multiplicative interaction terms to the regression leads to more complicated 
interpretation  of  the  constitutive  terms  in  this  model.  When  adding  an  interaction  term  to  a  
model,  it  drastically  changes  the  interpretation  of  all  the  coefficients.  Brambor,  Clark  and  
Golder  (2006)  argue  that  it  is  essential  not  to  interpret  constitutive  terms  as  if  they  are  
unconditional marginal effects. Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) point out that 
multiplicative interaction models are often flawed and inferential errors are common in many 
researches. The individual coefficient of this variable should be interpreted in a way, that 
other factors included into the interaction term would be zero. The coefficients in interaction 
models no longer indicate the average effect of a variable as they do in an additive model. 
After adding the interaction terms, the coefficient of individual variable do not anymore 
express the whole impact of that variable. It represents only proportion that is not included 
into the interaction term.  
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  Age     Size 
  ALB Female     ALB Female 
OSS -0.269 0.079   OSS -0.239 -0.196 
  (-0.64) (0.61)     (-0.22) (-1.0) 
NBFI -0.619 0.25   NBFI 0.518 -0.181 
  (-1.26) (1.42)     (0.43) (-0.55) 
NGO -0.636 0.291   NGO 0.147 -0.302 
  (-1.35) (1.60)     (0.13) (-0.91) 
Coop -0.191 0.033   Coop -1.171 -0.523 
  (-0.34) (0.16)     (-0.81) (-1.20) 
Age 0.127 -0.003   Size 0.337*** -0.034* 
  (0.56) (-0.04)     (5.08) (-1.84) 
OSS*NBFI 0.463 -0.099   OSS*NBFI 0.387 0.135 
  (1.01) (-0.74)     (0.33) (0.62) 
OSS*NGO 0.227 -0.054   OSS*NGO 0.23 0.337 
  (0.52) (-0.39)     (0.21) (1.52) 
OSS*Coop 0.333 -0.066   OSS*Coop 0.621 0.083 
  (0.67) (-0.45)     (0.49) (0.31) 
OSS*Age -0.079 -0.005   OSS*Size -0.014 0.017 
  (-0.39) (-0.10)     (-0.23) (1.43) 
Age*NBFI -0.024 -0.018   Size*NBFI -0.077 0.025 
  (-0.10) (-0.27)     (-1.0) (1.21) 
Age*NGO -0.117 -0.013   Size*NGO -0.065 0.036* 
  (-0.50) (-0.19)     (-0.91) (1.77) 
Age*Coop 0.216 0.043   Size*Coop 0.107 0.041 
  (0.78) (0.51)     (1.14) (1.38) 
OSS*Age*NBFI -0.009 0.018   OSS*Size*NBFI 0.008 -0.013 
  (-0.04) (0.35)     (0.12) (-0.95) 
OSS*Age*NGO 0.088 0.01   OSS*Size*NGO 0.014 -0.024* 
  (0.43) (0.20)     (0.22) (-1.75) 
OSS*Age*Coop -0.038 -0.006   OSS*Size*Coop -0.025 -0.009 
  (-0.16) (-0.10)     (-0.30) (-0.50) 
Size 0.284*** -0.005*   Age 0.034 -0.005 
  (17.16) (-1.66)     (1.29) (-0.64) 
Africa -0.795*** 0.054*   Africa -0.762*** 0.062** 
  (-7.38) (1.95)     (-6.89) (2.19) 
Asia -1.456*** 0.223***   Asia -1.438*** 0.227*** 
  (-20.31) (12.36)     (-20.09) (12.47) 
Middle 0.515*** -0.112***   Middle 0.527*** -0.106*** 
  (5.89) (-5.19)     (5.94) (-4.82) 
Cons 2.594*** 0.464***   Cons 1.898* 0.926*** 
  (5.13) (2.67)     (1.80) (3.08) 
              
n 5454 4901   n 5454 4901 
R^2 0.594 0.368   R^2 0.590 0.363 
Wald chi 2490.8 717.88   Wald chi 2519.07 707.58 
  19.00 19.00       19.00 
 
Table 11 
 Results from the outreach regression with the multiplicative interaction terms 
This table shows the effect of the interaction terms between profitability, institution type and age (Equation 5) or 
size (Equation 6). The regression shows whether the institution suffer from the tradeoff between profitability and 
outreach while they grow and mature. Abbreviations in the table are following: ALB – average loan balance, 
Female – percentage of female borrowers, OSS – operational self-sufficiency, Age – maturity of the institution, 
Size – size of the gross loan portfolio. Outreach is measured with two proxies: ALB and Female. The 
profitability is measured with three proxies, OSS; ROA and profit margin. The regression is run with the random 
effects method with White’s robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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When first studying the effect of age in the Table 9, I found out that there are no significant 
differences between the institutions while they age. As seen already in the earlier regressions, 
age does not seem to have significant effect on the outreach of the institution. As seen in the 
Table 11, the same solution applies to the equation done with the multiplicative interaction 
terms with age. In regards the size variable the situation is a little bit different. Size has a very 
strong impact to weakened outreach already in Equation 4 and also in the Equation 5 and 6. It 
seems that larger institutions have significantly larger average loan sizes as expected. 
Nevertheless, Table 11 shows that the complementary effect of size, profitability and 
institution type is not significant. This result indicates that even when the largest institutions 
aim to  profitability,  they  do  not  necessarily  lose  their  outreach.  The  results  won’t  change  to  
any extend even when running the linear combination tests for the equation in the Table 12. 
All the other variables are as expected in the last regressions as well.  
 
 
 
  
Age 
    
Size 
  ALB Female     ALB Female 
OSS*NBFI 0.194 -0.020   OSS*NBFI 0.148 -0.061 
  (1.09) (-0.60)     (0.32) (-0.66) 
OSS*NGO -0.042 0.025   OSS*NGO -0.009 0.141 
  (-0.41) (0.53)     (-0.04) (1.33) 
OSS*Coop 0.064 0.012   OSS*Coop 0.383 -0.113 
  (0.24) (0.17)     (0.56) (-0.62) 
OSS*Age -0.348 0.074   OSS*Size -0.253 -0.179 
  (-1.35) (0.87)     (-0.25) (-0.97) 
Age*NBFI 0.103 -0.021   Size*NBFI 0.260*** -0.009 
  (1.05) (-0.93)     (6.22) (-1.03) 
Age*NGO 0.01 -0.015   Size*NGO 0.272*** 0.002 
  (0.19) (-0.68)     (10.21) (0.26) 
Age*Coop 0.343** 0.041   Size*Coop 0.444*** 0.007 
  (2.15) (0.75)     (6.55) (0.31) 
OSS*Age*NBFI -0.151 0.094   OSS*Size*NBFI 0.107 -0.243 
  (-0.18) (0.40)     (0.09) (-1.08) 
OSS*Age*NGO -0.054 0.086   OSS*Size*NGO 0.112 -0.254 
  (-0.07) (0.37)     (0.10) (-1.13) 
OSS*Age*Coop -0.180 0.070   OSS*Size*Coop 0.074 -0.239 
  (-0.22) (0.29)     (0.06) (-1.07) 
 
 
Table 12 
Linear combinations table for outreach regression with multiplicative interaction terms 
Abbreviations in the table are following: ALB – average loan balance, Female – percentage of female borrowers, 
OSS – operational self-sufficiency, Age – maturity of the institution, Size – size of the gross loan portfolio. The 
table shows the base effect for each of the institution type interaction term without comparing results to the 
omitted category. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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8.3. Institution type 
I have studied the institution type through the profitability and outreach regressions. I want to 
go deeper in my analyses and therefore I run the oneway ANOVA analyses. I do the analyses 
for the main variables in the Table 13 to observe if there are significant differences between 
the  institution  types.  As  seen  last  column  in  the  Table  13,  most  of  the  F-test  values  are  
significant (critical level is 2.70 with 3 degrees of freedom). The significant F values tell that 
at least one treatment effect differs from zero, i.e. the means are not all equal. Based on the F-
values, I am able conclude that there are significant differences between institution types 
regarding almost all of the variables. It seems that ROA is the only variable that does not have 
significant differences at 5 % level depending on the institution type.  
When comparing the results at the variable level, it seems that there are large variations 
between different institution types. In regards the profitability indicators, cooperatives and 
banks have the highest values as concluded also by Lapenu and Zeller (2001). It is expected 
and rational result that the banks have high profitability since they are the most 
commercialized form of institution. The finding about cooperatives is aligned with 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) that also find out that cooperatives are more efficient and on 
average their profitability and sustainability are higher compared to other forms of ownership. 
NGOs seem to have lowest profitability indicator values as expected.  
The main differences in profitability come from the cost structure of the institutions. As seen 
in the Table 13, the costs are again lowest for the most profitable institutions, banks and 
cooperatives. Cooperatives have the lowest total costs. In regards the personal costs, banks 
and cooperatives have again the lower costs compared to other institution types. Also for 
example Lapenu and Zeller (2001) had a similar finding that cooperatives and banks have 
high staff productivity compared to other institution type. It was also shown in the Table 4 
with the correlation matrix that lower costs are highly correlated with more profitable
Result 2: I reject the Hypothesis 2 that there is a trade-off between profitability and outreach. 
Institutions won’t drift from their mission and suffer from the larger tradeoff even while they 
age and mature. Regarding to the institution types, there is no tradeoff for banks and 
cooperatives. For NBFIs and NGOs, the similar conclusion cannot be drawn, but the results 
are significant in neither direction. Based on my results, it should be possible to achieve both 
profitability and large outreach at least for many of the institutions. 
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 Table13OnewayANOVAstatisticsdependingontheinstitutiontypeThe tableshows themean,standarddeviationand thenumberofobservations foreachof thevariablesregardingeachof the institution types.In the lastcolumnF-statisticsbasedontheonewayANOVAshowifthedifferencesbetweeninstitutiontypesaresignificantregardingthevariable.Thecriticallevelis2.7atͷΨsignificancelevelandwith͵degreesoffreedom.AllThesignificant	valuestellthatatleastonetreatmenteffectdiffersfromzero,i.e.themeansarenot all equal. Abbreviations in the table are following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, ROA – return on assets, Profit – profit margin, ALB – average loan balance, 
Female – percentage of female customers, Yield – portfolio yield, Writeoff – write-off ratio, PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), LLR – loan loss ratio, TeTA – total 
expenses to assets, PeTA – personal expenses to assets, Size – size of the gross loan portfolio,  Age – maturity of the institution, Pstatus  – profit status, LtA – loans to 
assets.  

F-test
Mean Std N Mean Std N Mean Std N Mean Std N
OSS 1.15 0.28 685 1.15 0.39 1982 1.14 0.36 2423 1.20 0.35 544 3.57
ROA 0.02 0.06 618.00 0.02 0.10 1780 0.01 0.11 2143 0.02 0.05 478 2.29
Profit 0.06 0.32 685.00 0.01 0.47 1981 0.01 0.49 2417 0.09 0.33 540 7.71
ALB 7.06 1.31 666.00 6.23 1.19 2026 5.61 1.18 2475 7.02 1.21 566 393.32
Female clients 0.54 0.25 473.00 0.64 0.26 1799 0.76 0.25 2271 0.50 0.25 502 225.21
Yield 0.19 0.17 415.00 0.29 0.20 1314 0.26 0.16 1557 0.15 0.10 339 78.59
Write-off ratio 0.02 0.02 563.00 0.02 0.05 1682 0.02 0.04 2022 0.01 0.01 447 13.05
Par30 0.05 0.07 576.00 0.05 0.09 1875 0.06 0.11 2242 0.06 0.08 494 6.37
llr 0.01 0.02 598.00 0.02 0.05 1734 0.02 0.05 2095 0.01 0.01 466 10.06
Teta 0.21 0.10 618.00 0.28 0.15 1780 0.27 0.15 2142 0.17 0.09 478 117.88
Peta 0.07 0.04 470.00 0.12 0.09 1474 0.12 0.08 1691 0.05 0.04 369 126.77
Size 17.58 1.96 694.00 15.51 1.89 2080 14.86 1.65 2538 15.17 1.91 584 420.11
Age 2.45 0.75 703 2.27 0.80 2081 2.67 0.62 2527 2.53 0.69 583 119.04
Pstatus 0.97 0.18 700 0.77 0.42 2084 0.00 0.07 2531 0.03 0.16 581 4592.49
Lta 0.67 0.21 695.00 0.77 0.17 2057 0.77 0.17 2504 0.78 0.14 580 64.5
Bank NBFI NGO Cooperative
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operations. As seen in the Tables 5-6, higher personal costs can still improve profitability, 
especially for the banks. Banks are better able to capitalize of the high quality of the staff.  
Yield is another factor effecting profitability. But as seen already in the Table 4 with 
correlation matrix, yield levels are not that highly correlated with the profitability. Also Table 
5-6 show that the magnitudes are much higher for the cost drivers and therefore the effect of 
interest rates is not that crucial for profitability of the institution. In the Table 13, yield levels 
are on average much higher for NBFIs and NGOs. These institutions have lower profitability 
levels.  This indicates that  those institutions need to charge higher interest  rates to be able to 
cover the costs of reaching customers in a large scale. As seen in the Tables 7-10, especially 
NBFIs are able to raise their interest up to higher levels without suffering on the declined 
portfolio quality. 
In regards the outreach indicators, NGOs seem to have significantly better outreach compared 
to any other institution type when measured with average loan balance and percentage of 
female clients. NBFIs have the second largest outreach with both indicators followed by the 
cooperatives and finally banks. The average loan balance is smaller for NBFIs and NGOs 
compared to banks and cooperatives as seen in the Table 13. Proportion of female borrowers 
seems to be much smaller for banks compared to any other institution types. The finding is 
aligned  with  for  example  Cull  et  al,  (2009)  that  founds  that  the  average  share  of  women  
served is substantially lower for commercial microfinance institutions than for 
nongovernmental organizations. 
As studying the size of the institution, banks are the largest group whereas NGOs are on 
average the smallest one. Nevertheless, NGOs are on average the oldest category and NBFIs 
the youngest. In regards the profit status the differences are significant, because 97 % of the 
banks and 77 % of the NBFIs have reported to be for-profit institutions. On the other hand, 
only 3 % of the cooperatives and 0 % of the NGOs are for-profit institutions. A loan to asset 
ratio  is  quite  similar  to  different  institution  even  though  significantly  lower  to  banks.  It  
indicates that banks have more other services than loans compared to other institution types.  
As stated, there are significant differences between the institution types. However, oneway 
ANOVA test does not reveal where the differences are. I want to identify the differences and 
use Bonferroni, Scheffe, and Sidak multiple comparison tests (Williams, R., 2004). Williams 
(2004) explain that these tests examine the differences between each pair of means. However, 
just  using  the  5  %  level  of  significance  on  a  pair  by  pair  basis  can  be  misleading.  Many  
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comparisons are being done and therefore the probability is greater than 5% that some 
differences could be significant just by chance. These tests therefore apply corrections to the 
reported significance levels that take into account the fact that multiple comparisons are being 
conducted (Williams, 2004). Williams (2004) explains that Bonferroni, Scheffe, and Sidak 
multiple comparison tests tend to be conservative: they reduce the likelihood of rejecting the 
null when the null is true (reduce the likelihood of Type I error). However, they increase the 
likelihood of not rejecting the null when the null is false (increase a likelihood of Type II 
error).   
  Bank NBFI NGO 
NBFI 
OSS Profit ROA             
ALB Female Yield             
PaR30 Writeoff LLR             
Size Age Pstatus             
TEtA PeTA LtA             
NGO 
OSS Profit ROA OSS Profit ROA       
ALB Female Yield ALB Female Yield       
PaR30 Writeoff LLR PaR30 Writeoff LLR       
Size Age Pstatus Size Age Pstatus       
TEtA PeTA LtA TEtA PeTA LtA       
Coop 
OSS Profit ROA OSS Profit ROA OSS Profit ROA 
ALB Female Yield ALB Female Yield ALB Female Yield 
PaR30 Writeoff LLR PaR30 Writeoff LLR PaR30 Writeoff LLR 
Size Age Pstatus Size Age Pstatus Size Age Pstatus 
TEtA PeTA LtA TEtA PeTA LtA TEtA PeTA LtA 
 
 
 
 
Actual statistics for the Bonferroni, Scheffe and Sidak test are not reported here because of 
the limited space. Nevertheless, the Figure 6 shows the main differences between the 
institution types for each of the variable. In general, it seems that there are differences 
between each of the institution types. In regards the profitability indicators (first row in each 
box in Figure 6),  it  seem that there are no significant differences between banks and NBFIs,  
NBFIs and NGOs and cooperatives and banks. On the other hand, in regards of the outreach 
indicators (outreach and female), there exists significant differences between each of the two 
Figure 7 
The significant differences for each of the variables depending of the institution type based on the Bonferroni, 
Scheffe and Sidak multiple comparison test 
Highlighted areas show that there is significant difference in that variable between two institution types. 
Abbreviations in the table are following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, ROA – return on assets, Profit – 
profit margin, ALB – average loan balance, Female – percentage of female customers, Yield – portfolio yield, 
Writeoff – write-off ratio, PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), LLR – loan loss ratio, TeTA – total expenses to 
assets,  PeTA  –  personal  expenses  to  assets,  Size  –  size  of  the  gross  loan  portfolio,   Age  –  maturity  of  the  
institution, Pstatus  – profit status, LtA – loans to assets.  
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institution excluding cooperatives and banks. Cooperatives and banks seem to have a lot of 
similarities as well as NGOs and NBFIs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.4. Robustness checks  
The main results are done based on the unbalanced panel data method. For the robustness 
check,  I  run  the  regressions  based  on  the  smaller  sample  sizes  and  also  run  the  regressions  
with area specific data. I first run the regressions for only year 2010 (the year with most of the 
observations). As seen in the Table 17 in the Appendix 4, the results are similar to panel data 
regressions confirming the consistency of my study. The differences are only in the 
significance levels and in the magnitudes of the coefficient. In regards to the regional 
differences,  it  is  clear  the  profitability  levels  in  different  regions  have  shift  during  the  time  
period. When considering only year 2010, profitability of the institutions in Asia is not 
negative anymore. Asia has been one of the fastest developing areas during the past ten years 
and it makes sense that results are very different for the year 2010 than for the 16 years’ time 
spam from 1995 to 2011. The profitability of the institution in the middle region is 
significantly more positive in 2010 when comparing to LAC. These changes are due to 
changes in different regions and not to model misspecification. 
When running the robustness test for the profitability functions (Equation 1 and 2) with the 
year 2010 data, the main variables, as the positive effect of yield, are still significant. Some of 
the control variables are not significant anymore but most of the results are the same with the 
base regression confirming the robustness of my study. In regards to the outreach regression, 
the results are similar to ones presented earlier. Only difference in this robustness regression 
is that cooperatives are more likely suffer from the trade-off between profitability and 
outreach. Nevertheless, when running the linear combination tests (not reported), the effect is 
Result 3: I partly accept the Hypothesis 3. Regarding to profitability, banks and 
cooperatives are the most profitable institution whereas NGOs have the best levels of 
outreach. Banks are more sensitive to negative effect of raising interest rates and to 
positive effect of higher personnel expenses. Banks and cooperatives are less likely to 
suffer on tradeoff between profitability and outreach compared to NBFIs and NGOs 
opposite to my initial hypotheses. This is due to cost effective operations of banks and 
cooperatives. 
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not significant anymore. Results regarding the regional differences are similar as earlier. It 
seems that the trade-off is smallest in Africa and Asia and largest in the middle region.  
After conducting the first robustness test, I also run the profitability regression (Equation 2) 
and outreach regression (Equation 4) with the areas specific datasets. The results of the 
profitability regression are reported in the Table 18in the Appendix 5. I want to study 
regressions with separate data for each of the continents to see consistency throughout the 
regions. Unfortunately significance levels of my results are not as high as in the base 
regression while running the regressions with the smaller sample sizes. In profitability 
function, the results are similar to base regression indicating the positive effect of increasing 
interest rates and negative effect of total costs on profitability. Some regional differences are 
for example that the yield squared term seem to be higher in middle region showing that there 
it  may  be  profitable  to  charge  extremely  high  interest  rates.  Also  the  positive  effect  of  
personal expenses seems to exist only in the more well-off areas including LAC and middle 
region.  
When considering the outreach function (Equation 4) with the area specific data sets in the 
Table 19 in the Appendix 6, the results are again quite consistent throughout the regions. It 
seems that Asia is different to other regions when considering the institution types. Banks 
seem to  have  worse  outreach  in  Asia  compared  to  other  regions.  On the  other  hand,  NBFIs  
and NGOs have better outreach in Asia compared to other regions. Results seem to be 
consistent with the base regression confirming the consistency of my study even though 
results vary between the different regions.  
9.  Recap of the results and discussion 
After conducting a large amount of analyses and regressions, it is time to recap the results. 
Throughout my paper, it has been clear that profitability and outreach are both extremely 
important targets for microfinance institutions. Fortunately, based on my results, it seems that 
both of the targets are possible to reach at the same time. Other crosscut theme has been the 
significant differences in institution types regarding the profitability and poverty outreach. By 
categorizing results based on the institutional type, the results are more precise and actions are 
implemented in a more accurate way.  
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9.1. Profitability is rooted to cost cutting and raising interest rates 
I started my analyses by understanding the drivers behind profitability function of the 
institution that is well predicted by the agency theory. Most of the institutions benefit from 
increasing the interest rates. On the other hand decreasing total costs is even more efficient 
way to improve profitability.  
Profitability of the institution increases with higher interest rates. Nevertheless, as predicted 
by the agency theory, if interest rates are rising to very high levels, portfolio quality decreases 
and profitability starts to decline. Especially for the banks, the profitability starts to decrease, 
if  the  interest  rates  rise  to  too  high  levels.  Also  Cull  et  al.  (2007)  have  found  empirical  
evidence that for individual lenders, the loan delinquency rates increased as interest rates rise. 
Individual lenders can be assimilated to banks, NBFIs and cooperatives to large extend. As 
Cull et al. (2007) explains the safe borrowers choose not to borrow when the interest rates on 
loans rise above a threshold. This means that only a disproportionate fraction of risky 
borrowers stays in the pool of borrowers. This exacerbates problems with loan repayment 
while majority of the borrowers would have higher probability to default. 
My results show that increasing interest rates into the high level could be a good opportunity 
for some of the institutions, especially for NBFIs, if the only target is to improve profitability. 
As far as the microfinance industry is highly dependent on the subsidies, the profitability is 
one of the goals, not the only one. Social aspects and poverty reduction should be taken into 
account  as  well.  Even  though the  results  would  suggest  increasing  the  interest  rates  to  very  
high level for some of the institutions, it should not be done due to the negative overall effect. 
Microloans are designed to be offered at market rates of interest such that the MFIs can 
recover their costs but not so high that they make supernormal profits off the poor (Karlan and 
Goldberg 2007). In reality many institutions receive subsidies and therefore charging very 
low or high interest rates can distort the market competition (Karlan and Goldberg, 2007). 
Therefore it is very important not to stare only the profitability indicator when defining the 
appropriate level of the interest rates.  
As mentioned, other important driver for profitability is the cost structure of the institution. 
When comparing the magnitudes, cost reduction leads to more efficient operations and larger 
profitability improvement compared to rising interest rates. The finding is aligned for 
example with Mersland and Strøm (2010), who also state that cutting the costs is the best way 
to improve profitability. I found similarly to Cull et al. (2011) that nongovernmental 
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microfinance organizations tend to have higher operating costs, which declines the 
profitability of these institutions. Banks and cooperatives have the lower operational costs and 
are also the most profitable forms of institutions. Increasing total costs decrease profitability 
whereas increasing personal costs improves profitability level of the institution, especially for 
the banks. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) state that a great deal what distinguishes failed 
microfinance from successful microfinance ultimately has to do with management, 
particularly with how staff members are motivated and equipped to do their jobs. When 
considering the principal-agent theory modified to management and staff, it is easy to 
understand that motivating the staff is very crucial to institution’s success. Managers should 
be able to find bet employees and set  employee’s constraints in a right way. As Armendáriz 
and Morduch (2010) state that to which extend objectives can be met depend on the 
constraints set to employees. It is important to do future research how to improve cost 
structure of the institutions and make operations more efficient and capitalize all the potential 
benefits from the skilled employees.  
9.2. Poverty outreach can be achieved at the same time with profitability 
Based on my analyses, it seems that there is no trade-off between profitability and outreach to 
the poor. The trade-off is smallest or not existing especially for the banks and cooperatives 
that are also the most profitable forms of institutions. The better profitability and smaller 
tradeoff are most likely due the more efficient operations of the commercialized institutions. 
It is aligned with Mersland and Oystein (2010) finding that inefficient MFIs need to shift their 
loan portfolios toward larger average loans and are then most susceptible to mission drift. 
They also find that when an MFI increases its cost efficiency, it is better able to advance loans 
to the poorer members of the community. The results are similar to Schreiner (2002) that 
finds that self-sustainability approach (instead of poverty approach) produces strongest 
incentives to improve social benefits through time.  
Based on my results, it also seems that while institutions become larger and mature, the effect 
of profitability on outreach is not significant. This result indicates that mission drift is not 
apparent and larger and older institutions are not more likely to drift from their missions. 
Mission drift argument would imply that the older an MFI, the more it drifts towards higher 
income segments. Nevertheless, my finding is aligned with Mersland and Strøm (2010) 
statement that MFIs time in business may induce it to accept smaller loan sizes. They also 
show that the sample average loan size for all MFIs does not increase with MFI age. Mersland 
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and Strøm (2010) explain two reasons for that: (1) cost effect: operating costs may drop over 
time as an MFI expends less effort to promote microloans and to ensure their repayment, (2) 
knowledge effect: repeat relationship with the same customer segment reveals its typical 
creditworthiness. Due to that, MFI may be willing to extend marginal and smaller loans 
deeper into a segment with a good record. An experienced MFI is more likely to obtain 
important customer information. Nevertheless, it is still true that larger institutions have lower 
outreach indicators. However, based on my study, this is not caused by the fact that they are 
trying to achieve higher profitability. Even though size and age individually may affect to 
both outreach and profitability, they won’t make the trade-off significantly stronger between 
the profitability and outreach. 
9.3. More commercialized institutions can benefit from their efficient operations 
while aiming to profitability and large outreach 
In regards to institution types, there are a lot of differences. It can be seen that based on the 
profitability indicators, banks and cooperatives have highest values compared to other forms 
of  institution.  Based  on  the  regression  results,  the  constitutional  factors  of  profitability  are  
cost structure and then interest rates. Rising interest rates improves profitability of all the 
institution  types.  Rising  interest  rates  improves  profitability  of  the  NBFIs  and  NGOs  
relatively  more  compared  to  banks.  In  addition,  it  seems  that  especially  NBFIs  can  raise  
interest rates to a higher level without declining profitability. For banks, rising interest rates to 
too high levels causes the largest negative effect on profitability due to decreased portfolio 
quality. The reasons behind rising interest rates may be different for different institution types. 
NGOs often  increase  interest  to  be  able  to  reach  larger  amount  of  people  and  being  able  to  
function in a rural and more costly areas. In the case of shareholder firms, the drivers behind 
increasing interest rates are often trying to achieve higher profit levels. As mentioned, larger 
profitability  can  be  achieved  also  by  cutting  the  costs.  On the  cost  side,  the  costs  are  at  the  
moment lower for banks and cooperatives.  Banks are also able to best  capitalize funds used 
for the personal expenses. 
When considering the actual trade-off between outreach and profitability, we see that 
institutional type causes significant differences. For banks, it is possible to achieve high levels 
of  profitability  and  also  the  large  outreach  to  the  poorest  of  the  poor.  Also  Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua (2010) found out that private microfinance institutions (including banks, 
cooperatives and NBFIs) are more sustainable than NGOs which is consistent with my 
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finding.  The  reason  may  be  that  MFIs  collecting  deposits  have  higher  social  performance  
levels  compared  to  NGOs  (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua,  2010).  It  is  due  to  fact  that  collection  of  
deposits  is  a  major  component  for  those  institutions  and  increases  their  capacity  to  finance  
investments in lending. In addition, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) explain that one reason 
why the outreach of the regulated institutions could be better is that those institutions are 
allowed  to  collect  savings.  Savings  from  richer  clients,  who  bear  the  fixed  costs,  make  
provision of saving facilities to poorer borrowers. Also Mersland and Strøm (2010) have 
found out that by being more cost-efficient, institutions are able to reach the poorest 
customers in a larger scale. The commercial approach of microfinance is consistent with the 
social  mission  of  MFI.  This  finding  is  aligned  with  Cull  et  al.  (2007);  Mersland  and  Strøm  
(2010) and Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010). This could be due to the fact that banks have been 
able to organize their operations in a more efficient way and therefore are able to achieve high 
profitability levels without compromising outreach.  
For NGOs and NBFIs the effect is not clear and there could be the trade-off between 
profitability and outreach of the institutions.  For the NGOs and NBFIs the case may be that 
while serving the poorest, the operational efficiency suffers and the profitability declines. 
NBFIs can improve their profitability by increasing interest rates but they should be careful 
not to weaken their outreach when aiming to more profitable operations. NGOs are also able 
to achieve better profitability with higher interest rates but only up to a certain level. They 
also may have problems obtaining both profitability and outreach. This may be due to the fact 
that NGOs suffer from weak governance because stakeholders are often passive and only 
weakly influence management (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). 
Because it is possible to achieve both profitability and outreach, the policy makers should 
consider encouraging the recent drive towards attainment of profitability by the MFIs. 
Cooperatives may benefit from their ability to collect savings but still operate in a local 
community level and to have a knowledge and trust of its members. Banks on the other hand, 
seem to have the most structured and efficient operations but they need to be extremely 
careful not to raise interest rates to too high levels because the effect on portfolio quality is 
most dramatic to that group. All in all, it seems that bank and cooperatives may be the most 
efficient way to form a microfinance institution because they are able to achieve both 
profitability and outreach at the same time.  
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9.4. Results need to always be interpreted in a right geographical context 
In the beginning of the research, I mentioned that regional differences are large in 
microfinance market. The growth rate, inflations, interest rates, regulatory issues etc. depend 
on the geographical location which therefore defines a suitable style for MFIs to operate 
(Ahlin et al. (2011).  
Regarding profitability, Asia has significantly lower profitability throughout all the measures 
compared to LAC. There are much more microfinance institution in Asia that partly effects on 
the results. It is mostly due to the higher population, but even when measured on per capita 
basis,  South  Asia  has  twice  as  much  microcredit  as  any  other  region  (Gonzalez  and  
Rosenberg, 2006). The demand relative to supply may not be that large in Asia, where there 
are relatively more microfinance providers. This could decline the profitability levels for 
institution in Asia. In regards profitability, results relating to Africa and middle region are not 
significant. 
In regards the portfolio quality, Asia improves its performance to similar levels with LAC 
region. But on the other hand, the portfolio quality is lower in Africa compared to other 
regions. When there are a large number of very poor borrowers, the declined portfolio quality 
is rational finding. Microfinance is extremely important in the areas where the access to the 
traditional financial system is low. In these areas MFIs reach more clients and are more 
profitable (Vanroose and Bert 2013). Vanroose and Bert (2013) explain that it is due to the 
market-failure hypotheses: MFIs respond to a need that banks do not fulfill and MFIs flourish 
where the formal financial sector fails. For this reason, even though the lower portfolio 
quality, institutions in Africa are able to achieve good profitability levels in comparison to 
other regions.  
The results also show that trade-off is much larger in middle and in LAC compared to Asia 
and Africa. Trade-off is therefore more serious problem in the regions that are more 
developed. This is also aligned with the Vanroose and Bert (2013) finding that the outreach is 
larger for institutions in the regions where the access to the traditional finance system is low. 
This is mostly due to the fact that in better developed areas there are less extremely poor 
people (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2011). In LAC and middle, it is much more expensive to try 
to reach poorest of the poor, when there are relatively few people that belong to the group of 
extremely poor people. Even more, the outreach is significantly weaker in middle region 
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compared even to LAC. Gonzales and Rosenberg (2006) explain that microfinance got much 
later start in the middle region which could partly lead to different results in that region.  
Overall, the country context appears to be an important determinant of MFI performance 
(Ahlin et al., 2011). Asia has been the largest development field for microfinance industry but 
it seems that institutions should put more effort reaching the profitability of the operations. In 
Africa both profitability and outreach levels are good, but future work should be directed to 
improve portfolio quality. For middle region and LAC, that are the most developed regions, 
the focus should be to reach larger poverty outreach levels. Much more investigation is 
needed on the regional differences, what are the root causes behind those, and what the 
regions could learn from each other. All in all, macroeconomy and the geographical location 
cannot be forgotten when considering the performance of the MFIs.   
10. Concluding remarks 
In my research, I have found that decreasing costs and increasing interest rates are the main 
drivers for the profitability of the institutions. Even more important finding is that institutions 
can  aim to  profitability  and  at  the  same time have  a  high  poverty  outreach.  It  is  possible  to  
achieve both goals especially for banks and cooperatives. Since there are not big differences 
in interest rates charged between the institution types, it seems that profit-oriented institutions 
are able to operate more cost effective way to be able to reach the poorest of the poor 
efficiently. My finding is relevant for policy makers when deciding on whether or not to 
subsidize microfinance and whether to set regulations to support commercialization. The 
finding is relevant for microfinance practitioners for their decisions to further improve the 
efficiency of their operations and not being afraid of aiming to achieve higher profitability. 
The  finding  is  also  important  for  commercial  investors  who  aim  to  be  socially  responsible  
investors and who could invest in profitability institutions and achieve both sustainability and 
profitability.  
In the practical point of view, there is a lack of financing in microfinance industry that could 
best be fulfilled through commercialized institutions. Byström (2008) claims that the total 
annual demand for microcredit, the most developed sub-discipline of microfinance, is much 
larger than philanthropy and development aid are capable of providing. He also suggests a 
commercialization of microlending as a possible solution for the unmet demand. Letting 
profit-oriented institutions enter a scene that is still dominated to a large extent by donation-
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based institutions, one is more likely to raise the huge amounts of funds needed to meet the 
demand (Byström, 2008). He also recommends that in addition to the increased supply of 
funds, commercialization would also benefit MFIs and microborrowers by providing loans 
with longer maturities and more diversified funding sources. Cull et al. (2009) expect that the 
private sector will be a growing part of microfinance: the gaps in access are large and the 
private sector has proven to be innovative, fast-growing, and especially ready to adopt new 
technology. The challenge is to embrace the opportunities of the market while recognizing the 
potential trade-offs. 
Based on my results, it is important to try to make operations of the institutions more efficient 
and make institutions achieve higher profitability levels. As Gonzales and Rosenberg (2006) 
state private microfinance is profitable and stable enough to move into the mainstream 
financial system. Copestake (2007) researches poverty oriented MFIs and suggests that there 
is  a  lot  of  diversity  of  practice.  Some  of  the  MFIs  have  strong  financial  and  social  
performance systems, but there is a lot of room for them to do better. Banks and cooperatives 
have been able to have more efficient operations which may cause the smaller outreach trade-
off for those types of institutions. Also other institutions should aim to that direction. 
Gonzales and Rosenberg (2006) introduce recommended improvement areas including 
improved goal setting, strategic planning, routine monitoring of the poverty status of clients 
and ex-clients, a capacity for follow-up research into the reasons behind observed changes, 
and periodic reviews of these activities. These changes could help to accelerate the pace of 
innovation and growth in a more poverty and gender aware manner.   
Because there is not significant trade-off between the profitability and outreach, policies 
should be guided in a way that they encourage institution to achieve greater profitability. By 
doing their operations in a more commercialized and institutionalized way, they could also 
reach the larger number of people in total. The total spillover effects of microfinance 
institutions could be much larger and larger development impact could be achieved. As 
Karlan and Goldberg (2007) explain it would be mistake to restrict the analysis only to groups 
that are direct microfinance customers. That would misstate the full impact of the program, 
because the program can be expected to generate impact on millions of non-participants 
through spillovers.  
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that different kinds of institutions are needed and 
not every institution need to be commercialized. There are still many poor people that are best 
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served by the small aid or subsidy-based institutions. Nevertheless, this is not the general 
direction where the majority of the institutions should be developed towards. Byström (2008) 
describes the challenges in a microfinance industry in a following way: “Similarly as there is 
complaint that microfinance as a whole is damaging for the poor due to exceptions, 
byproducts and side effects, similarly it can be said that commercialized microfinance is 
extremely damaging to the poor”. Nevertheless, overall impact of commercialized 
microfinance can be one of the most crucial solutions to long term poverty reduction in 
developing world. The potential of commercial microfinance is huge but so are the hurdles 
that have to be overcome.  
As Cull al. (2011) states: “Commercial financial institutions are apt to play increasingly large 
roles in serving those with low-incomes, if not the poorest. The expansion represents a 
potentially large gain given barriers to financial access that span well beyond just the poorest 
households”, I also conclude my study in a similar way. To enable microfinance to reach its 
full potential, it is essential to put more effort on commercialization of the microfinance 
industry still remembering the individuality and heteroscedasticity of the institutions. As 
proven in this report, it is possible to achieve profitability without sacrificing the outreach to 
the poorest. This is especially true for more profit-oriented institutions such as banks and 
cooperatives that have more efficient operations and cost structure. Future research should be 
focused on how to commercialize institutions in a sustainable way instead of debating 
whether it is beneficial to do so. With some microlenders transforming from nonprofit to 
regulated institutions and banks redefining their operations to include lending to the poor, the 
microfinance industry has become more business-like and more complex (Armendáriz and 
Morduch, 2010). It is important to research which innovations could enable commercialized 
banks to reach poorest people more efficiently in the future while still maintaining their 
profitability levels and sustainable operation models (also Cull et al., 2011). Microfinance 
presents itself as a new market-based strategy for poverty reduction (Armanderiz and 
Morduch, 2010) and the most crucial thing to do is to research how to best implement all the 
potential benefits that the microfinance has to offer. 
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12. Appendixes 
Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
  PaR30 LLR Writeoff 
Yield -0.02 -0.016 -0.017 
  (-0.65) (-1.07) (-1.09) 
NBFI 0.009 0.009 0.011 
  (0.66) (1.38) (1.37) 
NGO 0.068*** 0.016*** 0.017** 
  (2.86) (2.67) (2.34) 
Coop 0.035 0.01** 0.01* 
  (1.43) (2.05) (1.87) 
Yield*NBFI 0.013 0.006 0.005 
  (0.31) (0.17) (0.12) 
Yield*NGO -0.282 0.014 0.021 
  (-2.35) (0.45) (0.58) 
Yield*Coop -0.163 0.001 -0.01 
  (-0.99) (0.02) (-0.32) 
Yield^2 0.017 0.024*** 0.038*** 
  (0.99) (3.92) (6.68) 
Yield^2*NBFI -0.06 -0.024 -0.042 
  (-1.62) (-0.69) (-1.06) 
Yield^2*NGO 0.221 -0.08* -0.11** 
  (1.52) (-1.74) (-2.14) 
Yield^2*Coop 0.142 -0.086 -0.082 
  (0.61) (-1.12) (-1.06) 
Age 0.019*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 
  (5.96) (3.14) (3.44) 
Size -0.006*** 0 -0.001 
  (-3.33) (-0.01) (-0.53) 
ALB 0.012*** 0.004** 0.005*** 
  (3.21) (2.53) (2.85) 
LtA -0.067** -0.061*** -0.07*** 
  (-2.31) (-4.31) (-4.51) 
PStatus 0.007 0.005* 0.006** 
  (0.96) (1.75) (2.05) 
TEtA 0.341*** 0.175*** 0.178*** 
  (6.41) (6.91) (7.39) 
PEtA -0.396*** -0.126*** -0.114*** 
  (-4.69) (-3.29) (-2.94) 
Africa 0.007 -0.01*** -0.011*** 
  (0.80) (-2.40) (-2.50) 
Asia 0.01 0.004 0.003 
  (1.13) (1.26) (0.73) 
Middle -0.011*** -0.001 -0.002 
  (-1.68) (-0.44) (-0.76) 
Cons 0.032 -0.015 -0.002 
  (0.89) (-0.59) (-0.06) 
        
n  3446 3542 3446 
R^2 0.092 0.235 0.238 
Wald Chi 146.59 187.18 261.5 
  21.00 21.00 21.00 
 
Table 14 
Results from the portfolio quality regression 
This table shows the impact of high interest rates to the portfolio quality (Equation 3). Abbreviations in the table are 
following: PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), LLR – loan loss ratio, Writeoff – write-off ratio, Yield – portfolio yield,  
Yield^2 – portfolio yield squared, Age – maturity of the institution, Size – size of the gross loan portfolio, ALB – average 
loan balance, LtA – loans to assets, Pstatus  – profit status, TeTA – total expenses to assets, PeTA – personal expenses to 
assets. Portfolio quality is measured with three different proxies PaR30, Loan loss ratio and writeoff ratio. The regression is 
run with the random effects method with White’s robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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  PaR30 LLR Writeoff 
Yield*NBFI -0.007 -0.009 -0.013 
  (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.32) 
Yield*NGO -0.302** 0.021 0.035 
  (-2.55) (0.66) (0.99) 
Yield*Coop -0.183 -0.014 -0.019 
  (-1.13) (-0.47) (-0.63) 
Yield^2*NBFI -0.043 -0.004 -0.002 
  (-1.29) (-0.01) (-0.06) 
Yield^2*NGO 0.239 -0.086 -0.117** 
  (1.64) (-1.60) (-2.02) 
Yield^2*Coop 0.159 -0.054 -0.056 
  (0.69) (-0.68) (-0.68) 
  
  
Table 15 
Linear combinations for the portfolio quality regression 
The table shows the base effect for each of the institution type interaction term without comparing results to the 
omitted category. Abbreviations in the table are following: PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), LLR – loan loss 
ratio, Writeoff – write-off ratio, Yield – portfolio yield,  Yield^2 – portfolio yield squared. The regression is run 
with the random effects method with White’s robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OSS 
Yield 0.860*** 0.855*** 0.764*** 0.726*** 0.918*** 0.851*** 
  (14.07) (13.97) (6.00) (5.59) (5.44) (5.01) 
Age 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003 
  (0.27) (0.19) (0.24) (0.13) (0.40) (0.24) 
Size -0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
  (-0.13) (-0.06) (0.49) (0.56) (0.37) (0.42) 
ALB -0.005 -0.001 -0.023* -0.021* -0.024* -0.024* 
  (-0.53) (-0.13) (-1.84) (-1.69) (-1.93) (-1.89) 
LtA 0.592*** 0.584*** 0.590*** 0.589*** 0.597*** 0.599*** 
  (10.36) (9.68) (9.58) (9.49) (9.69) (9.69) 
PStatus 0.019 0.003 0.031 0.033 0.023 0.026 
  (1.10) (0.07) (0.84) (0.92) (0.62) (0.73) 
PaR30 -0.359*** -0.359*** -0.350*** -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.353*** 
  (-4.28) (-4.29) (-4.14) (-4.23) (-4.12) (-4.22) 
TEtA -1.983*** -1.984*** -1.991*** -2.730*** -2.008*** -2.711*** 
  (-11.38) (-11.37) (-11.32) (-8.16) (-11.21) (-8.07) 
PEtA 0.551*** 0.533** 0.474** 2.559*** 0.411* 2.414** 
  (2.60) (2.52) (2.22) (3.90) (1.92) (3.65) 
NBFI   0.039 0.034 0.027 0.090 0.083 
    (1.04) (0.66) (0.35) (1.52) (0.95) 
NGO   0.022 0.036 0.015 0.062 0.032 
    (0.36) (0.53) (0.18) (0.83) (0.34) 
Coop   -0.034 -0.021 0.018 0.082 0.196* 
    -0.60 -0.28 (0.19) (1.10) (1.89) 
Africa     0.011 0.010 0.013 0.010 
      (0.35) (0.31) (0.42) (0.32) 
Asia     -0.091*** -0.089*** -0.097*** -0.098*** 
      (-3.78) (-3.69) (-3.91) (-3.92) 
Middle     0.030 0.034 0.030 0.035 
      (1.07) (1.23) (1.11) (1.28) 
Yield*NBFI     0.059 0.129 -0.405* -0.318 
      (0.42) (0.86) (-1.84) (-1.49) 
Yield*NGO     0.084 0.092 -0.222 -0.184 
      (0.58) (0.56) (-0.76) (-0.62) 
Yield*Coop     0.097 0.349 -1.301*** -1.160*** 
      (0.36) (0.96) (-3.28) (-2.84) 
TEtA*NBFI       0.743**   0.692* 
        (1.96)   (1.80) 
TEtA*NGO       0.816*   0.792* 
        (1.87)   (1.81) 
TEtA*Coop       0.115   -0.048 
        (0.21)   (-0.09) 
PEtA*NBFI       -2.217***   -2.129*** 
        (-3.26)   (-3.10) 
PEtA*NGO       -2.096***   -1.975*** 
        (-2.88)   (-2.70) 
PEtA*Coop       -1.687   -2.888*** 
        (-1.62)   (-3.46) 
Yield^2         -0.149 -0.121 
          (-1.31) (-1.04) 
Yield^2*NBFI         0.572*** 0.562*** 
          (3.29) (3.03) 
Yield^2*NGO         0.414 0.359 
          (1.19) (1.04) 
Yield^2*Coop         2.91*** 3.898*** 
          (4.69) (4.38) 
n  3446 3446 3446 3446 3446 3446 
R^2 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 
Wald Chi 413 416 433 590 445 625 
  (9.00) (12.00) (18.00) (24.00) (22.00) (28.00) 
 
Table 16 
Results from the profitability regression when adding variables one by one. 
The table shows results from the Equation 1 and 2 that studies the profitability function of the institution. In this table the variables are added 
to the regression one by one to be able to study the effect of each individual variable and combined effect of many variables. Abbreviations 
in the table are following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, Yield – portfolio yield, Age – maturity of the institution, Size – size of the 
gross loan portfolio, ALB – average loan balance, LtA – loans to assets, Pstatus  – profit status, PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), TeTA – 
total expenses to assets, PeTA – personal expenses to assets, Yield^2 – portfolio yield squared. The regression is run with the random effects 
method with White’s robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
97 
 
Appendix 4 
 
 
Profitability 2010   Yield squared 2010   Outreach 2010 
  OSS     OSS     ALB Female 
Yield 1.887***   Yield 1.349*   OSS -0.914** 0.299*** 
  (5.99)     (1.85)     (-2.16) (2.64) 
NBFI 0.016   NBFI -0.091   NBFI -1.562*** 0.351*** 
  (0.22)     (-0.87)     (-3.09) (2.62) 
NGO 0.063   NGO 0.044   NGO -1.81*** 0.556*** 
  (0.78)     (0.41)     (-3.47) (4.06) 
Coop 0.032   Coop 0.026   Coop -1.924*** 0.476*** 
  (0.34)     (0.19)     (-2.77) (2.70) 
Yield*NBFI -0.239   Yield*NBFI 0.634   OSS*NBFI 0.869** -0.23* 
  (-0.75)     (0.82)     (1.94) (-1.94) 
Yield*NGO -0.32   Yield*NGO -0.013   OSS*NGO 0.881** -0.345*** 
  (-0.99)     (-0.02)     (1.97) (-2.92) 
Yield*Coop -0.524   Yield*Coop -0.435   OSS*Coop 1.91*** -0.429*** 
  (-1.25)     (-0.40)     (3.15) (-2.79) 
Age -0.021   Yield^2 1.007   Age 0.073 -0.024* 
  (-1.24)     (0.82)     (1.28) (-1.71) 
Size -0.002   Yield^2*NBFI -1.361   Size 0.123*** -0.008* 
  (-0.33)     (-1.09)     (5.96) (-1.67) 
ALB -0.015   Yield^2*NGO -0.643   LtA 0.008 0.06 
  (-1.20)     (-0.50)     (0.04) (1.13) 
LtA 0.587***   Yield^2*Coop -0.11   PStatus 0.125 0.002 
  (8.89)     (-0.06)     (0.98) (0.07) 
PStatus 0.018   Age -0.021   PaR30 0.359 -0.081 
  (0.50)     (-1.28)     (1.37) (-1.29) 
PaR30 -0.039   Size -0.001   Africa -1.036*** 0.039 
  (-0.54)     (-0.14)     (-8.08) (1.23) 
TEtA -3.069***   ALB -0.015   Asia -1.61*** 0.247*** 
  (-18.35)     (-1.18)     (-20.53) (13.07) 
PEtA 0.882***   LtA 0.594***   Middle 0.33*** -0.138*** 
  (3.47)     (8.88)     (3.81) (-6.47) 
Africa -0.012   PStatus 0.023   Cons 6.216*** 0.339** 
  (-0.29)     (0.62)     (10.90) (2.32) 
Asia 0.041   PaR30 -0.037         
  (1.26)     (-0.51)   n 682 649 
Middle 0.052**   TEtA -3.085***   R^2 0.602 0.435 
  (2.04)     (-18.38)   F (67.16) (32.54) 
Cons 1.065***   PEtA 0.885***     F(15,666) F(15,633) 
  (6.59)     (3.44)         
      Africa -0.016         
n 602     (-0.40)         
R^2 0.526   Asia 0.04         
F (35.98)     (1.19)         
  F(18,583)   Middle 0.049*         
        (1.94)         
      Cons 1.094***         
        (6.18)         
                  
      n 602         
      R^2 0.529         
      F (29.59)         
        F(22,579)         
  
Table 17 
 Robustness check for profitability and outreach functions for the year 2010 
This table shows all the main regressions with smaller data set including only observations from the year 2010.  
Abbreviations in the table are following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, Yield – portfolio yield, Age – maturity of the 
institution, Size – size of the gross loan portfolio, ALB – average loan balance, LtA – loans to assets, Pstatus  – profit status, 
PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), TeTA – total expenses to assets, PeTA – personal expenses to assets, Yield^2 – portfolio 
yield squared, Female – percentage of female borrowers. This regression is run with the ordinary least squares method. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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  LAC Africa Asia Middle 
  OSS 
Yield 0.539 0.561* 1.947 0.238 
  (1.40) (1.64) (1.52) (0.97) 
NBFI 0.109 -0.196 0.206 -0.099 
  (0.64) (-1.15) (1.53) (-1.22) 
NGO 0.089 -0.15 0.308* -0.192 
  (0.82) (-0.65) (1.89) (-1.28) 
Coop -0.08 -0.16 0.3* -0.025 
  (-0.89) (-0.80) (1.81) (-0.15) 
Yield*NBFI -0.149 0.023 -1.103 0.433 
  (-0.23) (0.05) (-0.82) (1.27) 
Yield*NGO -0.557 0.076 -1.189 0.758 
  (-1.04) (0.11) (-0.90) (0.82) 
Yield*Coop -0.631 0.027 -1.845 -0.642 
  (-1.10) (0.03) (-1.33) (-1.14) 
Yield^2 0.998 -0.082 -4.119 1.906*** 
  (1.63) (-0.59) (-1.19) (3.74) 
Yield^2*NBFI -0.649 0.311 3.611 -1.119* 
  (-0.91) (1.35) (1.02) (-1.82) 
Yield^2*NGO 0.014 0.077 4.389 -1.787 
  (0.02) (0.13) (1.26) (-1.03) 
Yield^2*Coop 1.987 0.097 6.107* 1.885* 
  (1.32) (0.05) (1.73) (1.65) 
Age -0.031 0.047** 0.028* 0.023 
  (-1.33) (2.01) (1.70) (1.09) 
Size -0.018** 0.008 0.016** -0.014 
  (-2.18) (0.37) (1.99) (-0.78) 
ALB -0.004 -0.025 -0.008 -0.073*** 
  (-0.17) (-0.93) (-0.50) (-2.92) 
LtA 0.513*** 0.898*** 0.458*** 0.91*** 
  (5.57) (5.80) (6.20) (7.14) 
Pstatus -0.013 0.056 0.14** -0.005 
  (-0.21) (0.68) (2.01) (-0.09) 
PaR30 -0.401*** 0.005 -0.347*** -0.486** 
  (-2.72) (0.02) (-4.09) (-2.54) 
TEtA -1.741*** -1.119*** -2.052*** -3.445*** 
  (-11.63) (-5.57) (-8.28) (-10.52) 
PEtA 0.308* -0.3 0.299 0.916* 
  (1.88) (-0.99) (0.78) (1.87) 
Cons 1.433*** 0.701* 0.493*** 1.819*** 
  (8.78) (1.81) (2.58) (4.02) 
          
n 1393 275 895 883 
R^2 0.374 0.575 0.626 0.554 
Chi squared 447.73 270.29 314.87 273.06 
  (19.0) (19.0) (19.0) (19.0) 
 
Table 18 
Area specific profitability regression with yield squared terms for robustness check 
This table shows the profitability regressions for each of the geographical areas. Abbreviations in the table are 
following: OSS – operational self-sufficiency, Yield – portfolio yield, Yield^2 – portfolio yield squared, Age – 
maturity of the institution, Size – size of the gross loan portfolio, ALB – average loan balance, LtA – loans to 
assets, Pstatus  – profit status, PaR30 – portfolio at risk (30days), TeTA – total expenses to assets, PeTA – 
personal expenses to assets. This regression is run with the random effects regression with the White’s robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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  LAC Africa Asia Middle 
  ALB 
OSS -0.338 -0.941*** 0.239 -0.423* 
  (-1.04) (-2.74) (0.96) (-1.91) 
NBFI -0.172 -1.317** 0.318 -0.785** 
  (-0.42) (-2.09) (0.84) (-2.40) 
NGO -0.126 -1.575** -0.081 -0.819** 
  (-0.32) (-1.97) (-0.21) (-2.41) 
Coop 1.005** 0.118 -0.267 0.92** 
  (2.23) (0.14) (-0.38) (2.34) 
OSS*NBFI 0.372 1.101*** -0.453 0.645*** 
  (1.11) (2.77) (-1.52) (2.73) 
OSS*NGO 0.469 0.673* -0.31 0.389* 
  (1.42) (1.85) (-1.23) (1.77) 
OSS*Coop 0.127 0.292 0.502 0.368 
  (0.34) (0.76) (0.81) (1.61) 
Age -0.017 0.09 0.035 0.022 
  (-0.38) (1.53) (0.74) (0.46) 
Size 0.368*** 0.308*** 0.233*** 0.3*** 
  (13.24) (6.74) (9.10) (9.19) 
LtA -0.233 0.168 -0.079 0.378* 
  (-1.38) (0.71) (-0.47) (1.92) 
Pstatus -0.051 0.272 -0.006 0.705*** 
  (-0.39) (0.51) (-0.03) (3.55) 
PaR30 0.259 0.194 -0.184 0.417 
  (1.08) (1.06) (-1.03) (1.38) 
Cons 1.075** 1.887* 1.423*** 2.278*** 
  (2.39) (1.89) (2.76) (4.15) 
          
n 2009 467 1319 1256 
R^2 0.303 0.478 0.449 0.431 
Chi squared 589.8 271.99 152.34 395.6 
  (12.0) (12.0) (12.0) (12.0) 
 
Table 19 
Area specific profitability regression with yield squared terms for robustness check 
This table shows the outreach regressions for each of the geographical areas. Abbreviations in the table are 
following: ALB – average loan balance, OSS – operational self-sufficiency, Age – maturity of the institution, 
Size – size of the gross loan portfolio, LtA – loans to assets, Pstatus  – profit status, PaR30 – portfolio at risk 
(30days). This regression is run with the random effects regression with the White’s robust standard errors. *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
100 
 
Appendix 7  
Area Country MFI name Area Country MFI name
Africa Benin ALIDÃ© Asia Afghanistan ASA-AFG
Africa Benin Maritime Asia Afghanistan BRAC - AFG
Africa Cameroon Advans Cameroun Asia Afghanistan FMFB - AFG
Africa Cameroon CCA Asia Afghanistan Hope for Life
Africa Cameroon CDS Asia Afghanistan OXUS - AFG
Africa Cameroon CFA Microfinance Asia Afghanistan Parwaz
Africa Cameroon MUFFA Asia Bangladesh AF
Africa Congo, Democratic RepublicFINCA - DRC Asia Bangladesh ASA
Africa Congo, Democratic RepublicProCredit Bank- DRC Asia Bangladesh BASTOB
Africa Congo FAM Asia Bangladesh BEES
Africa Cote d'Ivoire CEP-CECREV Asia Bangladesh BRAC
Africa Ethiopia PEACE Asia Bangladesh BURO Bangladesh
Africa Gambia Reliance Asia Bangladesh CCDA
Africa Ghana CEDEF Asia Bangladesh CDIP
Africa Ghana Dwetire Asia Bangladesh CSS
Africa Ghana G-Life Asia Bangladesh CTS
Africa Ghana Grameen Ghana Asia Bangladesh DSK
Africa Ghana ID Ghana Asia Bangladesh ESDO
Africa Ghana OISL Asia Bangladesh Ghashful
Africa Ghana ProCredit - GHA Asia Bangladesh Grameen Bank
Africa Ghana Sinapi Aba Trust Asia Bangladesh GUK
Africa Ghana Y-SEF Asia Bangladesh HEED
Africa Kenya BIMAS Asia Bangladesh IDF
Africa Kenya ECLOF - KEN Asia Bangladesh JCF
Africa Kenya Equity Bank Asia Bangladesh Muslim Aid
Africa Kenya Faulu - KEN Asia Bangladesh NGF
Africa Kenya Juhudi Kilimo Asia Bangladesh POPI
Africa Kenya KADET Asia Bangladesh RDRS
Africa Kenya KPOSB Asia Bangladesh RIC
Africa Kenya K-Rep Asia Bangladesh RRF
Africa Kenya KWFT Asia Bangladesh Sajida
Africa Kenya Micro Kenya Asia Bangladesh SDC
Africa Kenya SMEP Asia Bangladesh Shakti
Africa Liberia BRAC - LBR Asia Bangladesh SKS Bangladesh
Africa Madagascar CECAM Asia Bangladesh SSS
Africa Madagascar SIPEM Asia Bangladesh ST
Africa Malawi CUMO Asia Bangladesh TMSS
Africa Malawi FINCA - MWI Asia Bangladesh Wave
Africa Malawi MLF MWI Asia Bhutan BDBL
Africa Mali Miselini Asia Cambodia ACLEDA
Africa Mali PASECA - Kayes Asia Cambodia AMK
Africa Mozambique CCOM Asia Cambodia AMRET
Africa Mozambique FDM Asia Cambodia CBIRD
Africa Mozambique Hluvuku Asia Cambodia CCSF
Africa Mozambique NovoBanco - MOZ Asia Cambodia Chamroeun
Africa Niger MECREF Asia Cambodia Farmer Finance Ltd
Africa Nigeria SEAP Asia Cambodia HKL
Africa Rwanda ACB sa Asia Cambodia IPR
Africa Rwanda Duterimbere Asia Cambodia KREDIT
Africa Rwanda RML Asia Cambodia Maxima
Africa Rwanda UOB Asia Cambodia PRASAC
Africa Senegal ACEP Senegal Asia Cambodia SAMIC-Limited
Africa Senegal CAURIE Micro Finance Asia Cambodia Sathapana Limited
Africa Senegal MicroCred - SEN Asia Cambodia Seilanithih
Africa Senegal U-IMCEC Asia Cambodia TPC
Africa Sierra Leone BRAC - SLE Asia Cambodia VFC
Africa South Africa Capitec Bank Asia China CFPA
Africa South Africa Ekukhanyeni Asia China CZWSDA
Africa South Africa SEF-ZAF Asia East T imor Moris Rasik
Africa Tanzania FINCA - TZA Asia East T imor TRM
Africa Tanzania IDYDC Asia India Adhikar
Africa Tanzania SEDA Asia India Ajiwika
Africa Togo ASDEB Asia India AML
Africa Togo CAPAB Asia India AMMACTS
Africa Togo CECA Asia India AMPL
Africa Togo FECECAV Asia India Arohan
Africa Togo FUCEC Togo Asia India ASA India
Africa Togo MGPCC DEKAWOWO Asia India Asirvad
Africa Uganda BRAC - UGA Asia India Asomi
Africa Uganda Centenary Bank Asia India Bandhan
Africa Uganda Finance Trust Asia India BASIX
Africa Uganda ISSIA Asia India BIRDS
Africa Uganda KSCS Asia India BISWA
Africa Uganda Madfa SACCO Asia India BJS
Africa Uganda MED-Net Asia India BSS
Africa Uganda MUL Asia India BWDA Finance
Africa Uganda Opportunity Uganda Asia India BWDC
Africa Zambia CETZAM Asia India Cashpor MC
Africa Zambia FINCA - ZMB Asia India CCFID
Africa Zambia MBT Asia India CDOT
Africa Zambia MCF Zambia Asia India Chaitanya
Table 20: List of the areas, countries and institutions 
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Asia India Disha Asia Nepal Manushi
Asia India Disha Microfin Asia Nepal MBBL
Asia India Equitas Asia Nepal NeRuDO
Asia India ESAF Asia Nepal NESDO
Asia India FFSL Asia Nepal Nirdhan
Asia India GFSPL Asia Nepal NRDSC
Asia India GLOW Asia Nepal Sahara Mahila
Asia India GOF Asia Nepal SOLVE
Asia India Grama Vidiyal Microfinance Ltd. Asia Nepal UNYC
Asia India GU Asia Pakistan Apna Microfinance Bank (Formerly NMFB)
Asia India GUARDIAN Asia Pakistan ASA Pakistan
Asia India HiH Asia Pakistan BRAC - PAK
Asia India Hope Microcredit Asia Pakistan CSC
Asia India ICNW Asia Pakistan CWCD
Asia India IDF Financial Services Asia Pakistan DAMEN
Asia India India's  Capital  Trust  Ltd Asia Pakistan FMFB - Pakistan
Asia India Indur MACS Asia Pakistan JWS
Asia India Janalakshmi Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. Asia Pakistan Kashf Bank
Asia India KCIPL Asia Pakistan Khushhali Bank
Asia India Kotalipara Asia Pakistan NRSP
Asia India Mahasemam Asia Pakistan NRSP Bank
Asia India Mahashakt i Asia Pakistan POMFB
Asia India Mimo Finance Asia Pakistan RCDS
Asia India MMFL Asia Pakistan Rozgar
Asia India Muthoot Asia Pakistan SRSP
Asia India Nano Asia Pakistan Sungi
Asia India NBJK Asia Pakistan T MFB
Asia India NCS Asia Pakistan T RDP
Asia India NEED Asia Papua New Guinea PNG Microfinance Ltd
Asia India Pust ikar Asia Philippines ASA Philippines
Asia India PWMACS Asia Philippines ASKI
Asia India RASS Asia Philippines CARD NGO
Asia India RGVN Asia Philippines CCT
Asia India RISE Asia Philippines CEVI
Asia India RORES Asia Philippines CMEDFI
Asia India Sahara Utsarga Asia Philippines ECLOF - PHL
Asia India Sahayata Asia Philippines FCBFI
Asia India Samasta Asia Philippines Joyful Development , Inc.
Asia India Sanchetna Asia Philippines JVOFI
Asia India Sanghamithra Asia Philippines Kasagana-Ka
Asia India Sarala Asia Philippines Kazama Grameen
Asia India Sarvodaya Nano Finance Asia Philippines KCCDFI
Asia India SCNL Asia Philippines KMBI
Asia India SEIL Asia Philippines MILAMDEC
Asia India SEWA Bank Asia Philippines MMPC
Asia India SHARE Asia Philippines NWTF
Asia India SKDRDP Asia Philippines Pagasa
Asia India SKS Asia Philippines PALFSI
Asia India SMILE Asia Philippines PMPC
Asia India SMSS Asia Philippines Serviamus
Asia India Sonata Asia Samoa SPBD Samoa
Asia India Spandana Asia Sri Lanka Agro Micro
Asia India SU Asia Sri Lanka Arthacharya
Asia India Suryoday Asia Sri Lanka BDCB
Asia India Swadhaar Asia Sri Lanka Berendina Microfinance
Asia India SWAWS Asia Sri Lanka BRAC - LKA
Asia India Swayamshree Micro Credit Services Asia Sri Lanka Lak Jaya
Asia India SVCL Asia Sri Lanka Regional Development Bank
Asia India SVSDF Asia Sri Lanka Ruhuna
Asia India TCT Asia Sri Lanka Sareeram
Asia India Trident Microfinance Asia Sri Lanka SDBL
Asia India UFSPL Asia Sri Lanka SEEDS
Asia India Ujjivan Asia Sri Lanka SEWA Finance
Asia India VFPL Asia Sri Lanka WDFH
Asia India VFS Asia Sri Lanka VFL
Asia India WSE Asia T hailand SED
Asia Indonesia BMT Sanama Asia T onga SPBD Tonga
Asia Indonesia CU Sawiran Asia Vietnam Binhminh CDC
Asia Indonesia KOMIDA Asia Vietnam CEP
Asia Indonesia MBK Ventura Asia Vietnam Dariu
Asia Indonesia WKP Asia Vietnam M7 Can Loc
Asia Laos ACLEDA Lao Asia Vietnam M7 DB District
Asia Malaysia AIM Asia Vietnam M7 DBP City
Asia Nepal CCODER Asia Vietnam M7 Dong Trieu
Asia Nepal CSD Asia Vietnam M7 Mai Son
Asia Nepal DD Bank Asia Vietnam M7 Ninh Phuoc
Asia Nepal DEPROSC-Nepal Asia Vietnam M7 Uong bi
Asia Nepal FORWARD Asia Vietnam T CVM Thanh Hoa
Asia Nepal JBS Asia Vietnam VBSP
Asia Nepal JSCCS
Asia Nepal Mahuli
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LAC Argentina Avanzar LAC Dominican RepublicALNAP
LAC Argentina Contigo Microfinanzas LAC Dominican RepublicASPIRE
LAC Argentina Cordial Microfinanzas LAC Dominican RepublicBanco ADEMI
LAC Argentina FIE Gran Poder LAC Dominican RepublicBanco ADOPEM
LAC Argentina OMLA LAC Dominican RepublicCDD
LAC Argentina Pro Mujer - ARG LAC Dominican RepublicECLOF - DOM
LAC Argentina Progresar LAC Dominican RepublicFDD
LAC Belize LICU LAC Dominican RepublicFIME
LAC Bolivia AgroCapital LAC Dominican RepublicFONDESA
LAC Bolivia ANED LAC Dominican RepublicFundaciÃ³n Esperanza
LAC Bolivia Banco FIE LAC Dominican RepublicPYME BHD
LAC Bolivia BancoSol LAC Ecuador Banco Solidario
LAC Bolivia CIDRE LAC Ecuador CACMU
LAC Bolivia Coop FÃ¡t ima LAC Ecuador CEPESIU
LAC Bolivia Coop JesÃºs Nazareno LAC Ecuador COAC 4 de Octubre
LAC Bolivia CRECER LAC Ecuador COAC Ambato
LAC Bolivia Diaconia LAC Ecuador COAC Artesanos
LAC Bolivia EcoFuturo FFP LAC Ecuador COAC Atuntaqui
LAC Bolivia Emprender LAC Ecuador COAC Chone
LAC Bolivia FADES LAC Ecuador COAC Fernando Daquilema
LAC Bolivia Fassil FFP LAC Ecuador COAC Fondvida
LAC Bolivia FONCRESOL LAC Ecuador COAC JardÃ-n Azuayo
LAC Bolivia FUBODE LAC Ecuador COAC Kullki Wasi
LAC Bolivia FUNBODEM LAC Ecuador COAC La BenÃ©fica
LAC Bolivia IDEPRO LAC Ecuador COAC Luz del Valle
LAC Bolivia IMPRO LAC Ecuador COAC MCCH
LAC Bolivia Pro Mujer - BOL LAC Ecuador COAC Mushuc Runa
LAC Bolivia ProCredit - BOL LAC Ecuador COAC Nacional
LAC Bolivia Sartawi LAC Ecuador COAC Padre Vicente
LAC Brazil ASCOOB CENTRAL LAC Ecuador COAC Pallatanga
LAC Brazil Banco da FamÃ-lia LAC Ecuador COAC Sac Aiet
LAC Brazil Banco do Empreendedor LAC Ecuador COAC San Antonio
LAC Brazil Banco do Vale LAC Ecuador COAC San Gabriel
LAC Brazil BANCRI LAC Ecuador COAC San JosÃ©
LAC Brazil CEADe LAC Ecuador COAC Santa Anita
LAC Brazil CEAPE MA LAC Ecuador CODESARROLLO
LAC Brazil CEAPE PE LAC Ecuador COOPROGRESO
LAC Brazil CEAPE PI LAC Ecuador Credi FÃ©
LAC Brazil Cent ral Cresol Baser LAC Ecuador D-Miro
LAC Brazil CrÃ©dito SolidÃ¡rio LAC Ecuador ECLOF - ECU
LAC Brazil CrediAmigo LAC Ecuador FACES
LAC Brazil CREDIOESTE LAC Ecuador FINCA - ECU
LAC Brazil Credisol LAC Ecuador FODEMI
LAC Brazil Cresol Central LAC Ecuador FundaciÃ³n Alternat iva
LAC Brazil ICC BluSol LAC Ecuador FundaciÃ³n Espoir
LAC Brazil SÃ£o Paulo Confia LAC Ecuador FUNDAMIC
LAC Brazil Santander MicrocrÃ©dito LAC Ecuador INSOT EC
LAC Chile BancoEstado LAC Ecuador ProCredit - ECU
LAC Chile Fondo Esperanza LAC Ecuador UCADE Ambato
LAC Colombia Actuar Quindio LAC Ecuador UCADE Latacunga
LAC Colombia Actuar Tolima LAC Ecuador UCADE Santo Domingo
LAC Colombia BancamÃ-a LAC El Salvador ACCOVI
LAC Colombia Banco WWB LAC El Salvador AMC de R.L.
LAC Colombia BCSC LAC El Salvador Apoyo Integral
LAC Colombia Comultrasan LAC El Salvador ASEI
LAC Colombia Confiar LAC El Salvador AsociaciÃ³n El Balsamo
LAC Colombia Contactar LAC El Salvador BANCOFIT
LAC Colombia Coomultagro LAC El Salvador CCAMET RO
LAC Colombia Coop MEDA LAC El Salvador ENLACE
LAC Colombia COOTREGUA LAC El Salvador FADEMYPE
LAC Colombia Crezcamos LAC El Salvador FINCA - SLV
LAC Colombia FinAmÃ©rica LAC El Salvador FundaciÃ³n CAMPO
LAC Colombia FMM Bucaramanga LAC El Salvador FUNSALDE
LAC Colombia FMM PopayÃ¡n LAC El Salvador MICREDITO
LAC Colombia FMSD LAC El Salvador PADECOMSMCREDIT O
LAC Colombia FundaciÃ³n Amanecer LAC Guatemala ADICLA
LAC Colombia FUNDESAN LAC Guatemala AGUDESA
LAC Colombia Interactuar LAC Guatemala ASDIR
LAC Colombia Microempresas de Antioquia LAC Guatemala AsociaciÃ³n SHARE
LAC Costa Rica ACORDE LAC Guatemala AYNLA
LAC Costa Rica ACRG LAC Guatemala CDRO
LAC Costa Rica ADRI LAC Guatemala CRYSOL
LAC Costa Rica APACOOP LAC Guatemala FAFIDESS
LAC Costa Rica APIAGOL LAC Guatemala FAPE
LAC Costa Rica ASOPROSANRAMON LAC Guatemala FIACG
LAC Costa Rica CREDIMUJER LAC Guatemala FONDESOL
LAC Costa Rica EDESA LAC Guatemala FundaciÃ³n MICROS
LAC Costa Rica FIDERPAC LAC Guatemala FUNDEA
LAC Costa Rica FUDECOSUR LAC Guatemala FUNDEMIX
LAC Costa Rica FundaciÃ³n Mujer LAC Guatemala FUNDESPE
LAC Costa Rica FUNDEBASE LAC Guatemala GÃ©nesis Empresarial
LAC Costa Rica FUNDECOCA LAC Guatemala MUDE
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LAC Hait i ACME LAC Paraguay FIELCO
LAC Hait i FINCA - HTI LAC Paraguay FundaciÃ³n Paraguaya
LAC Hait i Fonkoze Financial Services (SFF) LAC Paraguay Interfisa Financiera
LAC Hait i SOGESOL LAC Paraguay Microsol
LAC Honduras ADICH LAC Paraguay VisiÃ³n Banco
LAC Honduras Banco Popular LAC Peru ADRA - PER
LAC Honduras Credisol Honduras LAC Peru Alternativa Microfinanzas
LAC Honduras FAMA OPDF LAC Peru AMA
LAC Honduras FHA LAC Peru CMAC Arequipa
LAC Honduras FINCA - HND LAC Peru CMAC Cusco
LAC Honduras FINSOL LAC Peru CMAC Del Santa
LAC Honduras FundaciÃ³n Adelante LAC Peru CMAC Huancayo
LAC Honduras FUNDAHMICRO LAC Peru CMAC Ica
LAC Honduras FUNDEVI LAC Peru CMAC Maynas
LAC Honduras FUNED LAC Peru CMAC Sullana
LAC Honduras HDH OPDF LAC Peru CMAC Trujillo
LAC Honduras Microfinanciera Prisma LAC Peru COOPAC Norandino
LAC Honduras ODEF Financiera LAC Peru COOPAC Santo Cristo
LAC Honduras PILARH OPDF LAC Peru CRAC Los Andes
LAC Honduras World Relief - HND LAC Peru CRAC Nuestra Gente
LAC Jamaica ACCESS LAC Peru CRAC SeÃ±or de Luren
LAC Mexico ALSOL LAC Peru Crediscot ia
LAC Mexico Apoyo EconÃ³mico LAC Peru EDPYME Alternativa
LAC Mexico APROS LAC Peru EDPYME CredivisiÃ³n
LAC Mexico ASP Financiera LAC Peru EDPYME Nueva VisiÃ³n
LAC Mexico Avance LAC Peru EDPYME Proempresa
LAC Mexico Caja Depac Poblana LAC Peru EDPYME RaÃ-z
LAC Mexico CAME LAC Peru EDPYME Solidaridad
LAC Mexico COCDEP LAC Peru Financiera Confianza
LAC Mexico Compartamos Banco LAC Peru Financiera Crear
LAC Mexico Conserva LAC Peru Financiera Edyficar
LAC Mexico CrediClub LAC Peru Financiera Efectiva
LAC Mexico CrediComÃºn LAC Peru FINCA - PER
LAC Mexico CREDITUYO LAC Peru FONDESURCO
LAC Mexico Don Apoyo LAC Peru FOVIDA
LAC Mexico Finacen LAC Peru IDER CV
LAC Mexico FinAmigo LAC Peru Manuela Ramos
LAC Mexico Financiera Independencia LAC Peru MiBanco
LAC Mexico FINCA - MEX LAC Peru MIDE
LAC Mexico FinComÃºn LAC Peru Popular SAFI
LAC Mexico FinLabor LAC Peru PRISMA
LAC Mexico Forjadores de Negocios LAC Peru Pro Mujer - PER
LAC Mexico GCM LAC Suriname De Schakel
LAC Mexico Invirtiendo LAC Uruguay Microfin Uruguay
LAC Mexico Mas Kapital LAC Venezuela BanGente
LAC Mexico Oportunidad Microfinanzas
LAC Mexico Pretmex
LAC Mexico Pro Mujer - MEX
LAC Mexico ProApoyo
LAC Mexico Progresemos
LAC Mexico SemiSol
LAC Mexico Sociedad Enlace
LAC Mexico SOLFI
LAC Mexico SoluciÃ³n Asea
LAC Mexico SUFIRMA
LAC Mexico Te Creemos
LAC Mexico Vision Fund - MEX
LAC Nicaragua ACODEP
LAC Nicaragua ADIM
LAC Nicaragua AFODENIC
LAC Nicaragua ASODERI
LAC Nicaragua BANEX
LAC Nicaragua CEPRODEL
LAC Nicaragua FDL
LAC Nicaragua FINANCIA CAPIT AL
LAC Nicaragua Financiera Fama
LAC Nicaragua FINCA - NIC
LAC Nicaragua FODEM
LAC Nicaragua FUDEMI
LAC Nicaragua FundaciÃ³n 4i-2000
LAC Nicaragua FundaciÃ³n LeÃ³n 2000
LAC Nicaragua FUNDEPYME
LAC Nicaragua FUNDESER
LAC Nicaragua PRESTANIC
LAC Nicaragua Pro Mujer - NIC
LAC Nicaragua ProCredit - NIC
LAC Nicaragua PRODESA
LAC Panama Coop Juan XXIII
LAC Panama Financia Credit
LAC Panama Microserfin
LAC Panama ProCaja
LAC Paraguay Banco Familiar
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Middle Albania ASC Union Middle Kosovo BZMF
Middle Albania BESA Middle Kosovo FINCA - KOS
Middle Albania NOA - ALB Middle Kosovo KGMAMF
Middle Albania ProCredit Bank - ALB Middle Kosovo KosInvest
Middle Albania VisionFund Albania Middle Kosovo ProCredit Bank - KOS
Middle Armenia ACBA Middle Kyrgyzstan Agrocredit Plus
Middle Armenia AREGAK UCO Middle Kyrgyzstan Aiyl Bank
Middle Armenia ECLOF - ARM Middle Kyrgyzstan Bai Tushum
Middle Armenia Farm Credit Armenia Middle Kyrgyzstan BTA Bank
Middle Armenia FINCA - ARM Middle Kyrgyzstan CU Manzini
Middle Armenia INECO Middle Kyrgyzstan CU Zakowat
Middle Armenia KAMURJ Middle Kyrgyzstan Elet-Capital
Middle Armenia Nor Horizon Middle Kyrgyzstan First MicroCredit Company
Middle Armenia ProCredit Bank - ARM Middle Kyrgyzstan FMCC
Middle Armenia SEF-ARM Middle Kyrgyzstan Kompanion
Middle Azerbaijan AccessBank Middle Kyrgyzstan Mol Bulak Finance
Middle Azerbaijan Aqrarkredit Middle Kyrgyzstan OXUS - KGS
Middle Azerbaijan Aqroinvest Middle Kyrgyzstan Salym Finance
Middle Azerbaijan Avrasiya-Kredit Middle Lebanon ADR
Middle Azerbaijan Azercredit Middle Lebanon Al Majmoua
Middle Azerbaijan Azeri Star Middle Lebanon Ameen
Middle Azerbaijan Caspian Invest Middle Macedonia FULM
Middle Azerbaijan DemirBank Middle Macedonia Horizonti
Middle Azerbaijan Finance Technology Middle Macedonia Moznost i
Middle Azerbaijan FINCA - AZE Middle Macedonia ProCredit Bank - MKD
Middle Azerbaijan FinDev Middle Moldova Microinvest
Middle Azerbaijan KredAqro NBCO Middle Moldova ProCredit Bank - MDA
Middle Azerbaijan Mol Bulak Azerbaijan Middle Moldova RFC
Middle Azerbaijan Omni Finance Middle Mongolia Credit Mongol
Middle Azerbaijan Parabank Middle Mongolia Khan Bank
Middle Azerbaijan TBC Kredit Middle Mongolia Netcapital
Middle Azerbaijan TuranBank Middle Mongolia T FS
Middle Azerbaijan Viator Middle Mongolia VFM
Middle Bosnia and Herz. ADRIA mikro Middle Mongolia XacBank
Middle Bosnia and Herz. EKI Middle Montenegro Agroinvest - Montenegro
Middle Bosnia and Herz. LIDER Middle Montenegro Erste Bank
Middle Bosnia and Herz. LOK Microcredit Foundat ion Middle Morocco Al Karama
Middle Bosnia and Herz. MI-BOSPO Middle Morocco AMSSF/MC
Middle Bosnia and Herz. MIKRA Middle Morocco FBPMC
Middle Bosnia and Herz. Mikro ALDI Middle Morocco FONDEP
Middle Bosnia and Herz. MIKROFIN Middle Palestine ACAD
Middle Bosnia and Herz. Partner Middle Palestine Al Rafah Bank
Middle Bosnia and Herz. PRIZMA Middle Palestine ASALA
Middle Bosnia and Herz. ProCredit Bank - BIH Middle Palestine FAT EN
Middle Bosnia and Herz. SINERGIJA Middle Palestine Reef
Middle Bosnia and Herz. Sunrise Middle Palestine Ryada
Middle Bosnia and Herz. Women for Women Middle Poland FM Bank
Middle Bulgaria Agroimpuls Middle Romania Express Finance
Middle Bulgaria Doveriye- Bulgaria Middle Romania LAM
Middle Bulgaria General Toshevo Middle Romania OMRO
Middle Bulgaria Kredo Middle Romania ProCredit Bank - ROM
Middle Bulgaria Mikrofond Middle Russia Alternativa
Middle Bulgaria Nachala Middle Russia Aurora
Middle Bulgaria ProCredit Bank - BGR Middle Russia Doveriye - Volgograd
Middle Bulgaria USTOI Middle Russia FFECC
Middle Croat ia DEMOS SLC Middle Russia FINCA - Russia
Middle Croat ia NOA Middle Russia FORUS
Middle Egypt ABA Middle Russia SBS
Middle Egypt Al Tadamun Middle Serbia AgroInvest - Serbia
Middle Egypt CEOSS Middle Serbia MDF
Middle Egypt DBACD Middle Serbia OBS
Middle Egypt ESED Middle Serbia ProCredit Bank Serbia
Middle Egypt FMF Middle Sudan PASED
Middle Egypt Lead Foundat ion Middle T ajikistan Agroinvestbank
Middle Egypt SBACD Middle T ajikistan Amlok
Middle Georgia AgroCredit Middle T ajikistan Armon
Middle Georgia CREDO Middle T ajikistan Bank Eskhata
Middle Georgia Crystal Middle T ajikistan FINCA - TJK
Middle Georgia FinAgro Middle T ajikistan FMFB - T JK
Middle Georgia FINCA - GEO Middle T ajikistan IMON
Middle Georgia ImerCredit Middle T ajikistan JOVID
Middle Georgia JSC Bank Constanta Middle T ajikistan Mat in
Middle Georgia Lazika Capital Middle T ajikistan MDO Arvand
Middle Georgia ProCredit Bank - GEO Middle T ajikistan MLF Kiropol
Middle Iraq Al-Bashaer Microfinance Middle T ajikistan MLO HUMO
Middle Iraq CHF Iraq Middle T ajikistan MLO Mehnatobod
Middle Iraq Relief Internat ional Iraq Middle T ajikistan Nov Credit
Middle Jordan Alwatani Middle T ajikistan OXUS - T JK
Middle Jordan AMC Middle T ajikistan Phoenix +
Middle Jordan MEMCC Middle T unisia Enda
Middle Jordan MFW Middle T urkey MAYA
Middle Jordan Tamweelcom Middle T urkey T GMP
Middle Kazakhstan ACF Middle Ukraine HOPE
Middle Kazakhstan Arnur Credit Middle Ukraine ProCredit Bank - UKR
Middle Kazakhstan Bereke Middle Uzbekistan Daulet
Middle Kazakhstan FFSA Middle Uzbekistan Mikrokredit Bank
Middle Kazakhstan KMF Middle Uzbekistan Renesans
Middle Kazakhstan Moldir Middle Yemen Al Amal Bank
Middle Kazakhstan ORDA Credit Middle Yemen Al Awael
Middle Kazakhstan Sator Middle Yemen Azal
Middle Kosovo AFK
